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Abstract
This thesis shall contribute to European Criminal Procedure, a rapidly evolving area
of EU policy that has attracted much attention, but has also been subject to criticism.
The research will first identify and analyse the main rationales of this area. Since the
Tampere European Council of 1999, mutual recognition has become the most
fundamental concept of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and has experienced
a steep career, having been adopted by Art. 82 TFEU. When the principle of mutual
recognition was introduced, it was based on an analogy to the free movement of
goods. This analogy has often been regarded as flawed. Moreover, there has always
been a notion of mutual recognition in judicial cooperation as well. The study will
show how these two factors have influenced the development of the area, and how
policy concepts, such as the principle of mutual trust, have had a greater influence
on the development of the law than any legal doctrine.
The lack of a coherent approach to the area of judicial cooperation and the
unsystematic combination of different legal orders have caused unforeseen frictions
for the individual. These will be illustrated by an analysis of the law of transnational
evidence-gathering according to the European Evidence Warrant and the proposed
European Investigation Order.
It will be shown that most of the problems result from the lack of a uniform allocation
of jurisdiction and from an overly confined understanding of fundamental rights in the
context of judicial cooperation. By analysing the nature and purpose of jurisdictional
rules in a national and a European context, the thesis aims at uncovering the
theoretic foundations on which a uniform allocation of jurisdiction could be built.
Finally, the thesis analyses the role of fundamental rights in judicial cooperation. It
will uncover the ineptness of a nation-state oriented interpretation of fundamental
rights to adequately address the problems of mutual recognition and argue for a
European understanding of  transnational judicial rights.
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 Nuotio, Significance, p. 175, speaks of the “experimental character“ of the area.1
 Cf. to this phenomenon in general Walker, 25 OJLS (2005), p. 582s.; to the divide between2
domestic public and domestic criminal law doctrine cf. Meyer, Demokratieprinzip, p. 13 
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Chapter  1 Introduction
1.1 European Criminal Procedure: The Preliminaries 
European Criminal Procedure is one of the most rapidly evolving areas of European
law and subject to ever-increasing attention. However, it is also a relatively late
addition to the core of European law, and the pace at which new measures are
adopted owing to a perceived practical need has resulted in a very fragmented state
of law.
The completion of the internal market is regarded as being responsible for a rise in
transnational crime. While criminals are better able to act across frontiers, national
criminal prosecutions are still confined by their national territories. Collective action
in the realm of criminal law seems to be the only response. Because the gap
between the practical opportunities of organised crime and those of the national
criminal law systems is perceived to be so great, there has been a virtual rush to
counterbalance the effects through new forms of criminal law cooperation. This rush
has resulted in the lack of any clear legal coherence or structural underpinning of this
area. While in practice numerous legal acts have to be dealt with, there seems to be
no idea where these lead to, or what kind of a system is aimed at in the long run.1
There has hardly been time for more visionary and common approaches, and
theories on European Criminal Procedure are quite often nationally confined.
Moreover, they are contained within the frame of domestic criminal law theory.2
There are some principles that dominate the legal rhetoric, such as the principle of
mutual recognition, the free movement of evidence etc., but their meaning and value
are far from clear. I wish to show that many of the principles discussed in this area
and readily taken up by legal doctrine do not always have any legal significance.
 For an outline of these theories cf. Meyer, Demokratieprinzip, p. 42ss.; Apap/Carrera,3
European Arrest W arrant, p. 2; De Capitani, in: Guild et al. (eds.), The Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice ten years on, p. 23ss .
2
Instead of being legal principles, they are mainly policy concepts. However, a
criminal policy cannot guide the drafting or the interpretation of legal acts on its own.
For a coherent area of European Criminal Procedure it is important that it should rely
on legal principles that are adapted specifically to this area and contribute to its
proper and balanced functioning. 
The opposition against the development of European Criminal Procedure has very
quickly focussed on a few points: sovereignty, democracy and human rights. States
fear that EU action in the area of criminal law undermines their sovereignty in one of
its core areas. Critics in general remark on the democratic deficit of this area and the
insufficient protection of human rights.  Much of this is certainly right, and the3
question of human rights or procedural safeguards in general will receive close
attention. Most of the criticism, however, is either very general or it stays too closely
within the current framework. Thereby, any attempts to promote fundamental rights
in EU criminal law activities do not help to make this area less incoherent. On the
contrary, the strange compromises that are reached in negotiating human rights lead
to further fragmentation and often ensue contradictory legislative judgments on
related issues.
Of course it is very difficult to develop coherent principles for a relatively new area of
law. The traditions of the Member States are vastly different. What is more,
European Criminal Procedure will always be hybrid to a certain extent: it operates in
a multi-layered legal system where different legal orders must interact in complex
situations.
However, just as much as this is a problem, it also holds a chance: nation states are
often not able to address adequately situations that are essentially transnational on
their own or through traditional cooperation. In a multi-layered legal system, not only
can the prosecution be made more effective. It is also possible to establish new
transnational procedural rights that did not exist before. This becomes particularly
evident if one takes into consideration that the European level does not only create
 Cf. Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht, p. 5.4
3
a new level of competence, but also a new level of responsibility and accountability.
Where, in traditional judicial cooperation, responsibilities could be shifted from one
state to the other and vice versa, there is now a system where these can be placed.
In my thesis, I will analyse the current system of cooperation in the EU with regard to
leading principles. I will mainly focus on horizontal cooperation and the principle of
mutual recognition. After exploring the evolution of this principle, I will outline its
functioning in selected legal acts and then show the main systematic frictions of
horizontal cooperation. I will pay special attention to problems with procedural
safeguards of the individual and demonstrate this with regard to jurisdictional rules.
The aim is to develop a theory of transnational fundamental rights. To that end, I will
also briefly look at vertical cooperation and concentrate on some particularities of this
area. The procedural rights in vertical cooperation will probably be established in a
more specific manner, because states are less reluctant to accept detailed standards
for European bodies.
Before going into detail, however, it is important to establish a common ground of
understanding. There is no universally accepted terminology in the area of European
Criminal Law and the same terms are used with very different meanings. Therefore,
I will at first explain the sense in which these terms can be used and what I mean by
them. Following that, I will explore the genesis and development of EU criminal law
and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in general and explore the function of
European Criminal Procedure in this context.
There is no system of European Criminal Law at all comparable with a national
system. When speaking of European Criminal Law, one means something entirely
different from substantive criminal law. European Criminal Law is a very general term
that refers more to a field of research than a specific system of law.  In its broadest4
sense it refers to a dynamic system that consists of EU law, public international law
and national legal systems and comprises those norms that have both a criminal law
dimension and a European dimension in any way. It can refer to measures that relate
somehow to substantive criminal law, for example some common standards within
 For example in the Council framework decision of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims5
in criminal proceedings, 2001/220/JHA (OJ L 82/1 of 22.03.2001).
 In a narrow and more specific sense, it refers to European substantive criminal law. It is6
generally used in this sense when contrasted with other areas of European Criminal Law (in its
general sense).
 In a narrow sense, judicial cooperation is excluded from it, leaving only a limited scope. I will7
look at European Criminal Procedure in its broad sense, but include only those aspects of
harmonisation of national laws that affect transnational cases.
 In Europe, it also includes the EU as an actor. There is a number of ways how this area can8
be subdivided. I will speak of horizontal and vertical cooperation and explain this more fully
later. One could also differentiate between bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation of nation
states and direct enforcement by the EU.
 If one uses these terms in a general way, then European Criminal Law refers to the entire9
field of study. European Criminal Procedure is one part of it and consists mainly of European
Judicial Cooperation.
4
the ECHR, or the approximation or harmonisation of substantive criminal laws or the
protection of the Union’s interests through criminal law. In a negative sense, it can
also refer to the prohibition to penalize acts that are protected by a market freedom.
It can include procedural aspects, such as procedural guarantees found in the ECHR
or the approximation of national criminal procedures.  Finally, there are procedures5
of European institutions in related areas, e.g. those regulating the activities of OLAF.
Furthermore, it encompasses the important area of judicial cooperation and legal
assistance.6
As part of European Criminal Law, European Criminal Procedure as a general term
encompasses all European measures that influence national criminal procedures, as
well as all genuinely European procedures and forms of judicial cooperation.  Judicial7
Cooperation means the assistance that states give each other in connection with
criminal proceedings.  All terms are used in different ways according to their context.8 9
This terminological vagueness of European Criminal Law is a reflection of the
structural and substantive hybridity that is built deeply into the dynamic of EU
Criminal Law integration.
1.2 The genesis and current framework of European Criminal Procedure
European Criminal Law has always been an issue under discussion, but it emerged
only very gradually. When the European Communities were founded, there was
 Cf. Sugmann Stubbs/Jager, KritV 2008, p. 66; for the monopoly of force in police10
cooperation see Fijnaut, Police Co-operation, p. 244; Brants, in: Vervaele (ed.), European
Evidence W arrant, p. 103.
5
certainly no idea that criminal law or judicial cooperation would play any important
part within this framework. While for decades, EC integration was mainly economic,
most collective matters pertaining to international aspects of criminal law were dealt
with through the Council of Europe. 
However, relatively early on it became apparent that for various reasons, mainly to
protect common interests and to react more efficiently to perceived transnational
threats, certain common action in the realm of criminal law would be needed. From
the beginning, all action in this area was caught in a dilemma. Member States were
very unwilling to confer competences in the area of criminal law, because criminal
law is generally regarded as being at the core of state sovereignty.10
As a result, other existing competences have been used creatively to cover areas
that would normally fall under criminal law. In order to evade competence issues,
administrative powers have had to compensate for the reluctance to address criminal
law issues openly. This has led to a general shift in European Criminal Law towards
administrative sanctioning and administrative procedures.   
Concerns with sovereignty have also led to a greater focus on criminal law
cooperation as opposed to substantive measures of criminal law legislation. Even
though judicial cooperation has now developed its own powerful dynamic, initially it
seemed easier to present cooperation in sovereigntist terms. 
Finally, a certain hesitation on the side of Member States to admit the degree of
integration that has been achieved and to accept shared responsibility has led to a
lack of long-term planning and fundamental visions for the many fragmented practical
measures. This is above all a missed opportunity to actively and collectively shape a
newly emerging area of law, but it also creates problems for all individuals confronted
with these measures.
 “W hen it is established that a witness or an expert has concealed or falsified the truth as to11
the facts on which he has testified or has been examined by the Court, the Court shall be
empowered to refer such misfeasance to the Minister of Justice of the State of such witness
or expert, for the application of the appropriate sanctions provided by the national law.”
 “Each Member State shall treat any infringement of this obligation as an act prejudicial to its12
rules on secrecy and as one falling, both as to merits and jurisdiction, within the scope of its
laws relating to acts prejudicial to the security of the State or to disclosure of professional
secrets. Such Member State shall, at the request of any Member State concerned or of the
Commission, prosecute anyone within its jurisdiction who commits such an infringement.”
 Satzger, Int. u. Europ. Strafrecht, p. 87 s.; Böse, Strafen und Sanktionen, p. 108.13
 Pabsch, NJW  1959, p. 2003 s.14
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1.2.1 Rudiments of substantive criminal law
Therefore, genuine penal measures were only ever adopted in outstanding and
exceptional instances: 
The first instance of criminal sanctioning was the introduction of what is now Art. 30
of the statute of the ECJ: “A Member State shall treat any violation of an oath by a
witness or expert in the same manner as if the offence had been committed before
one of its courts with jurisdiction in civil proceedings. At the instance of the Court of
Justice, the Member State concerned shall prosecute the offender before its
competent court.” A corresponding norm was already found in the first version of Art.
27 of the statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community and
Art. 28 of the statute of the Court of Justice of the European Atomic Energy
Community (1957). Somewhat more vaguely, this idea was also expressed in Art.
28(4) of the code of the Court of Justice of 1952.  Another such provision which11
concerns the violation of standards of secrecy is found in Art. 194(1)(2) of the
Euratom Treaty.12
Although it is contested,  these provisions are generally regarded as self-executing13
supranational criminal norms.  This means that they contain more than just a rule of14
interpretation for national legislation, or an obligation to legislate. Instead, the
criminality of an act follows directly from these articles. They modify national laws
and together with the national provisions they define the offence and its
consequences. In the present context, the academic debate on whether this
 Ligeti, Strafrecht und strafrechtliche Zusammenarbeit, p. 239 s.15
 Art. 87 (2)(a) of the EEC treaty.16
7
understanding is really convincing is not so important. What is significant, however,
is that they were the first and, until today, the only provisions that were ever seriously
labelled supranational criminal law.
It is obvious that these provisions are of marginal importance for the practice of
criminal law and that they were dealing with a public good that due to its nature was
not yet protected by national laws. The acceptance of these norms therefore posed
no problem.
1.2.2 A system of administrative sanctioning as an alternative
However, right from the beginning it surfaced that certain newly emerging European
interests could only be protected through the threat of sanctions. The envisaged goal
of developing a Common Market with its respective market freedoms and
competition order needed to be put through effectively. While sanctions seemed
adequate, it was doubtful whether the Member States themselves could provide for
these. Firstly, because many cases concerned were of an international nature.
Secondly, common action seemed more reasonable as all cases should be treated
similarly to avoid distortions of competition. Thirdly, the willingness of nation states to
enforce proper sanctions in all cases was doubtful. Thus, a basis for common
measures was inevitable. But a European criminal law was not just unthinkable at the
time, it was unthought of.
The lack of competence in the area of criminal law has led to a major shift that is still
of great impact. The functions and objects of criminal law were tried to be
accomplished through a system of administrative sanctioning.  There was a15
provision in competition law as early as the EEC was founded allowing for the
institution of “fines or penalties”.  Now the basis for repressive measures is16
Art. 103(2)(a) TFEU (ex-Art. 83(2)(a) TEC), which will be dealt with in greater detail
below. Suffice it to say here that the punitive measures of competition law were of
 E.g. Art. 23(5) of Council Regulation 1/2003.17
 Beside certain other cases,18
 Satzger, Int. u. Europ. Strafrecht, p. 85; ECtHR of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22, p. 34-36 -19
Engel v. Netherlands.
 See below 2.2.1.20
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the first to arouse criminal lawyers and draw their attention to European law. While
the regulations adopted to implement this provision (particularly of 1962, 1995 and
2003) all explicitly stated that the measures are not of a criminal law nature,  it is17
clear that this labelling cannot influence the legal nature of the acts. This “disclaimer”
mainly served to appease Member States’ sensitivities about infringements of their
sovereignty. Additionally, it left a scope for national legislators and prosecutions to
further sanction the acts in question. 
With deepening integration, this system of sanctioning was refined and expanded. In
the wake of this development, a discussion set in that was concerned with the true
nature of these activities. Even though the sanctions are called administrative, they
might have the same function as a criminal sanction. By thus renaming sanctions,
the high standards and safeguards of criminal law could be circumvented and
individuals’ freedoms be violated. According to the case law of the ECHR, a measure
is subject to the safeguards of provisions concerning a “criminal charge” (Art. 6(1)
ECHR) if  either its goal is to repress or if the measure is of a certain severity or18
kind.  The ECJ has recognised the applicability of certain rights in this context, but19
the extent is still lesser than in the context of national criminal laws. What is most
troubling, however, is the intended parallel existence of competition law measures
and national criminal measures. 
Thus the first system of sanctioning in the EU was created to protect a new common
interest, and, although this sanctioning is the first emergence of anything resembling
criminal law, it was really a step away from principles of criminal law. Instead, a
system of administrative sanctioning to protect the competition order had been
created. This understanding and functioning is still very influential on ideas about
how a genuine European criminal law might function.  20
 See the Commission’s Annual Report on Fight against Fraud of 29 September 2011,21
COM/2011/595fin.
 Council Decision of 21 April 1970 on the replacement of financial contributions from Member22
States by the Communities' own resources, 70/243/ECSC, EEC, Euratom; cf. Hecker,
Europäisches Strafrecht, p. 522.
 ECJ judgment of 21 September 1989, C-68/88 - Commission v Greece, ECR 2695.23
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1.2.3 The protection of the Union’s financial interests as a trigger for criminal
law
The second parameter of European criminal law is again aimed at the protection of
a common public good: it is concerned with fraud against the financial interests of the
EU. Increasing financial activity and the subsequent enormous potential for
fraudulent activities have fuelled the development of European criminal law like
nothing else. The Commission estimates the total volume of fraud and other
irregularities to be 1.8 billion euros in 2010.  Most of the legislative activity set in21
after the financial reform of 1970 that introduced the system of own-resources.  22
Since there was still no specific competence in criminal matters, and no willingness
to create one on the side of the Member States, the solution was found by the ECJ
through the national criminal law systems. It established that, although no
competence of the Community existed in the area of criminal law, Member States
could be obliged to use their national criminal laws for the effective implementation
of Community law in other areas. A groundbreaking decision in this respect is the
notorious “Greek maize” case of 1989.  The court derived two basic concepts of23
European Criminal Law from the duty of community loyalty under ex-Art. 5 ETC. 
The main idea is assimilation, which means that offences against European goods
should be assimilated to offences committed against national interests and must be
treated in the same way (in concreto: with disciplinary or criminal proceedings). As a
consequence of this concept, the same degree of protection is reached within each
Member State. On the other hand, between Member States the level of protection
may still vary. This differentiates assimilation from harmonisation. Additionally, the
sanctions chosen must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
This concept has been very successful and was adopted in Art. 209a and later
 See below 1.2.5.24
 The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, after25
consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt the necessary measures in the fields of the
prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community with a
view to affording effective and equivalent protection in the Member States. These measures
shall not concern the application of national crim inal law or the national administration of
justice.
 Cf. for this debate Wasmeier / Thwaites, 29 ELRev. (2004), p. 613 ss.; Mitsilegas, 826
EurJLReform (2006), p. 301 ss.
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Art. 280(1) and (2) TEC, now Art. 325(1) and (2) TFEU. It is also found in many
framework decisions dealing with criminal law. 
This approach to criminal law must be regarded as an unusually functionalist
concept. It regards criminal law as a means towards making a community policy
effective, rather than as an independent area of law. The functionalist approach has
swept into many other areas of criminal law. Of course, it is rather lenient towards
Member States’ legal systems. It leaves the choice of the type and form of sanction
to them. However, this same line of argumentation recurred in a rather less lenient
way in questions of harmonisation, namely questions of competences of the EC
under the first pillar versus competences of the EU under the third pillar.24
In the subsequent development, the measures for the protection of the financial
interests of the Communities have been more and more expanded. The Maastricht
treaty brought about substantial improvements to the functioning of this area. It
introduced the first competence to cooperate in combating eurofraud in Art. 209 a
TEC. In 1999, OLAF was founded as an independent unit of the Commission.
Still, the discussion was centred around assimilation (Art. 209a(1) TEC).
Harmonisation concerning eurofraud became an issue only when the Amsterdam
treaty introduced Art. 280(4) TEC.  While this was seen by some as an opportunity25
for European criminal law measures, others claimed the exact opposite. In the end,
it was mostly believed as not conferring a competence, particularly because of its
second clause excluding “the application of national criminal law or the national
administration of justice”. Also, it was considered necessary for such an important
competence to be conferred in explicit terms, rather than through an implied power.26
 See Walter, 117 ZStW  (2005), p. 917 s.; Rosenau, ZIS 2008, p. 16; Hecker, Europäisches27
Strafrecht, § 14 para. 45 s.; Satzger, Int. u. Europ. Strafrecht, § 7 para. 41 s.; see also below.
 See Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht, § 4 para. 80 s.; Meyer, NStZ 2009, p. 658.28
 ETS No. 30; cf. Schomburg, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 329
para. 12 ss., see below for further details.
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The Lisbon treaty has widened these competences considerably. Among other
things, the reservation of Art. 280(4) TEC is not upheld, so that there is now even the
possibility of directly applicable European offences under Art. 325(4) TFEU.  This is27
a major change, because for the first time it gives the European Union an original
competence to create provisions of substantive criminal law concerning fraud against
the EU.  28
To sum up, the legislation concerning the protection of the financial interests of the
EU has been a major factor in establishing a European Criminal Law and
encouraging an academic debate on the role of criminal law on the European level.
1.2.4 The development of European judicial cooperation
The lack of clear competences is also the reason for the importance of legal
assistance and judicial cooperation. While further advances in substantive criminal
law were not possible, there was always a lot of activity in this area. As early as in the
1950s, the two so-called mother conventions of legal aid had been adopted within
the Council of Europe framework.  These conventions were still of the classical type,29
and proceedings took a very long time; additionally, in the beginning states were
reluctant to give up too much sovereignty through intensified judicial cooperation. 
On an operational level, however, much cooperation had been achieved. In the
1960s, customs cooperation was the most important area, while in the 1970s police
and judicial cooperation came to the fore, mainly in relation with terrorism. Although
no fixed institutions and no elaborate legal framework existed, European states
instituted several informal intergovernmental working groups (for example, the
different TREVI groups from 1975 onward). This form of cooperation was continued
by other working groups that prepared the introduction of Europol and the
 Jour-Schröder/Wasmeier, in: von der Groeben/Schwarze (eds.), Kommentar zum EU-/EG-30
Vertrag, vor § 29 EU para.15.
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cooperation in the Schengen framework.
It can be observed, thus, that due to the lack of competence in other areas of
criminal law, legal assistance was regarded as essential. It was also destined to take
on more and more functions that would normally be fulfilled by other areas of law.
Methods of judicial cooperation were thus seen as a real alternative to harmonisation
of criminal law. This line of reasoning would be perfected with the principle of mutual
recognition as we will see later on.
Yet states were very slow in cooperating through traditional international legal
assistance. Therefore, common action and new competences were promoted on the
European level.  The European political cooperation as it was codified in the Single
European Act 1986 paved the way for several international conventions in the area
of cooperation in criminal matters, but they were mostly not ratified.  The Schengen30
cooperation was a more successful measure of this form of cooperation.
The Treaty of Maastricht was a first turning point in that it strove to give European
criminal law activities a better framework. With the introduction of the pillar structure,
these activities got their place in the ambit of justice and home affairs. Among other
areas of criminal law, judicial cooperation in criminal matters became a matter of
common interest, Art. K.1 (7) and operated through joint positions, joint action and
conventions (Art. K.3 para. 2).
The means of legislation however did not prove to be sufficiently effective. Joint
positions and joint actions had an uncertain legal impact. A few conventions were
adopted, most notably the Europol Convention of 1995 or the Convention on the
protection of the European Communities’ financial interests. But conventions under
the EU framework proved to be just as problematic as any type of international
convention. The last-mentioned convention, for example, was done in 1995 and
entered into force only in 2002. The main problem was that there was no clear
framework into which all measures of judicial cooperation belonged. Since the area
was still completely intergovernmental, it created no significant acceleration as
 Weyembergh, in: Kerchove/ead. (eds.), La reconnaissance mutuelle, p. 38ss.31
 To the ambivalence of the intergovernmental/supranational division cf. Walker, Odyssey, p.32
16ss.
 There have been many discussions on the differentiation of safety and security. However, in33
other language versions, e.g. German, the same expression is used. The Lisbon treaty only
uses “security”, cf. Art. 67(3) TFEU.
 Apap/Carrera, European Arrest W arrant, p. 2.34
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compared to classical modes of cooperation.
The Amsterdam treaty brought about really substantial changes.  Although formally31
the third pillar still remained intergovernmental,  the perception changed, and many32
aspects made it easier to cooperate than before. The introduction of the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice was not just a visionary approach, it brought some
degree of systematisation to an otherwise confusing area. Art. 29-42 TEU sought to
“provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and
justice”.  The most notable effect came from the introduction of framework decisions33
as legislative instruments, Art. 34(2)(b).  Since common positions in the pre-34
Amsterdam era were not legally binding and decisions could not be used for the
approximation of laws – which is almost always necessary – framework decisions
and conventions were of the greatest impact. Of these two, framework decisions
were more frequently used because they avoided the lengthy and uncertain
ratification procedure. They gave the area of judicial cooperation a totally new
dynamic and speed that could never have been achieved with international
conventions.
The culmination of the system of judicial cooperation is the introduction of the mutual
recognition regime. How this came about and how it operates will be shown later.
1.2.5 Substantive Criminal Law in the Post-Amsterdam era
The Amsterdam treaty once more did not bring about an EU competence for
substantive criminal law. Art. 29 made it clear that only approximation of national
criminal laws was possible, to the extent necessary. Such measure could contain
minimum rules as described in Art. 31(1)(e). This latter provision was usually not
 Cf. the Pupino case, ECJ judgment of 16 June 2005, C-105/03; for a discussion see Peers,35
44 CMLRev. (2007), p. 883ss.
 ECJ judgment of 13 September 2005, C-176/03; see also the Commission Communication36
of 24 November 2005 on the implications of the Court's judgment of September 13, 2005
(Case C-176/03 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union),
COM(2005) 583 fin./2.
 ECJ judgment of 23 October 2007, C-440/05.37
 For an analysis of the judgments see Peers, 33 ELRev (2008), p. 399; Sugmann38
Stubbs/Jager, KritV 2008, p. 57.
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taken literally (as it is confined to organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug
trafficking), but interpreted as including all areas of criminal law where cooperation
under the EU treaty is possible. Many framework decisions have been enacted
accordingly. I will mention them only when they concern aspects of European
Criminal Procedure. Since this was still no very extensive competence in criminal
law, and the third pillar was still intergovernmental - at least up to a certain point  -35
this competence was not so very controversial. But this has been the reason for
another very important development: the discussion and final acceptance of an EC
competence to instruct Member States to introduce criminal sanctions in a specific
area. In generalizing and simplifying the essentials of the ECJ’s judgments on
environmental law  and ship-source pollution,  the EC had the competence to36 37
instruct Member States to introduce criminal sanctions if this was necessary for the
full effectivity of a policy in this area.  At first glance, it seems that this could have38
been decided even before the Amsterdam treaty, because it does not rely at all on
competences of the EU treaty. On the other hand, it was precisely the possibility to
approximate national laws provided for by the third pillar that made this view of things
possible. Before, it had to be argued that such a competence of instruction in
criminal matters could at all exist on a European level, rather than being reserved for
the Member States. Now, it was clear that at least under the third pillar, such a
competence existed at a European level. It was therefore sufficient to pose the
question as one of  the distribution of competences between two different pillars,
which seemed less consequential.
The decision however was more than just a re-allocation of competences. It is also
a very basic one about the nature of criminal law in Europe. It shows that criminal law
is regarded not as an area of law in its own right, but as an instrument for the
 Cf. Satzger, Int. u. Europ. Strafrecht, p. 113: “Durchsetzungsmechanismus”.39
 Cf. Sugmann Stubbs/Jager, KritV 2008, p. 65s.40
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implementation of policies in other areas of law.  As such, it is regarded in a39
functionalist way as an annex to other policies.  Although it is certainly true that
criminal law is not independent of other areas of law, that these other areas in fact
form the basis for the interests that are protected by criminal law, nonetheless this
extreme functionalist view is quite distinct from the traditional understanding of a
principled criminal law as an ultima ratio.40
So this development in itself lead away from a real competence in certain areas of
criminal law. It made criminal law an ancillary competence to other Community
policies which again increases the importance of judicial cooperation.
Because of this, it is still the area of judicial cooperation that is the most important
factor in the Europeanization of criminal law and that is meant to achieve all those
goals that are usually aimed at by substantive criminal law.
1.2.6 The Lisbon Treaty
Most of the above-mentioned issues have been addressed, even if not resolved, by
the Lisbon treaty. The Lisbon treaty reflects the developments in the area of judicial
cooperation in criminal matters by setting down the stage that was reached through
the activity of legislation and court rulings in the area, but that was still contested. In
doing so it adopts a slightly more progressive, coherent and visionary approach. 
Through overcoming the pillar structure, it resolves the ambiguities concerning the
legal status of measures in judicial cooperation and tries to provide more democratic
legitimacy for this area through the - albeit limited - application of the ordinary
legislative procedure.
Mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions is declared to be the basis for
judicial cooperation in Art. 82(1) and Art. 67(3) TFEU. Mutual recognition is also one
of the standards that influence harmonisation, cf. Art. 82(2) TFEU: to the extent
 Council Doc. 17024/09, adopted by the European Council on 11 December 2009, EUCO41
6/09; see also the Commission’s action plan COM/2010/171.
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necessary for facilitating its functioning, directives shall be adopted to approximate
national laws. This is confined however to specifically defined areas of national
procedural laws and does not extend to substantive law.
As concerns substantive criminal laws, the treaty tries to be more explicit and it
seems that substantive law will play a greater role. It defines the areas for which
approximation through minimum rules is possible in Art. 83(1) TFEU as areas of
particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension. This is an advantage, but
the definition used for this area is rather wide and consists of terrorism, trafficking in
human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking,
illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of
payment, computer crime and organised crime. Moreover, it can be extended
through a Council decision. 
Additionally, the treaty explicitly sets down the standards introduced by the case law
discussed above concerning the EC competence for the approximation of criminal
law. Only, since here it is not a question of competence anymore, it now becomes
clear that criminal law is seen in the pure functionalist view indicated above. Art.
83(2) TFEU states that: „If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the
Member States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union
policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures, directives may
establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and
sanctions in the area concerned.“ 
It seems that this is a competence that will be made use of in the future. The
Stockholm Programme  promotes activity in the area of substantive criminal law. It41
displays the same functionalist attitude towards criminal law as a tool to make
harmonised community policies more effective. What is more important is that it
takes this functionalist approach one step further. It also recommends the
approximation of national substantive criminal laws when this serves the functioning
 Cf. p. 2942
 P. 29.43
 For details of this procedure see Peers, 33 ELRev (2008), p. 507, 522-529; id., EU Justice44
and Home Affairs Law, p. 65-70.
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of the principle of mutual recognition.  An area that is explicitly mentioned are those42
crimes for which the dual criminality requirement is abandoned. Interestingly, such an
approach has no basis in the Lisbon treaty. It is quite clear from the functioning of
Art. 82 and 83 that the process of mutual recognition can only lead to approximation
of national procedural laws, while the approximation of national substantive criminal
laws is only possible in areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border
dimension. On the other hand, the ultima ratio quality of criminal law is referred to for
the first time in the Stockholm Programme.43
In vertical cooperation, the most important provision is that Eurojust is regarded as
the root of measures against eurofraud though the establishment of a European
Public Prosecutor, Art. 86 TFEU.
For both horizontal and vertical cooperation the competences of the ECJ have been
widened. In horizontal cooperation actions are now subject to judicial control
according to the general rules (Art. 19 TEU, Art. 251ss. TFEU), with the duty to
expedite custody cases (Art. 267(4) TFEU). As concerns vertical cooperation,
Europol and Eurojust may be subjected to judicial control of the European courts, cf.
Art. 263(5) TFEU. 
Although the Lisbon treaty is certainly clearer in this area than the previous
framework, there are still many problems. In particular, it sounds more far-reaching
than it is. Through the introduction of an “emergency-brake procedure“ in Art. 83(3)
TFEU which allows a Member State to halt the legislative process because the
fundamentals of its criminal law system are concerned,  and a system of enhanced44
cooperation in the same provision, which enables a group of at least nine EU
countries to nevertheless go ahead with the measure, it may well be that the
fragmentation of this area of law will continue. Additionally, the limitation of ex-Art. 33
EU (internal security) has been taken on by Art. 72 TFEU. 
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This, then, is the framework in which judicial cooperation has emerged and in which
it operates. It has to work more quickly than before, and it has to fulfill more
functions. In fact, it often has to compensate for a lack of competence in other areas.
Only insofar does it really act as an alternative to harmonisation.
1.3 Outlook
After this overview of European Criminal Law and Procedure, I would like to give the
analysis a more ample starting point. Chapter 2 offers an overview of theoretical
frameworks for judicial cooperation between states and tries to analyse how EU
cooperation is positioned within this structure. Traditionally, legal assistance evolved
in a horizontal structure in which two nation states cooperate as equal sovereigns
without the interference of third parties. The decisions of one state are accorded a
certain effect in the other state based on a request procedure. The system of mutual
recognition is, in essence, still such a horizontal cooperation system. Horizontal
systems can range from very loose political  procedures to deeply integrated juridified
mechanisms, such as the model of direct effect within some federal states. A vertical
model, on the other hand is one where specific procedural measures are based on
the (executive or legislative) decisions of a supranational entity. As there is no strict
division, cooperation on a European level always operates in a mixed system. The
current dynamic of criminal law integration has, however, led to a very hybrid system
in which strong vertical institutions are limited to fulfilling functions that are, in
substance, horizontal. The European institutions are there to resolve the tension
between cooperation and harmonisation, and between trust and uncertainty.
Because cooperation requires some degree of harmonisation, a lack of
harmonisation is, paradoxically, compensated for by strong vertical bodies. 
Chapter 3 is a study of the most important paradigm in the area of judicial
cooperation, namely the principle of mutual recognition. It starts with a brief account
of the history of mutual recognition in classical judicial cooperation and explores the
reasons why the new regime of mutual recognition is not presented as linked to
mutual recognition in legal assistance, but as a spillover of the internal market
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principle of mutual recognition. Mutual recognition is generally presented as a
necessary reaction to the abolishment of internal borders by enabling judicial
decisions to profit by free movement, while at the same time conserving national
legal systems and respecting national sovereignty in a sensitive area. After exploring
the validity and the limits of this analogy, the chapter will demonstrate that the new
principle of mutual recognition was not introduced into judicial cooperation because
of the novel legal content of the principle, but because of the integrative dynamic of
this policy concept that was expected to benefit an otherwise stagnating area of law.
That mutual recognition is not free of its traditional implications will be shown by
tendencies of Member States to link mutuality to the classical principle of reciprocity.
A short look at the terms “extradition” and “surrender” will show how a new
vocabulary can trigger legal developments.
The fourth chapter will turn to the concept of mutual trust as the underlying rationale
of mutual recognition. The notion of trust is used for various ends in the debate on
European Criminal Procedure, but ideas as to its meaning are varied and often
unclear.  I will start by outlining both legal and sociological concepts of trust and
cooperation. I will then explain how the ECJ tends to develop mutual trust into a true
legal principle by looking at its case law in both civil, criminal and asylum matters. A
particular focus will be on the relation of trust and harmonisation, since trust is
essentially a mechanism to deal with diversity. The chapter concludes with a critique
of current notions of trust and tries to give a prospect of what a well-founded concept
of trust can and what it cannot achieve.
Chapter five illustrates some of these general issues with the example of the
framework decision on the European Evidence Warrant and the proposed directive
on the European Investigation Order for the area of transnational evidence-gathering.
The area of evidence-gathering is particularly helpful in understanding problems with
the principle of mutual recognition, as evidence is by its nature inextricably linked
with a particular legal order and is only collected with regard to a trial. Friction that
occurs when combining different legal orders will be demonstrated. It will be shown
that many of the problems attributed to mutual recognition are in fact based on the
lack of a uniform allocation of jurisdiction and of a coherent policy for transnational
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fundamental rights.
Chapter 6 addresses the issue of jurisdiction in greater detail. After discussing the
nature of jurisdictional rules it gives an overview of the bases for attributing
jurisdiction. The analysis will show that positive conflicts of jurisdiction do not just
emerge through the assumption of extraterritorial jurisdiction, but increasingly also
through a differing understanding of territorial links. The focus will then shift to the
wavering EU approach to jurisdiction in existing legislation. I will demonstrate how the
lack of a coherent approach to jurisdiction is another symptom of the reluctance to
assume collective authorship in areas that are, in any case, already subject to EU
law. The advantages of consciously shaping and directing a new area are sacrificed
to a hesitant and experimental approach that leaves individuals faced with arbitrary
results. I will then discuss possible solutions for a more coherent and rights-based
development of jurisdictional rules.
The purpose of chapter 7 is to focus on the individual and provide a framework for
procedural rights in the context of multi-layered judicial cooperation. Current debate
on fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice is too much
centred on a general balance of freedom and security. The chapter argues for a
concept of fundamental rights that is specifically adapted to judicial cooperation and
that is transnational in its perspective. An analysis of existing legal sources for
fundamental rights in judicial cooperation will show that these rights all have their
basis in national laws, a fact that is also reflected in the case law of the ECtHR and
the ECJ. Since the national perspective suffers from a blind spot when the actions of
another sovereign are concerned, these rights cannot adequately address situations
that are essentially transnational. The involvement of the EU offers the chance to
overcome this limitation as it introduces a new level of responsibility and
accountability. The chapter explores in what cases existing rights must be interpreted
transnationally by giving them a functionally equivalent meaning and how new
transnational rights can be created.
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Chapter  2 Models of judicial cooperation
In order to describe and evaluate existing principles of European Criminal Procedure,
and in order to establish a framework for new principles, it is important to have a well-
defined starting point. Much of the confusion in the present debate on these forms of
cooperation in criminal matters is due to uncertainty about the meaning of certain
concepts and ideas. Scholars often write on similar issues, but with completely
different terminology, and, what is more important, with different views on the framing
of the questions. According to their national background, authors locate what I call
“Principles of European Criminal Procedure” in totally different legal frameworks. This
not only impairs effective academic collaboration in this area, it also prevents an
understanding of the actual functioning of European procedural law. I will therefore
outline the basic forms of judicial cooperation. By that I do not refer only to the
models that are currently put into practice, but rather to a system of possible models
that could be adopted. These will give us a framework in which evaluate the
principles of current EU legislation in criminal procedure.
What distinguishes the mechanisms on the EU level from solely national procedures
is that several independent actors are working together on a criminal proceeding: two
or more Member States and in some cases also EU institutions. This multi-layered
system creates challenges for the modes of cooperation. Depending on the form of
collaboration between these actors we need to distinguish vertical and horizontal
cooperation. When the responsibility for initiating and continuing the procedure lies
with the Member States, I will speak of horizontal cooperation. The implications of
horizontal cooperation for the position of the individual and the effectiveness of
prosecution are different from those of vertical cooperation. Vertical cooperation
means the involvement of genuine European powers and institutions in the process
of prosecuting a crime. In vertical cooperation, one needs to consider the position of
a third actor on a different level. This brings about a new level of accountability and
has further-reaching effects on the position of the individual concerned and the
 There are different approaches in describing the current state of EU criminal procedure.45
Sieber, 121 ZStW  (2009), p. 17ss. differentiates between “cooperation models“ and
“supranational models“. He focuses on the legal systems and the interaction of their respective
norms, whereas my starting point is the distribution of powers between the actors.
 Cf. also Walker, Odyssey, p. 16ss.46
 See Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law, p. 322s.47
 Walker, Odyssey, p. 16.48
 Aided, ironically, by public opinion, cf. Mitsilegas, Trust-building measures, p. 289.49
 See also Mitsilegas, EU Criminal law, p. 322s.; Walker, Odyssey, p. 29, who also detects a50
similar danger from federalist tendencies of “empire-building”.
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outcome of the procedure.45
The combination of horizontal and vertical elements that we find in practice now is
also indicative of a general tension in the area of judicial cooperation. The
Europeanisation of judicial cooperation is not just the result of supranationalist
visions and interests.  To a greater extent, it has been shaped by actors with46
distinctly sovereigntist interests. Member States have a great desire to enhance their
law enforcement within the European Union through cooperation mechanisms. At the
same time, they jealously guard their sovereignty in criminal matters which they
regard as essential.  Sometimes, this is done more by framing the debate through47
a certain rhetoric rather than by refraining from closer integration. This is one of the
reasons why so-called Eurosceptic states were very much in favour of closer judicial
cooperation.  For these reasons, European bodies are created, but often relegated48
to horizontal rather than vertical functions. At the same time, sovereigntist concerns
with European bodies often only set in at a second stage, namely on the
accountability level. It is then that Member States realise the extent of the integration
and seem to shrink from true collective authorship.  Often, the most effective checks49
are not introduced because they would have to be based on a supranational level,
leading to unclear responsibilities and a very hybrid overall structure.50
The paradoxical fact that European bodies largely fulfill horizontal functions is also
due to the fact that they are sometimes instituted to overcome inherent limitations of
horizontal cooperation. After all, European criminal law is largely about the specific
relation of harmonisation and judicial cooperation. European institutions are therefore
particularly necessary to enhance cooperation between states when harmonisation
 Cf. chapter 4 for an in-depth analysis of the concept of trust.51
 See below for their specific relevance in the history of mutual recognition.52
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cannot be successfully introduced. Thereby, these institutions become an expression
of the conceptual tensions of trust.  51
2.1 Horizontal model of cooperation
The horizontal model of cooperation is so far the only one that has been developed
on a large scale in an international environment. The vertical cooperation model,
instead, is today mainly found within one nation state’s legal system. Interestingly,
the EU model is currently based on a horizontal model with increasing vertical
elements. 
The horizontal forms of cooperation have a long tradition in the history of classical
legal assistance. The procedures of classical legal assistance are as old as the idea
of nation states.  With the increasing importance of public international law, judicial52
cooperation received its place in international treaties and a “legal” form in the literal
sense. From a purely conventional relationship between sovereigns, it became a type
of legal process. This juridification is still in progress and it was not until very recent
times that a right of the individual in the legality of the procedure has been identified
and recognised by law. Classical legal assistance can be seen as a role model of
horizontal cooperation between sovereign states, without the interference of third
actors.
Classical legal assistance has played and still plays an important role in the ambit of
criminal law in Europe. Many bilateral and multilateral treaties, brought forward by the
Council of Europe, have contributed to a more efficient prosecution of crimes which
involve more than one European state. But notwithstanding this undoubted success,
legal aid has not overcome one structural problem that lies in its nature: Being a form
of horizontal cooperation between sovereign states, legal aid has always been totally
dependent on these sovereign actors. It has been considered as a threat to national
sovereignty and therefore made subject to many restrictions.  For example, a state
 Cf. also the following chapters for the meaning and influence of the double criminality53
requirement.
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normally only grants legal aid if the matter concerned is punishable under its own
law, too.  The prosecution of offences that are a crime in one state only can53
therefore not be extended over its national borders. And, even more importantly,
granting legal assistance has always been considered as a political process, which
is subject to governmental control and may be refused for raisons d’état. Therefore,
we always find exceptions of public policy in the treaties establishing the modes of
legal assistance. The step of political control is a major hindrance not only to the
granting of legal assistance as such, but also to the speediness of the process. Due
to the lengthy proceeding, states often abstain from trying to solve the problem by a
request of legal assistance. The duration of the process of legal assistance thus
affects the state’s interest in prosecution, but also the individual’s interest in the
matter being resolved within reasonable time limits.
At large, we can see that the obstacles of classical legal aid, which EU criminal
procedure seeks to overcome, are inherent in a purely horizontal model of
cooperation. Without external, harmonising factors, the relationship between two or
more sovereign states will only be compatible up to a certain extent. In examining the
„new“ modes of cooperation in the EU system of criminal procedure we therefore
have to keep in mind the question of whether these are suitable to disentangle the
process from its restrictions of horizontal cooperation.
Notwithstanding the experiences with the cooperation process of classical legal aid,
the European legislator has not attempted to create a new system of cooperation,
but instead took horizontal cooperation as the starting point of European criminal
justice. This has obvious political reasons. But if it is judged from a structural point of
view, it must face the same objections as the system of classical legal aid. If one
leaves the responsibility with the Member States, there will still be a process of
national control and an assessment of the validity of the action from the point of view
of the granting state’s national legal system. This can be demonstrated simply by the
structure of the process of cooperation according to the new European modes of
cooperation. The basic steps remain intact: One Member State has to make a
 See also Council Doc. 5573/06.54
 As set in Art. 2 of the framework decision on the European Arrest W arrant (2002/584/JHA).55
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request, and another Member State has to grant this request. Admittedly, one has
tried to change terminology. Moreover, there have been numerous attempts to solve
some of the problems of classical legal aid. One measure is to set exact time limits
in which a request must be processed. Another means is to reduce the grounds for
refusal. The adoption of such measures has certainly increased the effectiveness of
cooperation.
However, the basic idea of this attempt is not to alter the structure, but to change the
details of the procedure. This idea has been favourably adopted by the Nordic
countries who have signed a treaty on the so-called “Nordic Arrest Warrant” on 15
December 2005, creating a procedure of surrender of suspects and convicted
criminals. This attempt of the Nordic countries is in compliance with the European
Arrest Warrant, but carries the ideas of shortening the procedure and diminishing the
grounds for refusal further. The Nordic Arrest Warrant totally abandons the
requirement of dual criminality and sets shorter time limits for the surrender of the
person.  Also, it does not require a minimum length of the custodial sentence.54 55
Still, the structural process of horizontal cooperation remains basically untouched by
these new measures. The EU legislation, which seeks to implement the „principle of
mutual recognition“, as well as the multilateral agreement between the Nordic states,
which goes further in the effects, does not alter the requirement of a special, two-step
procedure of request and the granting of the request, despite the terminological
changes. Therefore we need to consider at least very briefly the other possibilities of
cooperation in a multi-actor system of criminal prosecution.
A further step in achieving a more efficient and harmonic cooperation would be to
totally abandon the two-step procedure. One would merely have to consider foreign
procedural measures as equivalent to domestic ones. Thus, the validity of a foreign
decision would be extended to all other Member States. The implementation of such
a model would be very easy in theory: The EU would need to set down by law that all
decisions of Member States' courts and prosecution authorities have to be treated as
 Since this has clearly not been achieved through the European Arrest W arrant, it is56
contradictory when the Commission calls the implementation of mutual recognition through the
European Arrest W arrant an “ipso facto” recognition that leads to execution “automatically”, cf.
Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal COM(2001) 522 fin./2 points 2 and 4.5.
 Since 01 January 2011 a uniform Code of Criminal Procedure – Eidgenössische StPO  – has57
come into force.
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domestic decisions without any differentiation. Such a far-reaching measure,
however, is politically and practically unfeasible in a heterogeneous complex, as is
the case with the European Union.  Therefore, it is not considered to be of practical56
importance in the future. But nevertheless it can serve as a point of comparison. We
can observe that the principle of immediate validity of every judicial decision is
attained within nation states, but not on an international level.
In nation states that have a non-unitary legal system, the model of direct validity is
often applied. Switzerland, for example, has a unitary substantive criminal law, but
different laws of criminal procedure in the several cantons. The 26 cantons set rules
as to the organisation of criminal justice, they establish the competent authorities and
they set the laws of court procedure.  To facilitate criminal procedure, the cantons57
have agreed on inter-cantonal treaties (so-called Konkordate, cf. esp. the Konkordat
über die Rechtshilfe und die interkantonale Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen of
5.11.1992) that give one canton’s police the power to conduct investigations in other
cantons under the requirement that these measures are legal according to its own
procedural law. This means that investigators do not have to take into consideration
the law of the canton where they are operating, but only the law of the canton that
they belong to. This is a very far-reaching measure which was only possible because
in Switzerland the laws of criminal procedure are already harmonised to a high
degree. It cannot serve as a model for Europe, which is a far too heterogeneous
legal space. But it shows the structural possibilities of horizontal cooperation: Taken
seriously, horizontal cooperation can be as far-reaching as the Swiss model, giving
the procedural measures of different states exactly the same consequence. What is
needed, though, is a sufficient common basis in the law of criminal procedure, so
that no major frictions will occur.
A similar development can be seen in the United Kingdom, where the Criminal
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Justice and Public Order Act 1994 abolished the requirement of an endorsement of
an arrest warrant. Under its section 136, arrest warrants issued in England and
Wales are executable in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and vice versa. The judicial
decision of one country is thus directly applicable in another country. This
development may be described as changing a traditional model of recognising a
foreign decision (“endorsement”) to a model of treating a foreign decision like a
domestic one. Admittedly an „endorsement“ is not a procedure of equal weight and
political importance as a recognition of a foreign decision in the process of classical
legal aid between the Member States of the EU. However, it shows the necessity of
transforming a foreign decision into a domestic one, and by abolishing the
endorsement, a structural shift occurred from a restricted horizontal system to a more
developed horizontal system.
The different possibilities in horizontal cooperation have shown that this way of
organising criminal justice offers a lot of potential. From the lengthy procedures of
classical legal aid to the direct applicability of foreign decisions, from political review
to direct enforcement without further control, there are ample opportunities in models
of horizontal cooperation. The comparison of different models of horizontal
cooperation shows us the current position of cooperation in EU law. Cooperation on
the European level has neither exhausted the full potential of horizontal cooperation,
nor remained in the narrow framework of classical legal aid. But what can be seen
through the analysis of horizontal cooperation is another point that is vital for any
further development in this area: Without a substantive basis of common legal
principles, common rules and structures, an extensive horizontal cooperation is not
feasible. It is therefore not surprising that horizontal cooperation has not reached its
final extent in EU criminal law. The European legislator has instead begun to
introduce some forms of vertical cooperation as well, whose particularities I will now
briefly examine before returning to horizontal cooperation.
2.2 Vertical model of cooperation 
To describe vertical cooperation with a precise term is not an easy task. It would be
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an oversimplification to say that the difference is that „the EU“ is the acting part. The
various bodies of the European Union play a role in horizontal cooperation as well.
This is most notable in the third pillar framework decisions, where the Council set
more or less the exact content of the legislation and will be so for directives in this
area, although the implementation gives some scope to the Member States. Because
of these often inherent vertical elements in horizontal cooperation, one cannot simply
distinguish the horizontal and the vertical form of cooperation by differentiating
between the actors. One must rather pay attention to the question of who has the
main responsibility for the decision. If the concrete procedural measure, e.g. the
arrest of a person, the search of a dwelling, or the recognition of a foreign sentence,
is substantially determined by the legislative acts of the EU, I will consider it as a
form of vertical cooperation, even if the Member States apply the measure. On the
other hand, if EU legislation gives leeway to the Member States and the concrete
measure mainly depends on prerequisites set by the Member States, the
responsibility lies with them and I define it as a form of horizontal cooperation.
Obviously, there is no clear dividing line. We can observe already at this stage that
the EU system is a mixed system of cooperation. It is principally based on an
enhanced system of horizontal cooperation: The mechanisms of classical legal aid
have been taken as a starting point but were then remodelled to make them more
efficient. At the same time, some forms of vertical cooperation have been adopted.
Even if one does not regard the sanctioning of cartels as part of criminal law, there
still need to be mentioned the Commission’s anti-fraud office (OLAF) and the Union
bodies for the cooperation between national prosecution authorities (Europol and
Eurojust). Especially the latter ones will surely get more responsibilities in future and
therefore assume much importance in a vertically functioning system of criminal law
enforcement.
From a theoretical point of view, the main feature of vertical cooperation is a change
in perspective. The legal space in which the procedural measures take place is no
longer considered a fragmented one, with several national systems that interact, but
as a unitary legal space, where only the EU-wide perspective is taken into
consideration. The acts of the prosecuting authorities are no longer seen as products
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of a cooperation between several actors that are working together as equal partners,
but rather as occurrences of a unitary and harmonic European legal space. This
newly created territoriality, which might be described as a European territoriality, is
the main feature of vertical cooperation. If the responsibility for a procedural act lies
with the EU, the perspective changes and a Union-wide standard may be applied. At
the present moment, there is hardly any purely vertical procedure. The institutions
that are usually named in this context, such as Europol and Eurojust, do not in any
way lead vertical criminal cooperations. They are, on the contrary, a vertical element
in a strictly horizontal form of cooperation between different Member States. The only
procedures for which this definition is at least partly true are procedures in
competition law and, to a much lesser extent, the investigations of OLAF.
2.2.1 Administrative Procedures
Competition Law
As for the practical side, there is one pertinent example for the application of vertical
cooperation already in force: the sanctioning of companies that infringe competition
rules. In this sector, we have, or at least had until recently, a unitary European-wide
system of law enforcement. The Commission has extensive investigative powers to
discover violations of competition rules and ensure the enforcement of Art. 101 and
102 TFEU (ex-Art. 81 and 82 TEC). If a cartel or monopoly is detected, the
sanctioning again lies with the Commission. Judicial review is ensured by the Court
of Justice. This system, as created by the old Council Regulation 17/62, was a purely
vertical one: Investigation, sanctioning and judicial review were conducted under the
sole responsibility of Community bodies. The new Regulation 1/2003 further
develops this system and does not change its basic functioning, but introduces some
horizontal elements by giving competences to the national competition authorities.
One concession must be made, however, as to the context of this sanctioning
system. According to the legislation itself (Art. 23(5) of the Regulation 1/2003), the
decisions of the Commission are not of a criminal law nature. What relevance has
the structure of the enforcement of competition law in our ambit of study then? The
 See the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 5 April 2006, T-279/02, Degussa v58
Commission, [2006] ECR II-879 para. 66-98, and the judgment of the Court of Justice C-
266/06 of 22 May 2008, para. 36-63.
 For a comparative overview of the various European jurisdictions see Bassiouni, in: id. (ed.),59
Int. Criminal Law Vol. I, p. 73ss.; Bernardi, in: Bassiouni et al. (eds.), p. 94ss.
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first answer is that irrespective of whether it forms part of criminal law or of an
administrative law system, the structural importance of this truly vertical system of
law enforcement remains pertinent. It shows how a harmonic Europe-wide system
may work and what alternatives are possible for the current functioning of European
Criminal Procedure. And the second answer is that it is highly dubitable whether the
wording of Art. 23(5) can change the nature of the Commission’s decisions in
substance. Apart from competence issues, this framing of the issue makes it easy on
sovereigntist Member States to accommodate these activities within their conceptual
outlook on the EU. If we consider the actual effects of such a decision, it gets very
close to decisions in criminal matters. According to Art. 23(1) of Regulation 1/2003,
the Commission may impose on undertakings fines of up to 1 % of their turnover for
obstructing the investigations. If an infringement of Art. 101 and 102 TFEU (ex-Art.
81 and 82 TEC) is proven, the fine may be as high as 10 % of the turnover,
according to Art. 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003. Revealingly, these fines are only
imposed if intentional or negligent misconduct can be proven, which is an essential
element of criminal law sanctions. And the fines are as high as 10 % of the turnover
in order to deter the company from infringements – deterrence being a typical aim of
criminal law sanctions. It can therefore hardly be denied that the Commission’s
decisions according to Art. 23(2) of the Regulation 1/2003 have a criminal law nature.
And in consequence even the Court of Justice considers it as a sanction similar to a
criminal sentence. In the Degussa case, it is discussed whether the rather vague
determination of the exact amount of the financial sanction is in conformity with the
principle of legality of penalties.  This principle, which has been developed in the58
ambit of criminal law,  is at issue in the present context, too, which clearly shows the59
criminal nature of the financial sanctions under Art. 23(2). For our purposes, the
mechanism of direct vertical enforcement gives a valuable example of a vertical
cooperation system and may even serve as a model for future cooperation in criminal
matters in general.
 See for details Wahl, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 7 para. 5ss.60
 1999/352/EC (OJ L 136/20, 31.05.1999).61
 For the history of OLAF see Brüner/Spitzer, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht,62
§ 43 para. 17ss.
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The purely vertical system of Regulation 17/62, however, has partly been abrogated
by the new Regulation 1/2003. In the context of the present research, the
introduction of horizontal elements is of great interest. It is rather unexpected that a
measure of vertical cooperation that is supposed to be more efficient should be
subjected to elements of horizontal cooperation at a later stage. According to its
Articles 11-16, a close form of cooperation between the Commission and the
Member States’ national competition authorities has been introduced. It was intended
to unburden the Commission of its heavy work load in prosecuting competition
infringements and enable it to concentrate on matters of importance after the
enlargement of the European Union.  From a structural point of view, it shows how60
a development in legal cooperation can take a turn and go in another direction as
well. The purely vertical system has proven to be ineffective because too much
responsibility lay with the Commission. Similarly, the purely horizontal system of
cooperation in classical legal aid has proven to be ineffective, too, because the
responsibility was entirely with the Member States. Both approaches have their
undoubted merits: A horizontal cooperation preserves national legal traditions, a
vertical cooperation leads to harmonic and unitary solutions. But in practice, both
systems needed to be altered in the European judicial space. The European Union
is neither a system of purely international cooperation, nor a unitary supranational
body, but it has elements of both spheres. This is reflected in the forms of legal
cooperation which are neither horizontal nor vertical but combine elements of both
structures.
OLAF
OLAF, the European anti-fraud office, was founded in 1999 through a Commission
decision  and acts as successor to UCLAF.  Its main task is to investigate fraud61 62
against the EU-budget, corruption and similar irregular activity. In contrast to Europol
and Eurojust, OLAF does not have a legal personality, but forms a part of the
 W ith the respective consequences for cooperation, see Schröder, in: Sieber et al. (eds.),63
Europäisches Strafrecht, § 33 para. 19, 60ss.
 Court of First Instance, judgment of 6 April 2006, T-309/03 - Camos-Grau; Court of First64
Instance, judgment of 13 July 2004, T-29/03 - Comunidad Autonoma de Andalucia.
 Brüner/Spitzer, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 43 para. 61, 64.65
 Civil Service Tribunal, judgment of 28 April 2009, joint cases F-05/05 and F-07/05 - Schmit,66
Violetti et al.
 General Court, judgment of 20 May 2010, T-261/09P.67
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Commission. This means that OLAF can conduct both internal and external
investigations and use the Commission’s competences for external investigations. It
is, on the other hand, completely independent of the Commission in fulfilling its tasks
which is even subject to judicial review. Both internal and external investigations are
explicitly set down as administrative procedures.  This has far-reaching63
consequences for the legal framework. Even though judicial review is granted, one
prerequisite set up by the Court of First Instance is that the decision in question has
binding effect on the individual and is not just preparatory.  Therefore, judicial review64
is in fact very limited.  The Civil Service Tribunal tried to change this,  but was65 66
overruled by the General Court.  This means that actions which in ordinary criminal67
proceedings are subject to judicial review can only be reviewed after a binding
decision in the case of OLAF.
Conclusion
The procedures in the field of competition law and anti-fraud law are based on an
administrative law rationale. That this is unsatisfactory, or even illegal, because it
evades the application of fundamental guarantees of a criminal procedure has often
been demonstrated and does not need to be reiterated here. Since this criticism has
been taken on board, but the need for genuine European prosecution has remained,
the institutional setting is subject to gradual change. The idea of a European public
prosecutor has long been under discussion, but it is particularly relevant now that the
Lisbon treaty has finally provided a basis for creating it. Since a European public
prosecutor would in all probability take its basis in Eurojust as intended by the treaty,
it is obvious that there is no clear distinction between horizontal and vertical
cooperation and that both elements will always be prevalent in any form of
 OJ C 316/2 of 27 November 1995.68
 See Neumann, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 44 para. 5.69
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cooperation. Still, it is necessary to clearly see the differences in the functioning of
the horizontal and the vertical mechanism, and to know the advantages and
disadvantages for the relevant area of criminal procedure so that a balanced legal
framework can be developed for primarily vertical forms of cooperation. I will
therefore first outline the existing European prosecution institutions and show their
functioning, even though they are mainly founded on a horizontal cooperation basis.
I will then outline how this will change when a European Public Prosecution is going
to be set up, how this will affect the working of judicial cooperation and particularly
individuals’ rights in this context.
2.2.2 Criminal procedures
Europol
Europol too started its work in 1999 after the 1995 Convention had finally been
ratified.  Its main aim is to improve the effectiveness and cooperation between68
Member State-authorities mainly by sharing and pooling information. Even though it
has no executive powers, it is certainly going to have operative functions in the
future. While Art. 30(2)(a) TEU and the consequent change of the Europol
Convention allowed for some participation in operational police work, the Lisbon
treaty has opened the path to giving Europol a central role in coordinating, organising
and carrying out investigative and operative measures with Member States’
authorities in accordance with regulations based on Art. 88(2)(b) TFEU.  Through69
these new mechanisms, Europol will become an actor in vertical cooperation. The
decisions of Europol can be challenged before the Court of Justice from 2014
onwards, which will give Europol a clearer legal framework.
 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 (OJ 2002 L 63/1) as amended by70
Decision 2003/659/JHA of 18 June 2003 (OJ 2003 L 245/44).
 See for details Grotz, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 45 para. 7, 33ss.71
 Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 (OJ 2009 L 138/14); see Nilsson, in:72
Guild et al. (eds.), The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice ten years on, p. 75.
 P. 24 of the Stockholm Programme.73
 Delmas-Marty (ed.), Corpus juris portant dispositions pénales pour la protection des intérêts74
financiers de l’Union européenne, 1997; cf. also van den Wyngaert, in: Walker, Neil (ed.),
Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, p. 215ss.; Killmann/Hofmann, in: Sieber et al.
(eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 48 para. 2ss.
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Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor
Eurojust was first founded as a judicial counterpart to Europol in 2002.  The aim was70
to create an institution fostering the exchange of information and providing aid for
Member States in judicial cooperation. Eurojust consists of national members
appointed by the Member States that can act independently or jointly in college.71
Since they do not appear before the Member States’ courts or conduct measures
themselves, the actions of Eurojust cannot be described as a form of vertical
cooperation in a strict sense. Rather, Eurojust is based on a system of horizontal
cooperation because the outcome of its work is to facilitate proceedings between the
Member States by providing information. The fact that this horizontal model is upheld
does however not exclude a change of perspective into a vertical system. The very
creation of a Union body with specific tasks brings a third actor into the picture. A
criminal trial is no longer a process that one Member State conducts independently,
with or without the aid of another Member State, but also the result of a three-
dimensional procedure.
This combination of horizontal and vertical elements is further highlighted by the
proposals for the future development of Eurojust. Many proposals aim at
strengthening the role of Eurojust  and even go so far as to give it a right to resolve72
conflicts of jurisdiction or initiate proceedings that Member States have to execute73
which is possible through a regulation according to Art. 85(1)(a) TFEU primarily for
eurofraud. The most important step taken in this direction, however, is the possibility
to create a European Public Prosecutor. The idea of creating a European Public
Prosecutor was already established in the Corpus Juris  and the  subsequent74
 COM/2001/715fin. of 11 December 2001; see Brüner/Spitzer, NStZ 2002, p. 393ss; Radtke,75
GA 2004, p. 1ss.
 For these new possibilities see Espina Ramos, in: Klip (ed.), Substantive Criminal Law,76
p. 35ss.
 See e.g. Klip, EU Criminal Law, p. 410, 431.77
 COM/2001/715 fin.78
 Cf. also Brüner/Spitzer, NStZ 2002, p. 395.79
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Commission Green Paper.  However, the Lisbon treaty now sets down that the75
European Public Prosecutor could emerge from Eurojust through a regulation (Art.
86(1) TFEU).  The possible competences of a European Public Prosecutor are76
limited to fraud against the financial interests of the Union. But there is also the
possibility of enlarging the scope of competence so that it encompasses areas of
particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension as defined in Art. 83 (cf.
Art. 86(4) TFEU). This is a very wide concept, as has been seen in a different context
above. It also shows that the idea of a European Public Prosecutor is taken very far
and not limited to its core function in the eurofraud-area. The European Public
Prosecutor will act as a prosecutor in front of Member States’ courts and be
responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment the perpetrator.
The most contentious issues, such as the legal position of the European Public
Prosecutor, procedural rules, admissibility of evidence and judicial review of
procedural measures,  are left to the regulation, cf. Art. 86(3) TFEU. This shows that77
the idea of a European Public Prosecutor is still rather vague. Therefore, the
Commission Green Paper will probably still be influential in shaping ideas of a
European Public Prosecutor. 
The Green Paper on establishing a European Public Prosecutor  shows the78
intertwining of horizontal and vertical cooperation in criminal matters, in that it closely
links the idea of a European Public Prosecutor to the principle of mutual
recognition.  It sets down that actions or measures of the European Public79
Prosecutor should have the same validity in every Member State and that it can use
all national procedural measures, which can in turn be enforced in every other
Member State. Instead of establishing harmonised rules for evidence gathering, the
Green Paper sets down rules for the compulsory admissibility of evidence legally
gathered in one Member State, which is mainly seen as a necessary requirement to
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fulfill subsidiarity. This approach to the law of evidence is problematic, as will be
shown in greater detail below. What is important here is that the problems for
individuals’ rights in this area are based on a confusion of horizontal and vertical
cooperation. While in horizontal cooperation mutual recognition may, under certain
circumstances, truly be neutral to individuals’ rights, this is certainly not so in a
vertical setting. In horizontal cooperation, mutual recognition simply means that an
actor is faced with the decision of another actor, according to this actor’s laws. But in
vertical cooperation, a third actor can choose between several legal systems of all
participating states. The outcome of the proceeding is not dependent on one or
another legal order, but on the arbitrary decision of one particular actor. Hence, it is
always close to “forum-shopping”.
But, on the other hand, this responsibility of an independent third makes it easier to
establish procedural rights in the context of vertical cooperation, and particularly for
a European Public Prosecutor. There are a number of reasons. First of all, in an area
of law that is already supranational, the fear of nation states to lose sovereignty
through attempts at regulating procedural rights is less prevalent. Secondly, Member
States might, despite initial drawbacks from collective authorship, be willing to
regulate the actions of supranational agencies in order to restrict their scope of
action. Therefore, whenever the European Public Prosecutor should be established,
there will probably be a rather specific set of rules concerning individuals’ rights that
will apply, at least to a greater extent than in horizontal cooperation. These
suggestions for a procedural framework may even serve as a model for an
application to the area of horizontal cooperation. How such a framework, in
theoretical terms, could be established, will be the topic of the last chapter.
 See the Presidency Conclusions of 15 and 16 October 1999: „33. Enhanced mutual80
recognition of judicial decisions and judgments and the necessary approximation of legislation
would facilitate co-operation between authorities and the judicial protection of individual rights.
The European Council therefore endorses the principle of mutual recognition which, in its view,
should become the cornerstone of judicial co-operation in both civil and criminal matters within
the Union. The principle should apply both to judgments and to other decisions of judicial
authorities. [...] 36. The principle of mutual recognition should also apply to pre-trial orders, in
particular to those which would enable competent authorities quickly to secure evidence and
to seize assets which are easily movable; evidence lawfully gathered by one Member State’s
authorities should be admissible before the courts of other Member States, taking into account
the standards that apply there. 37. The European Council asks the Council and the
Commission to adopt, by December 2000, a programme of measures to implement the
principle of mutual recognition. In this programme, work should also be launched on a
European Enforcement Order and on those aspects of procedural law on which common
minimum standards are considered necessary in order to facilitate the application of the
principle of mutual recognition, respecting the fundamental legal principles of Member States.“;
see Apap/Carrera, European Arrest W arrant, p. 11s.; Belfiore, 17 EJCCL (2009), p. 2s.
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Chapter  3 Main paradigm: Principle of mutual
recognition
When we look at the specifically European take on horizontal judicial cooperation, we
notice first of all that the language of classical legal aid is replaced more and more by
a new terminology. The principles that are named in this context differ considerably
from traditional ones. I will now outline the main principles of this area and analyse
their specific function within the European judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
It will become clear that many of these concepts have a function quite unconnected
with the specific content of judicial cooperation. Often, they are used to promote a
criminal policy and link the integration in criminal matters to other areas of EU law.
The most important principle is the principle of mutual recognition. 
It has become a commonplace to say that since the Tampere European Council of
1999 mutual recognition has become the fundamental concept of European Criminal
Procedure.  It is the basis for numerous legislative measures in the field of80
cooperation in criminal matters.
The time was favourable for the introduction of a new concept: a perceived rise in
 For a more thorough analysis of this line of argumentation see below at point 7.2.81
 Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the Community and the82
establishment of a European Prosecutor (COM/2001/715 fin.), p. 29.
 ECJ judgment of 20 February 1979, C-120/78 - Cassis de Dijon; see in detail later 2.1.2.83
 Directive 89/48/EEC on a general system for the recognition of higher-education diplomas84
(OJ 1989, L 19/16).
 Mansel, 70 RabelsZ (2006), p. 682.; cf. also Schmidt, 14 JEPP (2007), p. 671: an attempt to85
integrate all areas marked by different regulations.
 See Schmidt, 14 JEPP (2007), p. 667.86
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cross-border crime seemed to make closer cooperation between the Member States
necessary.  At the same time the reformation of the lengthy and complex81
proceedings in legal aid proved unattainable and the creation of new mechanisms for
an effective prosecution of crimes seemed imperative. As outlined above, a sufficient
legal basis for harmonising the substantive law was nonexistent; at any rate, the
Commission preferred mutual recognition as, according to its view, causing much
less impairment on Member States’ judicial systems.  The concept in itself seemed82
equally well adapted to the purpose. The Commission drew an express analogy to
the internal market: 
Here, the principle of mutual recognition had been developed concerning the free
movement of goods, as a means for the abolishment of trade barriers.  Furthermore,83
mutual recognition had been extended to professional qualifications.  The84
Commission considered this successful application of the principle of mutual
recognition in other areas, while at the same time establishing it as a concept for a
general coherence of EU law.  This approach and the very novelty of the concept of85
mutual recognition in judicial cooperation in criminal matters seemed promising for
accomplishing the envisaged goals, just as the novelty of mutual recognition had
given the development of the internal market a push when harmonisation seemed to
lag.86
But while the Tampere European Council is generally acknowledged to have set
down mutual recognition as the corner stone of judicial cooperation in criminal
matters and some writers trace it back to the UK Home Secretary Jack Straw’s
 Mitsilegas, 43 CMLRev. (2006), p. 1278s.; Asp, in: Husabø/Strandbakken (eds.),87
Harmonisation, p. 26; van Bockel, ne bis in idem, p. 59.
 Cf. Bassiouni, in: id. (ed.), Int. Criminal Law Vol. II, p. 5s.88
 Walker, Odyssey, at p. 13s. on the claims of Tampere.89
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words  at the Council of Europe 1998 in Cardiff, many questions remain87
unanswered: What exactly is the difference between this new principle and the idea
of mutual recognition as it has been discussed in classical legal aid for more than a
century, that has been strived at in many treaties and national laws? 
A possible answer could relate to the obligation to recognise and execute foreign
decisions, as opposed to the mere possibility, although such an obligation is not
uncommon in treaties on legal aid. Or it could be a potentially automatic enforcement
of foreign judgments without an exequatur, i.e. a transformation into a domestic
decision or a formal declaration of execution, thereby treating the foreign authorities
like domestic authorities.  A difference could also lie in a wider scope of recognising
foreign decisions through the gradual abolition of classical grounds for refusal of
legal aid,  such as dual criminality, the non-extradition of nationals, public policy88
exceptions, specialty etc. or through widening the range of application of mutual
recognition from final judgments to procedural orders in the pre-sentencing stage –
an area that had not been comprised under the term of “recognition” before.
But one could also think of “softer” effects of the extension of the principle of mutual
recognition to criminal matters: These could simply be the particular dynamics that
ensue when using an internal market language, with its implications of mutual trust,
as it seemed to have worked for cooperation in civil matters, or the wish to find a new
“big idea””  for further integration as other Union ideals had lost some of their appeal89
and public opinion became more sceptical.
In order to answer at least some of these questions it is important to explore the
historical dimensions of this concept first. After that, I will explain the system of
mutual recognition that existed before the “principle of mutual recognition” was
introduced. This will also show that the principle of mutual recognition does in some
respects have little legal content; it is rather a political concept. To sum up the
historical development, it can be said that mutual recognition concerning judicial
 Bassiouni, in: id. (ed.), Int. Criminal Law Vol. II, p. 4; Ligeti, Strafrecht und strafrechtliche90
Zusammenarbeit, p. 115.
 Lammasch, Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht, p. 3ss.91
 E.g. the more difficult modes of travelling and the relevant expenses, the commonness of92
political crimes that other states did not care to get involved in.
 Cf. to this Ligeti, Strafrecht und strafrechtliche Zusammenarbeit, p. 77ss.93
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cooperation in criminal matters is not a new idea as such. The actual changes that it
does bring about will be discussed after the historic outline.
3.1 History of mutual recognition in classical judicial cooperation and
modes of recognition 
A brief outlook at the history of the recognition of foreign penal orders will show that
the problems faced by judicial cooperation have been similar for a long time. The
strategies and mechanisms used to address these have not been as different from
today‘s ideas as one is apt to think, but a closer examination of the historical
dimensions will help to clear up in what important points they actually did differ.
Extradition is believed to be the most ancient tool in legal aid  and can at least be90
traced back several centuries, although it took a while until states formed contractual
obligations to this effect.  Extradition was directed at „re-claiming“ suspects or91
convicts who had fled the country for the aim of prosecution or the execution of a
sentence. Since this was, due to various reasons,  fraught with difficulties,92
alternatives were soon put into practice. The vicarious administration of justice
(applying either domestic or even foreign substantive criminal law) was not
uncommon and Grotius even claimed an obligation under international law to either
extradite or punish (“aut dedere aut punire”).  This made the recognition and93
execution of foreign judgments not immediately necessary and explains its relatively
late emergence; extradition itself was, on the other hand, not considered a form of
recognition of a foreign decision. 
 Cf. Lammasch, Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht, p. 824 nt 1; Delius, Ausländische94
Strafurtheile, p. 515s.
 Delius, Ausländische Strafurtheile, p. 516.95
 Cf. Delius, Ausländische Strafurtheile, p. 528.96
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3.1.1 Earlier times
In the Middle Ages, the recognition of a foreign judgment would have been
incompatible with the prevailing concepts of sovereignty. The idea that a foreign
authority‘s act could limit the sovereign exercise of power, even if voluntarily agreed
on, was rejected. Instances of the enforcement of foreign judgments are rare and
states only seem to have deviated from this maxim due to practical reasons. There
are therefore a few treaties, especially in cities of  Upper Italy. Venice most
particularly took on convicts from many states as it needed workers for its fleet while
landlocked countries could thereby impose a penalty not otherwise enforceable, the
penalty of galley service.  Also, Monaco and Andorra sent convicts to France owing94
to their lack of enforcement capacities.95
In time, the enforcement of foreign judgments became less exceptional, although the
predominant rhetoric would still stress sovereignty as opposing this mechanism. In
modern times there were already several treaties envisaging a recognition of foreign
judgments, albeit within a very limited scope. The most prominent example, due to its
long existence, is the Revised Act of the Shipment on the Rhine (revidierte
Rheinschiffahrtsakte) of 1868 that is still in force today. It was initially concluded
between France, several German states and the Netherlands (all concerned riparian
states) and set down that the judgments of specific Rhine border courts had to be
executed by all other states also in relation to criminal matters concerning the law of
shipping and the like. The astonishing fact here is that, although an exequatur was
required by national law,  there was no public policy exception set down.96
Outside of special treaties, only very few laws provided for a possibility of recognising
or enforcing foreign judgments. For example, in 1859, para. 231 subpara. 4 of the
code of criminal procedure of the Kingdom of Hannover entitled the ministry of justice
to replace an extradition with the enforcement of the relevant judgment, a provision
that seems to have been rather singular in its wide scope of application. Art. 30 of the
 Delius, Ausländische Strafurtheile, p. 515 [translation by author]; similarly Bar, Das97
Internationale Privat- und Strafrecht, p. 579.
 Meili, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 500; Lammasch, Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht, p.98
823.
 See Delius, Ausländische Strafurtheile, p. 517 with further references.99
 Cf. Braum, 125 GA (2005), p. 683; Delius, Ausländische Strafurtheile, p. 516.100
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Swiss Federal Act of January 22, 1892 allows for the assumption of enforcement by
mutual consent of all concerned.
Generally speaking, it can be said that up to the 19  century in international publicth
law it was a “universally acknowledged principle that a state does not enforce foreign
penal judgments, not even those envisaging fines”  and the exceptions could be97
termed singular.  The opponents of recognition had a clear majority.98 99
3.1.2 19  century academic debateth
It was not until the late nineteenth century that the debate about mutual recognition
of penal judgments seriously began. Advocates of the principle became more
frequent, following mainly two distinct lines of reasoning.
3.1.2.1 State-interests
On the one hand, mutual recognition was seen as a measure to promote political
goals: In the formation of new political entities (such as the North German
Confederation) and especially in nation-state-building mutual recognition served to
make compatible diverse procedural orders and court systems among the relevant
states until a more complete harmonisation could replace it.  Once seen in this way,100
mutual recognition remained a means of political rapprochement and was subject to
a rather instrumentalist view. 
A common approach to International Criminal Law was already regarded as a
necessary reaction to a perceived rise in cross-border crime, an argument that
should become a recurring line of reasoning, though empirical evidence to this effect
was seldom given. Although international crime might really have increased, most
 Cf. Jäger, Verfolgung durch Verwaltung.101
 Cf. lately the Commission report on the implementation since 2007 of the Council102
framework decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender
procedures between Member States, COM/2011/175fin., p. 7.
 Cf. Delius, Ausländische Strafurtheile, p. 520.103
 See Braum, 125 GA (2005), p. 685.104
 Delius, Ausländische Strafurtheile, p. 515.105
 At p. 523 s.106
 Cf. e.g. Schröder, BayVBl. 1979, p. 231; cf. the critical approach of Lagodny,107
Rechtsstellung des Auszuliefernden, passim; see also Ligeti, Strafrecht und strafrechtliche
Zusammenarbeit, p. 115.
 See for extradition the decision of the German Constitutional Court of 30 June 1964,108
BVerfGE 18, 112; for other form of judicial cooperation Higher Regional Court (OLG) Stuttgart
of 07 May 1985, Justiz 1985, p. 324; OLG Köln of 28 May 1984, NJW  1985, p. 572. 
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acts in judicial cooperation were clearly covering the prosecution of purely national
offenders and not the mobile, intelligent and well-equipped super-criminal.  It has101
been sustained convincingly that the European Arrest Warrant, for example, is
systematically issued for very minor offences.  The main aim of judicial cooperation102
is, therefore, to avoid any loophole to a perpetrator,  its underlying rationale a103
prosecution without a gap.  104
We already find the idea of mutual trust as a postulate that creates maxims for state
action.105
These ideas are all in line with a pre-constitutional concept of legal aid, where the
state interests and political negotiations and decisions are the main guidelines of any
action taken. Thus Delius warns  of the damage that a too strict legal framework106
would ensue – judges especially could not decide whether the recognition of a
sentence was opportune. The individual affected by a measure of legal aid does, on
the other hand, not have a real rights-based position. Until late in the 20  century,th
especially in the continental legal doctrine, he was considered the „mere object“  of107
political actions between sovereign states. Constitutional rights were held to be not
or only partly applicable (similar to an „effet attenué“), even the right to life.  In108
Germany, judicial review of decisions to extradite was restricted to the court-decision
of admissibility, the final ministerial decision to extradite was on the other hand
exempt from any review and pursued solely political purposes.
 Delius, Ausländische Strafurtheile, p. 524ss.; Lammasch, Auslieferungspflicht und109
Asylrecht, p. 827, puts forward the idea of a reduced dual criminality concept: dual criminality
is not to be required if the different criminal laws are based on external circumstances such as
geography, e.g. a landlocked state should enforce penalties concerning crimes in the scope of
the law of the sea. No state, however, should execute a decision if the different criminal laws
reflect a different set of values.
 V. Liszt, Gleiche Grundsätze, p. 90ss.110
 Delius, Ausländische Strafurtheile, p. 520, though he finally refuses this idea.111
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This view of the individual as an object also explains why classical grounds for
refusal of legal assistance were debated controversially when they were not needed
to protect a public interest. Many authors raised the question of whether to keep dual
criminality, but most of them still argued to maintain it so as not to force a state to
execute a decision opposed to its own concepts of the administration of justice.  V.109
Liszt, however, clearly favours an abolition of this idea in legal aid so as to truly
recognise a foreign level of substantive criminal law. Legal aid was to tear down the
borders between states and be applied flexibly, according to political need.  Some110
authors even went so far as to think of an abolition of any kind of exequatur and
review on the merits when enforcing a foreign judgment,  an idea that would still111
count as progressive today.
3.1.2.2 Individual’s interests: Reduction of the sentence
Another line of reasoning for the recognition of foreign judgments had the interests
of the accused or convict at its core. 
Quite early on it was regarded as contrary to the basic notions of justice to subject a
person to a punishment for an act when a sentence had already been served in
another country for the same deed. But an international ne bis in idem in the form of
the recognition of a foreign case as res judicata was still mainly seen as incompatible
with state sovereignty. The right of a state to punish an act could, according to this
view, not be consumed by any foreign sentence or enforcement. Therefore, the
effects of a foreign judgment were most often only seen in a reduction of the
 Cf. Meili, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 505; Grützer, Zwischenstaatliche Anerkennung, p.112
352 admits that a state cannot consume another state‘s right to punish but believes this right
should be given up to the practical advantages a recognition would bring along.
 „Les peines prononcées par jugement régulier des tribunaux d'un Etat quelconque, même113
non compétent, mais dûment subies doivent empêcher toute poursuite dirigée à raison du
même fait contre le coupable. Seraient exceptés, toutefois, les délits contre la sûreté des Etats
et les délits mentionnés ci-dessus à l'article 8. Une peine subie seulement en partie, s'il n'y a
pas eu remise du reste, n'entraverait pas la poursuite devant les tribunaux d'un autre pays.
Cependant, dans ce cas, on offrira l'extradition même d'un national, lorsqu'il y a extradition
entre les pays respectifs et que le coupable préfère l'extradition; excepté seulement les cas
des crimes et délits contre la sûreté de l'Etat et ceux mentionnés, ci-dessus, à l'article 8.
Toutes les fois qu'il y a lieu d'exercer de nouvelles poursuites après un jugement prononcé à
l'étranger, on tiendra compte de la peine que le coupable a déjà subie du chef du même fait.
[...]“
 This last requirement is still very common.114
 „Les acquittements prononcés du chef d'insuffisance des preuves produites contre l'accusé115
seraient valables partout. De même, les grâces accordées par le souverain d'un pays ayant
sous sa main le coupable. Les acquittements motivés par la non-criminalité du fait auraient
même force que la loi du pays déclarant non punissable ce même fait. [...]“
 „L'aggravation de la peine à raison de récidive, quand la condamnation antérieure est116
émanée d'un tribunal étranger, ne peut être appliquée qu'après examen préalable de
l'infraction antérieure. Cependant, selon l'avis du tribunal, le dossier de l'instruction étrangère
pourra suffire. Le tribunal, vu les circonstances et les doutes soulevés, pourra écarter
souverainement la question d'aggravation à raison de récidive.“
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domestic sentence,  a mechanism that is still employed today in the absence of112
international treaties.
3.1.2.3 Individual’s interest: Ne bis in idem
However, on the 7  of September 1883 in Munich, the Institut de Droit Internationalth
famously claimed a very far-reaching construction of an international ne bis in idem:
In Art. 12 of its resolutions  it proposes that any foreign judgment preclude renewed113
proceedings on the same issue if the sentences have been served, excluding only
some offenses, e.g. acts against the safety of the state and the like.  It also114
petitioned for a recognition of acquittals in Art. 13.  Art. 15 extended the effects of115
a foreign judgment so that it could serve as a basis for recidivism, i.e. for aggravated
sentences for repeat offenders.  Due to the importance of the matter the Institut de116
Droit International slightly amended these resolutions in 1950.
It took a long time until states voluntarily accepted this idea and introduced statutes
or concluded treaties implementing this principle. In the 19  century, Belgium seemsth
 Cf. Grützner, NJW  1969, p. 346.117
 „L'exécution de la peine ne peut jamais avoir lieu hors du pays où le jugement est118
prononcé, sauf le cas d'une convention internationale ou conclue entre les membres d'un Etat
formant un système fédératif.“
 See Maag-Wydler, Vollstreckung ausländischer Straferkenntnisse, p. 40ss.119
 Reported in Lammasch, Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht, p. 825 and p. 825s. nt 3.120
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to have been the first to take such an approach, even anticipating the Institut de Droit
International.117
3.1.2.4 Execution of foreign sentences
What is striking about the 1883 resolutions of the Institut de Droit International is that
Art. 14 explicitly opposes the execution of a foreign judgment outside of an
international convention or a treaty between confederate states.  But the execution118
of a foreign judgment can be very well compatible with the rights of the individual,
and even conducive to it. For a foreign convict it is most often a great relief to be able
to serve the sentence in his country of origin where he knows the language and
mentality and probably has his social ties. In the light of resocialisation it is more
reasonable to have a sentence served where the convict will be living afterwards.
Sometimes, when a convict is living in a country other than the sentencing state, a
sentence will be too short to justify the total break in the individual’s life that must
follow an extradition to serve a sanction.  This is also the reason why the surrender119
procedure for sentences under the European Arrest Warrant sets down a four-
months-threshold, cf. Art. 2 (1) of the framework decision. That the assumption of
execution through the authorities of the state of residence can be desirable was
already seen in the 19  century when a Saxon convict was, on his request and withth
the consent of the Saxon king, allowed by the Austrian ministry of justice to serve his
sentence in Austria to save him the long journey back, although this was clearly
contrary to Austrian statutory law.120
At the same time, the recognition and enforcement of foreign sentences might help
to avoid the different treatment of foreigners and nationals concerning conditional
measures: If a country could be certain that its decisions to supervise a convict would
 Grützner, NJW  1969, p. 347; Maag-Wydler, Vollstreckung ausländischer Straferkenntnisse,121
p. 42s. 
 Cf. Grützner, NJW  1969, p. 345.122
 Maag-Wydler, Vollstreckung ausländischer Straferkenntnisse, p. 32.123
 Oehler, Recognition, p. 618; idem, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 588; Grützner, NJW  1969,124
p. 352; Maag-Wydler, Vollstreckung ausländischer Straferkenntnisse, p. 32.
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be enforced abroad, it might more willingly release foreigners conditionally from
prison  which it does not do to an equal degree owing to the greater risk that they
might abscond.  121
On the other hand it can be more likely to agree on the execution of a foreign
judgment than to make an own judgment: A crime is usually prosecuted and the
offender sentenced in the state where the crime has been committed (locus delicti
commissi). This is due to the fact that the public interest in the prosecution of a crime
is most pertinent there. Thus, if the sentencing state is not the state where the
sentence shall be served, it is more likely that the offender is convicted in the state
where the crime has been committed and then surrendered to the other state who
then enforces the foreign judgment. The alternative would be to surrender the person
without a trial and then make the indictment and the trial in the other state (“vicarious
administration of justice”), but since this state has usually not an own interest of
equal weight in prosecuting a crime that has not been committed on its territory, it
tends to leave the prosecution to the state where the crime has taken place and only
assumes the enforcement of the sentence. 
3.1.3 Recent developments
A more considerable level of activity concerning the recognition and enforcement of
judgments set in at the end of the 1940s.  122
The recognition of a foreign judgment is not necessarily seen as a restriction of the
sovereignty of the executing state. At least it is treated as unproblematic if this state
has restrained its sovereignty voluntarily.  Moreover, the mutuality of recognition123
also ensures a wider enforcement area for domestic decisions.  Another idea that124
is put forward here is the international solidarity and cooperation that should
 Jescheck, 76 ZStW  (1964), p.68s.125
 See already Delius, Ausländische Strafurtheile, p. 517; Lammasch, Auslieferungspflicht und126
Asylrecht, p. 826,  proposes this form of recognition for neighbouring states.
 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition127
to financial penalties.
 For an overview see Weyembergh, in: Kerchove/ead. (eds.), La reconnaissance mutuelle,128
p. 28ss.
 ETS-No. 112.129
 ETS-No. 141.130
 See below for some examples.131
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overcome nationalist concepts of sovereignty.125
One milestone has been the 1948 Convention between Norway and Sweden that is
the basis for the Nordic Cooperation model, often seen as exemplary. At the
beginning it was limited to the recognition of fines. Recognition often begins with
regard to fines since the problems concerning the execution are less poignant
here:  even if the sentencing state has a completely different sanctioning system126
from the executing state, fines can relatively easily be transformed and, if necessary,
reduced. Additionally, financial penalties are less drastic than custodial penalties and
can more easily be executed despite different values and different substantive
criminal laws. Therefore, the first EU measure that explicitly sets down an obligation
to enforce final judgments is the framework decision on the mutual recognition of
financial penalties.  Although the scope of its application is rather limited, its127
functioning is quite progressive. The dual criminality requirement is abolished to the
same degree as in the framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant.
Other sorts of sanctions are executed mainly within the framework of the Council of
Europe conventions  such as the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced128
Persons  and, for other orders,  the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure129
and Confiscation of the Proceeds From Crime,  later complemented by the 1985130
Schengen Agreement. The Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons aims
at the assumption of execution but constitutes no actual obligation of either the
sentencing state or the country of origin of the convict to do anything more than
“cooperate”. For a more effective system, action on the EU level became
necessary.  One of the major objections to the execution of foreign judgments131
 Cf. Grützner, NJW  1969, p. 349.132
 Cf. Ligeti, Strafrecht und strafrechtliche Zusammenarbeit, p. 175ss.133
 Cf. Weyembergh, in: Kerchove/ead. (eds.), La reconnaissance mutuelle, p. 26.134
 Cf. only Satzger, European Assumption of Enforcement, p. 407s.135
 See below under 6.6; cf. also Satzger, Int. u. Europ. Strafrecht, p. 128ss.; Ligeti, Strafrecht136
und strafrechtliche Zusammenarbeit, p. 97ss.
 „A person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be137
prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a penalty has been
imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer be
enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party.“
 „No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence138
for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in
accordance with the law.“
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remains the fact that it is difficult to make the different sanctioning systems and
enforcement practices mutually compatible.  132
The Convention also maintains, of course, the dual criminality requirement.  One133
thing that has to be mentioned in this context is the intricate problem that arises
through this requirement. While a state might find it very difficult in constitutional
terms to execute a sentence on a person without considering his acts as punishable,
it can be of the utmost importance for that person to serve that sentence in his home
country, especially if he faces a lengthy imprisonment.  This dilemma precludes any134
easy answer and has to be discussed elsewhere.135
The ne bis in idem  has been established through Art. 54 of the Schengen136
Convention  implementing the 1985 Schengen Agreement and is incorporated into137
Art. 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights .138
3.1.4 Conclusion
It can be seen from this that the mutual recognition of penal judgments is by no
means a totally new idea. Before the 19  century, however, the execution of ath
foreign judgement was seen as contrary to a state’s sovereignty and only very
exceptionally assumed, usually due to a practical need. Other mechanisms that
fulfilled similar functions were preferred. Only in the 19  century did theoreticalth
concepts emerge that would allow for a more general approach, based both on state
 See Jescheck, 76 ZStW  (1964), p. 70; Oehler, Recognition, 609ss.; idem, Internationales139
Strafrecht, p. 573ss.; Weyembergh, in: Kerchove/ead. (eds.), La reconnaissance mutuelle,
p. 26.
 See Jescheck, 76 ZStW  (1964), p. 70.140
 Take for example the suggestions of the W orking Group on a Programme for European141
Criminal Justice in the preamble therof.
 See Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 573; Jescheck, 76 ZStW  (1964), p. 70 ss.; Meili,142
Internationales Strafrecht, p. 512ss. to older concepts.
 It can be assumed that statutes taking into account recidivism are becoming fewer and143
fewer.
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interests and individuals‘ rights. Since then, the academic debate has been going on
so that there is now a rather clear system to classify potential effects of foreign penal
judgements. In classical legal aid, the recognition (and eventual enforcement) of a
judgement could have the following legal effects: 
1. Negative effects
The negative effects of a foreign judgment are those that block a renewed
prosecution in another country, most notably the principle of ne bis in idem.  A prior139
stage in this area was the reduction of a domestic penalty in case a penalty had
already been served in another country.  A possible future development could take140
this idea further and lead to a preclusion of proceedings once investigations are
started in another country, without waiting a final judgement.141
2. Positive effects
Positive effects of the recognition of a foreign judgment result mainly in the
assumption of the enforcement, but can extend to all other effects that criminal
judgments have in the sentencing state,  such as supervisory measures after a142
conditional release, extra-criminal effects like the loss of public (e.g. election) or
private (e.g. heritage) rights, being the basis for a revocation of a conditional release
or for recidivism.143
The problems concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
have been similar to those that are now discussed under the new principle of mutual
recognition in judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the EU. For example, the
negative effects of foreign judgments are nowadays fully taken into account by the
 Art. 54 CISA; Art. 50 Charter of Fundamental Rights; framework decision 2009/948/JHA of144
30 November 2009 on prevention and settlement of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in
criminal proceedings (OJ L 328/42 of 15.12.2009).
 2005/214/JHA (OJ L 76/16 of 22.03.2005).145
 2008/909/JHA (OJ L 327/27 of 05.12.2008).146
 2008/675/JHA (OJ L 220/32 of 15.08.2008).147
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provisions on ne bis in idem.  The positive effects of the recognition of foreign144
judgments are regulated mainly by the framework decision of 24 February 2005 „on
the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties“,  the145
framework decision of 27 November 2008 „on the application of the principle of
mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or
measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the
European Union“  and the framework decision  of 24 July 2008 „on taking account146
of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course of new
criminal proceedings“.  The scope of the former two legislative measures is an147
enforcement of foreign penal judgments, the latter has the aim of giving previous
foreign convictions all other effects which sentences may have, equally to the effects
of previous national convictions. The outcome of this legislation is the mentioned
positive effect of mutual recognition: all effects a criminal judgment may have are
taken over by the other Member State. 
This may be to the advantage as well as to the disadvantage of the accused: Under
Article 3 of the framework decision of 24 July 2008, Member States must ensure that
previous convictions in other Member States are „taken into account“. This rather
vague wording leaves many possibilities of implementation as well as application by
the courts. According to the law of the sentencing state, the former conviction may be
a reason to raise the sentence because the offender has already shown disrespect
to criminal norms before. But it may also give reasons to impose a lower total
sentence if the applicable law does not simply add the sentences in case of multiple
convictions but reduces the total amount proportionally.
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3.2 The spillover of the principle of mutual recognition from the internal
market logic
Mutual recognition did thus exist in traditional legal aid, though the term was used
mainly for final sentences and not for the investigative stages or for extradition. The
question remains, then, of what is meant when mutual recognition in EU judicial
cooperation is linked to mutual recognition in the internal market rather than to
mutual recognition in legal aid. In order to understand this, it is important to look
briefly at how mutual recognition operates in the internal market. This will show
where the parallels to judicial cooperation are. After that, I will demonstrate how the
analogy is flawed. This will bring us to the reasons of why the parallel was drawn at
all and what impact it has. 
The internal market has been the core project of European integration for decades.
After it became clear in the 1950s that a political union could not be realised, all
efforts were concentrated on creating an economic union that promoted prosperity
and increased wealth in Europe, thereby making the European countries dependent
on each other and reducing the possibilities of warfare. 
For the purpose of this economic integration, mutual recognition was not the first
instrument that the legislator availed himself of. Rather, concepts of a more
substantive nature were in its focus, like the abolition of customs duties and non-tariff
barriers as well as the harmonisation of legal and technical standards. However,
these measures proved to be complex and time-consuming. The economic
integration moved at a slow pace and the idea of one single European economy
seemed without reach in the medium term. Harmonisation of standards was still a
complex legislative procedure that could not (and was not necessarily intended to)
keep up with the further integration of the internal market. At this stage, mutual
recognition came in as a kind of catalyst. Its basic functioning was a shift from a
more substantive to a formalistic approach. There should no longer be the need to
set common standards and harmonise market conditions, but Member States should
be obliged to recognise each other’s domestic standards instead.
This principle of mutual recognition was mainly put forward by the Court of Justice in
 ECJ of 11 July 1974, C-8/74; for the importance of these rulings in the present context cf.148
also Gleß, 116 ZStW  (2004), p. 354ss.
 ECJ of 20 February 1979, C-120/78; a narrower interpretation of Cassis is given by149
Armstrong, in: Barnard/Scott (eds.), p. 233ss.
 ECJ of 12 March 1987, C-178/84.150
 ECJ of 24 November 1993, C-267/91 and C-268/91.151
 COM/1985/310fin.; see Armstrong, in: Barnard/Scott (eds.), p. 226s.152
 Para. 63, 65 and 77ss. of the W hite Paper; Armstrong, in: Barnard/Scott (eds.), p. 227.153
53
its famous rulings in Dassonville,  Cassis de Dijon,  Brasserie du Pêcheur  and148 149 150
Keck . All these decisions further developed the free movement of goods, which151
played a central role in the internal market as the most noticeable market freedom.
In the Dassonville-judgment, a criminal law case, the Court developed the formula
which defined the „measure of equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction“ (Art. 30
TEC / Art. 34 TFEU) as „all trading rules enacted by Member States which are
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community
trade“. This very wide definition therefore comprises every kind of legislative activity
with any remote effect on trade. In its subsequent Cassis-judgment, this line of
reasoning was further developed and the Court set down in how far product
standards required by national laws might be justified. The result to barriers to trade
was that disparities between national laws on product standards could not, as a rule,
prevent products legally produced and marketed in one Member State from being
marketed in another Member State. Exceptions were made only for reasons of
taxation, public health, consumer protection, and later, in the Keck-decision, for
selling arrangements. The result paved the way for a free circulation of goods based
on the country of origin principle.
The jurisdiction of the ECJ thus brought forward the main ideas of economic
integration: Market actors should not be confined by national borders, but only focus
on the most efficient way of producing and marketing goods. Mutual recognition
played an important role during this process, although its importance diminished with
continuing harmonisation. The Cassis-rule of mutual recognition was readily taken up
by the Commission in its White Paper on “Completing the internal market” in 1985.152
The new strategy was to introduce a specific balance between a system of mutual
recognition and harmonisation.  It was taken further by the Single European Act153
 Report of the European Parliament on the proposal for a regulation of the European154
Parliament and of the Council laying down procedures relating to the application of certain
national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another Member State and repealing
decision, 3052/95/EC of 4.12.2007, A6-0489/2007, p. 45.
 Sievers, in: Guild / Geyer (eds.), p. 113; cf. also Scharpf, Governing in Europe, p. 43ss. for155
the asymmetry in favour of negative integration concerning the relation of competition
frameworks to market correction through regulatory standards.
 Cf. also Maduro, 14 JEPP (2007), p. 818s.156
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through the introduction of Art. 100b(1)(2) TEC whereby the Council could declare
that the regulation of one Member State must be recognised as equivalent in
another. The new regime of mutual recognition was generally perceived to be a great
success. It was much faster than to wait for relevant harmonising measures in the
areas concerned and it seemed to work, if not quite as well as harmonisation.
However, in practice mutual recognition always remained just a corollary to
harmonisation. It was mainly important as an interim concept before relevant
harmonisation entered into force, because it became obvious that harmonisation
operated more smoothly. In the Amsterdam treaty, this above-mentioned norm was
therefore abolished. As of 2007, 75% of the internal market trade volume took place
in harmonised areas, only 25% was on the basis of mutual recognition.  154
This practical development highlights the dilemma of mutual recognition. Mutual
recognition is often chosen as the preferred mode of integration when forms of
positive integration such as harmonisation are unsuccessful because Member States
are not willing to move ahead collectively. It is easier for Member States to agree on
forms of negative integration and accept other states’ rules than to give up their own
regulatory system altogether in favour of common standards.  Yet, mutual155
recognition as a mechanism is itself dependent on trust and solidarity and therefore
needs to be complemented by a certain degree of harmonisation. So when mutual
recognition is presented as a way to preserve diversity and leave national
sovereignty untouched, this is only partially true, for first of all mutual recognition as
a mechanism has a great deal of influence on regulatory systems of sovereign
states, and secondly it is often the beginning of harmonising attempts.156
Still, the success of mutual recognition had its effects on many other areas of law.
Within the internal market, the White Paper already enlarged the scope of the
 At para. 79.157
 Directive 89/48/EEC on a general system for the recognition of higher-education diplomas158
OJ 1989, L 19/16 and now directive 2005/36/EC; see Armstrong, in: Barnard/Scott (eds.),
p. 252ss.; Peers, 41 CMLRev. (2004), p. 19.
 Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the159
expulsion of third country nationals (OJ L 149/34 of 02.06.2001).
 See however Peers, 41 CMLRev. (2004), p. 20s.160
 Cf., however, Mansel, 70 RabelsZ (2006), p. 651 for a comprehensive debate.161
 Cf. e.g. Walker, Odyssey, p. 8 fn. 14.162
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“principle” of mutual recognition.157
Later, the same approach was taken to such diverging areas as the recognition of
professional qualifications  or expulsion decisions in immigration law.  This is158 159
interesting with regard to the relation of mutual recognition to harmonisation. For,
when the recognition of professional qualifications was introduced, there had been
hardly any harmonisation in this area. The same was true for immigration law.
Mutual recognition in civil matters
Strangely enough, mutual recognition in criminal matters is rarely likened to mutual
recognition in civil matters,  just as mutual recognition in civil matters is not linked160
to the internal market logic to the same degree. This is particularly surprising
because the Tampere European Council established the principle of mutual
recognition as a corner stone for the areas of criminal and civil law at the same time.
While this was regarded as a change of paradigm in criminal matters, the debate in
civil matters was not comparable.  Since mutual recognition had long been realised161
there, the terminology itself did not seem revolutionary; also, since civil law
cooperation traditionally operates in a rather distinct sphere,  it might not have been162
influenced as much by the debate in criminal law cooperation. 
Mutual recognition of decisions in civil matters has a considerably longer tradition
than mutual recognition in criminal matters. While states were very reluctant to give
up their ius puniendi to another state, only private rights are at stake in civil
proceedings. Treaties dealing with recognition in civil matters were therefore not
infrequent. The 1968 Brussels Convention dealt with the recognition and
 Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in163
Civil and Commercial Matters.
 Regulation 44/2001/EC of 22 December 2000, entry into force on 1 March 2002.164
 Private law, not public law: see Stessens, in: Kerchove/Weyembergh, La reconnaissance165
mutuelle, p. 91, 97.
 Commission Communication and Proposal of 26 November 1997, COM/1997/609fin., p. 12,166
36; Draft programme of measures for implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of
decisions in civil and commercial matters, OJ C 12/1 of 15.01.2001, p. 5; ECJ of 11 May 2000,
C-38/98: to be construed narrowly.
56
enforcement of judgements extensively.  When it was largely supplanted by the163
Brussels I Regulation in 2000,  only few changes were made as to its content. The164
only reference to the dynamics of the internal market is found in the preamble.
Recital 10 refers to the “free movement of judgments” in a specific case, and, if this
is accepted as internal market language at all, mutual trust is given as a reason for
automatic recognition and the narrow scope of the exequatur.
The link of cooperation in civil matters with the internal market becomes clear in Art.
81(2) TFEU (and even more so in ex-Art. 65 TEC). It sets out that measures of
recognition and enforcement of decisions are to be adopted “particularly when
necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market”. This makes sense, since
judgments in civil matters are directly concerned with market freedoms. To regard a
judgement in civil matters as subject to “free circulation”, so reiterating its
resemblance to a product, seems not so far-fetched. There is a remote affinity to
products, because cases in civil matters are subject to the principle of party
disposition.  In civil procedure, parties are free to present their case to the court or165
end a trial, and therefore take an active role in the creation of a judgment. Still, the
connection with the internal market has not led to such a seeming revolution in civil
matters, even though a new regime of cooperation would be a lot easier to institute
there. Even before mutual recognition became an internal market concept, there was
harmonisation concerning jurisdiction, which facilitates recognition a great deal. Still,
however, in cooperation measures in civil law there are a lot of exceptions,
particularly a public policy exception, that, despite many attempts,  has not yet been166
abolished in the more far-reaching of the measures.
 Sieber, 103 ZStW  (1991), p. 963.167
 Para. 39 of the Presidency Conclusions; see Mitsilegas, 43 CMLRev. (2006), p. 1278s.;168
Peers, 41 CMLRev. (2004), p. 8s.
 OJ C 19/1 of 23.01.1999.169
 Para. 45 of the Action Plan.170
 Para. 83 of the Presidency Conclusions.171
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Mutual recognition in criminal matters
As outlined above, mutual recognition as a principle, not just as a factual occurrence,
and the link to the internal market, were introduced to facilitate lengthy and
complicated proceedings of classical legal aid in criminal matters. We find this idea
recurring in literature. As early as 1991, for example, Sieber proposed to take on the
idea of mutual recognition, which he regarded as a deregulation of the internal
market, and apply it to criminal matters concerning the free movement of a European
search warrant.167
At the Cardiff European Council in 1998, the change of paradigm was not yet
apparent. All that was asked for was that the Council identify “the scope for greater
mutual recognition of decisions of each others’ courts”.  The ensuing Vienna Action168
Plan  “on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an169
area of freedom, security and justice” repeated this idea, but it is clear by the
measures proposed (mainly to ratify the relevant conventions) that there was still no
idea of a new system. Mutual recognition seems to be only one part of judicial
cooperation, and by no means pivotal to the measures proposed.  On the contrary,170
it can be seen that mutual recognition is understood in a narrow way. Many of the
proposed measures that are not linked with mutual recognition would now be
regarded as prototypical fields of application for the principle of mutual recognition,
for example the facilitation of extradition procedures. The subsequent Vienna
European Council only acknowledged mutual recognition to the extent that it “urges
the Council to start immediately with the implementation of the 2-year priorities”  of171
the Action Plan, to which mutual recognition belongs. However, these priorities also
comprise the implementation of treaties on legal assistance in- and outside of the
TEU framework.
 See above.172
  As early as in the SEA, cf. above.173
 At Para. 35 of the Presidency Conclusions.174
 Cf. Para. 33 of the Presidency Conclusions.175
 At Para. 36 of the Presidency Conclusions.176
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It is the special European Council of Tampere that made a first step towards
introducing mutual recognition as a new paradigm.  It starts with transforming172
mutual recognition into a legal concept. So, for the first time in the official European
documents mutual recognition was called the “principle” of mutual recognition. This
change in language also denotes a breach with mutual recognition in the tradition of
mutual legal assistance. First, a principle endorses quite different associations.
Secondly, it is in the internal market that mutual recognition had begun to be
commonly called a “principle”.  This understanding was alien to the terminology of173
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Consequently, we already find the idea of
abolishing extradition for a procedure of transfer, and under the heading of mutual
recognition.  Additionally, it enlarges the scope to encompass more than just174
judgments. Other judicial decisions are to be recognised as well  and the principle175
is also linked to the admissibility of evidence: “evidence lawfully gathered by one
Member State’s authorities should be admissible before the courts of other Member
States, taking into account the standards that apply there”.  Though the range of176
the idea is limited, this is more than just internal market language; this is internal
market logic.
If one keeps in mind the specific dynamic which mutual recognition has given to the
internal market, it is understandable that a similar catalyst was sought for
cooperation in criminal matters as well. And indeed there are several parallels
between internal market cooperation and cooperation in criminal proceedings which
allow such a transposition of the principle of mutual recognition to criminal matters.
The main similarity lies in the fact that different actors from different national legal
systems interact in a larger space and can be hampered by differing regulatory
standards. In transnational cases with pieces of evidence located in different states
the procedural measures of criminal investigations, like searches, questionings, wire
tapping and DNA analysis, sometimes have to take place in more than one
 Tampere Presidency Conclusions of 15./16. October 1999, para 36, cited supra in nt. ...;177
Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the Community and the
establishment of a European Prosecutor, COM/2001/715fin., p. 58s.
 Infra, p. ... (5.2)178
 Supra, p. ...179
 Cf. Mitsilegas, 43 CMLRev. (2006), p. 1281.180
 Infra, p. ...181
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jurisdiction, bringing prosecutors and judges in the position to examine the
enforceability of these measures and the admissibility in criminal trials. The idea of
mutually recognising evidence was therefore one of the first applications of the
principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters.  I will deal with this more in depth177
in the fifth chapter.  Likewise, the concept of mutual recognition was extended to178
the recognition of final sentences.  179
This kind of transposition of a legal concept from one area to another is not
unjustified in the outset.  Similar to the internal market, different national standards180
of criminal procedure often impede a closer cooperation. Mutual recognition is once
more regarded as a means to overcome these differences by simply accepting –
recognising – the other Member States’ different rules on criminal procedure, without
the need to harmonise them on the European level; it is supposed to allow for
diversity and respect sovereignty in an area where sovereignty seems to be even
more important to Member States. But again, such a form of cooperation requires a
sufficient amount of trust between the actors. I will treat this issue more extensively
in the fourth chapter.  Despite decades of cooperation in the EU, the differences181
between the Member States’ systems of criminal justice are still much greater than
the differences between their economic systems. There are many intrinsic factors like
national traditions, criminal policy and police and judicial organisation, which are so
heterogenous in Europe that mutual recognition without any harmonisation quickly
reaches its limits.
Moreover, the analogy between cooperation in the internal market and cooperation
in criminal matters is flawed for a number of reasons. The main difference lies in the
overall objective envisaged by the two forms of cooperation. Mutual recognition of
products is already a manifestation of the goal of free trade. Mutual recognition in
 Cf. Gleß, 116 ZStW  (2004), p. 365s.; ead., 115 ZStW  (2003), p. 136ss.; Satzger, StV Beil.182
2/2003, p. 142.
 Cf. Lavenex, 14 JEPP (2007), p. 762; Peers, 41 CMLRev. (2004), p. 5, 23.183
 Cf. Mitsilegas, 43 CMLRev. (2006), p. 1280s.184
 For pre-trial orders see Barbe, in: Kerchove/Weyembergh (eds.), La reconnaissance185
mutuelle, p. 81, 84ss.; Schutte, ibd., p. 101; Jones, ibd., p. 107, 112; Kerchove, ibd., p. 113ss.
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criminal matters, on the other hand, is not an end in itself but just a means to
enhance criminal prosecution. But Member States do not share the same
fundamental beliefs on criminalisation as they share the concept of free markets. The
examples of criminalisation of abortion in Ireland and decriminalization of certain
forms of cannabis in the Netherlands and in the Czech Republic may suffice to
illustrate the problem of differences that remain.
The market analogy is also inapplicable from a structural point of view. In the internal
market, the states principally only provide for a legal framework and leave the activity
to the various market actors, who are private subjects. In criminal law, however, state
authorities themselves take the active part in cooperation, because public officials
“create the products“. A mutual recognition of their actions thus raises the problem of
national sovereignty in a much more acute manner than does the liberalisation of
trade. Moreover, judicial decisions, especially at a pre-sentencing stage, do not
compare with an existing product that may be subject to free movement.  After all,182
a judicial decision or order, and a piece of evidence, are only existent through law
and within a certain legal framework.  There is nothing factual that could be183
separated from the recognition of foreign legal standards and then circulate freely. 
Additionally, the internal market principle of mutual recognition has as its core the
promotion of freedom through recognition. Criminal law on the other hand is mainly
restrictive of individuals’ rights.  By instituting the principle of mutual recognition,184
states ensure that they can put through their ius puniendi Europe-wide – either as
manifest in a final judgement, or in the course of enforcing it, as with pre-trial
orders.  Admittedly, the recognition of judgments or pre-trial orders can also be185
conducive to individuals’ rights. Such is the case when, for example, an acquittal is
recognised or a final judgement is recognised not for its enforcement, but in order to
prevent renewed proceedings in another Member State. Similarly, evidence from
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another Member State that has to be admitted might be extenuating. This, however,
does not alter the basic position. It is merely the corollary of the restrictive nature of
criminal law that a state may also not make use of its ius puniendi. The individual
itself does not gain rights by this. He cannot institute proceedings against himself in
one Member State so as to prevent prosecution elsewhere through a prior decision,
or have his impunity recognised. Nor can he force states to cooperate in the
obtaining of extenuating evidence. Unlike in civil law, the proceeding is not within his
disposition. What is more, the freedoms within the internal market are an aim in
themselves. Instead, the benefits that an individual might derive from mutual
recognition are always ancillary to a criminal proceeding.
Finally, the outcome is very different. When diverging product standards or
professional qualifications are recognised, this is mainly relevant for the individuals
to whom these freedoms are conferred. Customers, who are not convinced of these,
can in the end still decide not to accept a certain product, or avoid a certain
professional for that reason. That is to say, the law operates within a framework of
individual choice, unlike in criminal matters.
What then was the point of linking mutual recognition in criminal matters to the
principle of mutual recognition within the internal market? Clearly, the principle of
mutual recognition in criminal matters is not the same as within the internal market
and does not function in the same way. Yet, it is related to it and has brought about
substantial changes to judicial cooperation in criminal matters. On the other hand,
the principle of mutual recognition cannot deny a strong link with principles of legal
aid. This is what I will show now. The answers to this will finally bring us to the
function of the introduction of the principle of mutual recognition.
3.3 A “Copernican Revolution”? 
When one looks at the debate, it becomes clear that the main aim was to accelerate
legal aid and make it more efficient and predictable. Most approaches that were used
to realize these goals were then seen as characteristic features of the principle of
mutual recognition. 
 There were already provisions on the acceleration in the Council of Europe Conventions,186
see e.g. Art. 20 of the European Convention on the Punishment of Road Traffic Offences of 30
November 1964 (ETS No. 52), which lifts the need for an authentification of documents.
 In doing so, the dual criminality requirement brought along considerable advantages for the187
suspect. It protected his legal positions and is therefore often invoked as a procedural
safeguard. The history of this requirement is often held against this line of reasoning. However,
the meaning of a legal concept is subject to change and not bound by its history. The more the
individual acquires a rights-based position in legal aid, especially in extradition, the more will
the classical concepts of legal aid be subject to a new interpretation.
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Classical legal aid was so lengthy for different reasons. First, it was based on a
system of requests that, in theory, had to be transmitted via the diplomatic
channel.  More importantly, the granting of a request of legal aid is still a sovereign186
political act.
Since there was no legal framework for legal aid, through long-standing practice a
couple of principles developed for political reasons. These, in their turn, often
complicated the procedure of legal aid and seem slightly anachronistic. Among these
principles is, first of all, the principle of reciprocity. It has its most important
application in areas where there is no treaty for legal aid. It means that a state will
only grant a request when the requesting state guarantees that in the future it would
grant a similar request made by the requested state.
The principle of reciprocity developed into the requirement of dual criminality. This
means that a state will only assist another state when the act in question also
constitutes an offence under its own law. The idea behind this was that only such a
hypothetical reversion of the facts could guarantee full reciprocity.  Dual criminality187
has been regarded as a major obstacle for effective judicial cooperation. It has also
been criticized for the ideas it is founded on. This is because it seems wrong that a
state should not be able to prosecute a crime only because the suspect has fled to
a state that does not penalise the act, or because evidence is by chance located
there.
The principle of mutual recognition is supposed to overcome all of these obstacles in
time. It is to replace classical legal aid. In fact, many of the above-mentioned
characteristics of legal aid are said to be no longer compatible with a regime of
mutual recognition. 
 Cf. e.g. the time limits for the execution of a European Arrest W arrant according to Art. 17188
of the framework decision (2002/584/JHA, OJ L190/1 of 18.07.2002).
 See also below.189
 ETS No. 30.190
 ETS No. 99.191
 OJ C 197 of 12.07.2000.192
 ETS No. 24.193
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The means that are used to this end are rather obvious. One way to speed up
cooperation was to introduce strict time limits for the execution of requests.188
Another way to enhance the effectiveness is to abolish many of the grounds for
refusal. It is considered to be vital that no public policy exception should stand in the
way of immediate recognition, not even a European one. The dual criminality
requirement was to be curtailed. The request system is to be abolished altogether.
This is first of all manifest in a change of language (“issuing” and “executing state”
instead of “requesting” and “requested state”).  But it also has a strong content, as189
the political stage is done away with. The extradition – or surrender – of nationals
has been introduced.
However, the picture painted of classical legal aid is merely theoretical. Some of
these obstacles existed only in areas without treaties. Others were only applied in
extradition proceedings, as these are (until now) the most far-reaching form of
judicial cooperation. And when we look at the newer treaties on legal aid, we see that
almost all of the above-mentioned approaches to overcome these obstacles were at
least attempted. Most treaties on legal aid contain an obligation to execute a request,
for example Art. 1(1) of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters , the mother convention of 1959. Its scope was further enlarged by its 1978190
protocol.  The EU convention of 29 May 2000 on mutual legal assistance in criminal191
matters,  among other things, facilitates the forms and procedures of legal aid quite192
considerably by introducing a sort of time-limit set by the requesting state,
establishing direct contact and requiring the requested states to comply with
formalities indicated by the requesting state.
The development is similar in extradition law. The mother convention of 1957  is not193
yet very far-reaching, but its protocols that wanted to go beyond this level have not
 Art. 66 CISA.194
 OJ C 78/1 of 30.03.1995.195
 OJ C 313/11 of 27.09.1996.196
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been ratified by all states. To overcome these problems, the CISA introduced a
simplified procedure for extradition.  The 1995 Convention on simplified extradition194
procedure between the Member States of the European Union  took this idea a lot195
further. It made extradition possible with very few formalities and in a very strict time
frame. Due to the low number of ratifications, it was not applied Union-wide. The
same fate faced the 1996 Convention relating to extradition between the Member
States of the European Union.  It already set down that, in principle, the extradition196
of nationals could not be refused. It further enlarged the scope of application and
abandoned the political crimes exception. Additionally, it further facilitated
proceedings. Extradition requests could now be handled by the competent authorities
via fax. These are just a few examples. In reality, almost every concept connected
with the principle of mutual recognition can be found in some envisaged treaty.
The main problem in facilitating legal aid, then, was not that there were no legal
instruments designed to achieve this. Rather, too few states ratified the treaties so
that they could not enter into force, or only after a considerable lapse of time.
Sometimes, the problem lay at an earlier stage and no consent could be reached.
The reasons were mainly connected with the fear of giving up sovereignty. It is
peculiar that, at a time when simple treaties on legal aid, or conventions within the
EU framework, could not be ratified, the principle of mutual recognition was endorsed
and framework decisions implementing it were - relatively - successfully adopted. For
framework decisions required unanimity as well. And it does not seem that a
framework decision or the principle of mutual recognition are less infringing on
Member States’ sovereignty, rather the opposite. So objectively, there was no reason
to expect that framework decisions based on mutual recognition would answer the
purpose; in fact, the development is almost paradoxical. Apparently, the principle of
mutual recognition was seen as a way out of a deadlock situation because of its
novelty. When classical mechanisms could not succeed anymore, a new dynamic
like that of the internal market promised a solution. The central role that mutual
 The Parliament in the German version of a draft report on an Initiative by the Governments197
of the French Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Kingdom of Belgium for the adoption
by the Council of a framework decision on the execution in the European Union of orders
freezing assets or evidence (5126/2001 – C5-0055/2001 – 2001/08043(CNS)), Committee on
Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, Rapporteur: Luís Marinho,
VORLÄUFIG 2001/0803(CNS) REV 1on p. 16; not in the English version, available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ meetdocs/ committees/ libe/20010710/ 443040DE.pdf;  AG
Colomer in para. 41 of his Opinion in Advocaten voor de W ereld in the original Spanish
version, also in the language of the Case (Dutch), not in English (C-303/05).
 See Wahl, Perception, p. 121.198
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recognition acquired was thus not linked to its content, but rather to its aspirational
potential. 
While mutual recognition was always an issue in judicial cooperation, it was never
such a central point. But does this make the introduction of the principle of mutual
recognition a “Copernican revolution”  of judicial cooperation?197
Certainly, it is a concept that is all-encompassing, because as a “principle” or a
regime it does not just apply to judicial decisions, as mutual recognition in the former,
more narrow sense. It also purports to include orders, standards of evidence
gathering, and much more. In a legal sense, however, what it attempts is not
completely new. This corresponds with the perception of practitioners that
instruments based on mutual recognition are merely a further development of the
classical scheme of judicial cooperation.  The original Conventions were not per se198
inapt to address the problems of legal aid. It is rather the peculiar dynamic of doing
all at once and differently that helped to overcome the slow progress of legal aid. We
will come back to this aspect of the functions of the principle of mutual recognition
later.
The attempt to establish a new system for judicial cooperation through mutual
recognition could not succeed without friction, as is evident in the implementation of
the framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant. Although the
implementation is generally regarded as successful, it is also an outstanding
example of the practical compromises that the integration in the sphere of criminal
law necessitates. Many national implementing laws fall quite clearly short of the
requirements of the framework decision, sometimes more or less openly, sometimes
 The Commission still sees major shortcomings in its report of 11 April 2011 on the199
implementation since 2007, COM/2011/175fin., p. 5.
 Decision of the Oberlandesgericht Hamburg of 23 November 2004, Ausl 28/03.200
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by means of complex and confusing legal constructions.  Legal practice will have to199
find ways to cope with contradictions and integrate the national approaches.
Considering the historical role of extradition and the pace at which the new
framework decision was implemented, all this seems hardly surprising. 
From a legal point of view, mutual recognition therefore did not lead to a
fundamentally new system of cooperation. And ironically the term “mutual
recognition“ that was supposed to lead out of the problems of classical legal aid
paved the way back into it to some degree.
In the internal market logic, mutual recognition is associated with Europe-wide
recognition of certain standards. In legal aid, however, mutuality of recognition is a
means to ensure reciprocity. The principle of reciprocity shows that extradition was
always subject to reasonings of international politics rather than principles of law.
That these reasonings are not overcome, and seemingly even reinforced through the
mutual recognition regime can be seen by the readiness with which national actors
use the terminology to reintroduce principles of classical extradition law.
A very striking example of this is the Spanish reaction that followed the famous
Darkazanli decision of the German Constitutional Court.
Spanish Authorities had issued a European Arrest Warrant for Darkazanli, a
German-Syrian national living in Germany. The execution was granted by the
Hamburg Appellate Court  and Darkazanli appealed to the Constitutional Court,200
arguing a breach of his constitutional rights through both the framework decision
itself and the German implementing law. The Constitutional Court evaded the
complex and controversial question of the relation between national constitutional
rights and European framework decisions, and tried to argue as narrowly as possible,
restraining itself to the implementing law and German nationals. It held that law to be
invalid because it did not use the leeways left open by the framework decision in a
way compatible with the German Constitution. The German Constitution precludes
 Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 18 July 2005, 2 BvR 2236/04.201
 Cf. Fichera, 15 ELJ (2009), p. 87.202
 Cf. for Greece Fabry, European Arrest W arrant, p. 25. 203
 Cf. also the reaction of the House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, minutes204
of evidence of 18 January 2006, available at http://www.publications. parliament.uk/
pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/156/6011805.htm.
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the extradition of Germans, save to other EU countries or international courts under
certain conditions (Art. 16(2)). The Court held that, in order to do justice to the
special bond of citizens to their home country, the exceptions were to be exercised
with caution. It then went on to differentiate between three typical situations based on
the territory where the alleged offense had taken place and the necessary solutions.
Since Darkazanli had acted mainly in Germany, but the law did not take this into
account, it was declared void on the 18  July 2005.th 201
Only three days later, on the 21  July, the Audiencia Nacional took a measure thatst
seemed almost retaliatory.  Following a peculiar procedure of non-contentious202
decision under Spanish law, it announced that in the future it would probably treat all
European Arrest Warrants coming from German Courts as classical requests for
extradition (this first part was not followed strictly later on) and that it would not
extradite or surrender Spanish nationals to Germany. The exact course to take was
made dependant on how the reasoning of the German Constitutional Court would
read. The Audiencia Nacional would then act exactly inversely, in order to secure the
principle of reciprocity (Art. 13.3 of the Spanish Constitution) and the mutuality. This
first decision was complemented by another one on 20  September 2005. Otherth
Member States’ courts threatened similar measures.203
At first glance, the step that the Spanish court took seems a logical reaction.  After204
all, if one country does not recognise the European Arrest Warrant of another
country, how can that country be expected to follow the path of “mutual“ recognition?
Clearly, Germany was in breach of its obligation to implement the framework
decision.
However, the “mutual“ recognition regime was never meant to be mutual, but
universal. This is first of all true from a formalistic point of view. A framework decision
 ECJ, reference for a preliminary ruling, lodged on 27 July 2011, C-396/11 - Radu.205
 OJ C 282/14 and 282/15 of 24.09.2011,  question 5.206
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by its very nature imposes independent obligations on all Member States to comply
with it. If one Member State is in breach of its obligations, the obligations of the other
Member States do not cease. All other approaches would defy the nature of a
framework decision and  classify it along with any treaty under international law
where obligations are mutual. Even if a framework decision should be an
international treaty, as is sometimes claimed, it would still be subject to the
particularities of EU law. The obligation to transpose EU law is never interdependent.
More importantly, from a substantive point of view too, mutual recognition was never
meant to be just “mutual“ or reciprocal. It was a term introduced to trigger the
development of a European judicial sphere where certain acts have universal validity.
The long history of mutual recognition in judicial aid and its function of guaranteeing
reciprocity were not taken into consideration. Thus, while purporting to tie the area of
judicial cooperation in criminal matters to the internal market conceptually, the term
“mutual recognition“ makes it easy for Member States to revert to conventional
judicial cooperation.
The legality of a similar course of action is now the object of a pending reference for
a preliminary ruling.  The Romanian Curtea de Apel Constanta referred, among205
others, the question of whether the executing state may refuse surrender on the
ground that the issuing state has incorrectly transposed the framework decision on
the European Arrest Warrant “in the sense that the condition of reciprocity has not
been satisfied”.  For the above-mentioned reasons concerning the functioning of206
mutual recognition, I would have considered it an acte clair that this is not
permissible. 
3.4 The functions of the principle of mutual recognition
If this is the ambiguous background picture, how can we specify the functions of the
principle of mutual recognition? 
 Cf. also Mansel, 70 RabelsZ (2006), p. 682.207
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There is, first of all, the legal function of the principle of mutual recognition. It was
meant to accelerate and juridify judicial cooperation. By overcoming classical
requirements for legal aid and classical procedures, and introducing strict time limits,
this worked out successfully. Additionally, the abolition of the political stage and
political grounds for refusal did not just speed up procedures, it also helped to set
them within a strictly legal framework.
Although this was not wholly impossible to achieve through treaties in classical legal
aid, it was very difficult to attain there. Certainly, the introduction of a completely new
governing concept helped to take a wider approach and attempt to do away with all
obstacles to efficient cooperation at once. Such a dynamic would have been very
difficult to achieve through continuing the negotiations on classical treaties that were
perceived to be a failure.
This is where the political function comes in. At the time, it was a lot easier to change
the framework of legal aid by adopting a concept that seemed to be completely new
in this area. Because of the link to the internal market, the principle of mutual
recognition brought along the promise of success and on-going integration. It helped
to place the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice at the core of European
integration and close to other areas, because it serves as a structural principle for a
general coherence of EU law.  All this has had a huge impact on legal practice, so207
that in the end, the principle of mutual recognition seems indeed to be quite different
from mutual recognition in the classical sense.  The new dynamic caused mutual
recognition to be regarded as a real principle so that in the future it may be used as
an argument against national laws, even if there is no specific rule that is violated. It
has also brought into judicial cooperation other implications, for example the idea of
mutual trust.
Finally, if it has not built a completely new system of judicial cooperation as such, it
has at least created a whole new vocabulary for it. A new language and terminology,
new concepts and forms, have such a great influence in law that they in time shape
the content of the law, even if the starting point was not so different from the
 Cf. Nettesheim , EuR 2009, p. 26.208
 Jessurun d’Oliveira, Union Citizenship, p. 82.209
 Wollenschläger, Grundfreiheit ohne Markt.210
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traditional understanding of the area.
3.5 The role of concepts and forms in European criminal policy
The importance of new policy concepts and symbols for the evolution of new legal
and theoretical approaches runs like a common thread through the whole of
European law. For example, when European citizenship was introduced by the
Treaty of Maastricht, there was little agreement as to its content. It may be assumed
that even its originators did not have a clear idea of what it might mean and what it
should lead to.  While it was originally dismissed by many as mere symbolic208
activism devoid of any real content  - and maybe rightly so - it must now be209
regarded as a central notion of EU law that has acquired specific legal content and
lead to far-reaching case law.  210
This shows that in judicial cooperation in criminal matters, new terms are coined to
create new concepts and forms and to bring about a new dynamic, more than for the
sake of specific legal changes. The introduction of the “principle” of mutual
recognition and the mutual recognition “regime” entailed a whole change of
terminology for judicial cooperation.
First of all, the internal market parallel brought about many other parallels of the
same kind. The idea of a free movement of evidence, of free circulation of
judgements etc. all take up on this basic analogy. Similarly, the idea of mutual trust
can partly be located here.
Secondly, the language is modelled to express a qualitatively new dimension of
integration in criminal matters. Rather than continue with traditional concepts of
judicial cooperation between sovereign states, the language tries to promote a
European legal area dimension as a realisation of  the Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice. Thus, most measures implemented seem to introduce “European” acts.
 Council Doc. 7307/05 of 12 April 2005.211
 Council framework decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008; a European Enforcement212
Order, however, exists in cooperation in civil matters; for the re-naming see also Morgenstern,
ZIS 2008, p. 76.
 Cf. the justification of the Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution concerning213
amendment 1 in the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
(Rapporteur: Ioannis Varvitsiotis) of 17 May 2006, A6-0187/2006 and the text subsequently
adopted by Parliament, P6_TA(2006)0256. In Art. 1 of the original proposal, the enforcement
order had been defined as “a decision delivered by a competent authority of the issuing State
for the purpose of enforcing a final sentence imposed on a natural person by a court of that
State”.
 As to the implications of this change in terminology see also Weyembergh, in:214
Kerchove/ead. (eds.), La reconnaissance mutuelle, p. 42 (“symboliquement très important”).
 Or not even there, since many Member States chose to retain their classic language, cf.215
e.g. Gless, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 39 para. 13.
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The “European” Arrest Warrant is, of course, not a European warrant. Despite the
standardized form on which it is transmitted, it is still a purely national decision,
subject entirely to national law, without the least harmonisation or common
requirements. The same is true for the “European” Evidence Order. The desire to
create European orders went so far that the proposed framework decision on the
European Enforcement Order  twisted its intended meaning because of its211
conceptual ambitions. It was later adopted and had to be renamed as the Council
framework decision “on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to
judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving
deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union”.212
The European Parliament had argued that recognition and enforcement should not
take place on the basis of a European order, but on the basis of the original
judgment and  a certificate.213
The idea of a European legal area also let the “request regime” seem inadequate. It
was replaced by the mutual recognition regime, which, apart from the juridification of
the procedure, means that the requesting state is now called issuing state, while the
requested state is called executing state.  The goal that it envisages, the totally214
automatic recognition, or the genuine European validity of all decisions, is as yet only
reached in the language.215
The renaming of existing methods of cooperation is also seen in the creation of new
principles. The “principle of availability” is increasingly discussed as another basis for
 Cf. Böse, Der Grundsatz der Verfügbarkeit, passim.216
 Cf. above under 3.2; para. 35 of the Presidency Conclusions.217
 Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, recital 5 (“...abolishing extradition between Member218
States and replacing it by a system of surrender between judicial authorities”) and throughout,
but point 4.5 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal COM(2001) 522 fin./2 states
that “it is to be treated as equivalent to it [i.e. extradition] for the interpretation of Article 5 of the
European Convention of Human Rights relating to freedom and security”; see also
Apap/Carrera, European Arrest W arrant, p. 6.
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the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.  Taken in its widest meaning, it requires216
that data available to prosecuting authorities in one state should automatically be
made available to prosecutions of all other Member States. It is mainly relevant to
police cooperation. While the principle of availability might indeed have a rather
specific content, it has become synonymous to cooperation in data exchange, which
has more traditional intergovernmental connotations.
I will now discuss two specific examples on how the creation of new concepts that
does not correspond with the creation of new content can actually nevertheless
influence the interpretation of the law. First, I will look at extradition law where,
among Member States, there is now the surrender procedure. After that, I will outline
the relation of the principle of mutual recognition to mutual trust and its legal
implications.
3.6 Extradition and surrender
Early on in the debates, we find the idea of simplifying extradition through fewer
formalities. But the idea of replacing the extradition procedure through another
system only seriously came up in connection with the principle of mutual recognition.
Starting with the Tampere European Council,  it was thought that a simple “transfer”217
of persons would be more in line with an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. As
a consequence, the framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant only speaks
of “surrender”.218
It is not clear from these documents whether any change in the position of the
individual was intended with it, and what exactly the difference to extradition was –
 The ECtHR assumes that the new scheme of surrender “discontinues” the use of219
extradition procedures, but without drawing any conclusions from this, cf. judgment of 21 April
2009, no. 11956/07, para. 34 - Stephens v Malta No. 1; the ECJ holds that any limitation of
grounds for refusal reinforces the system of surrender that is based on mutual recognition as
opposed to the replaced extradition system, judgment of 6 October 2009, C-123/08, para. 54,
58 - Wolzenburg.
 According to Peers, Justice and Home Affairs Law, p. 662 s., it suggests a more binding220
degree of obligation.
 Surrender is also practiced between states and international criminal tribunals, cf.  Plachta,221
11 EJCCL (2003),  p. 178, 192s.
 Cf. also Deen-Racsmány, 14 EJCCL (2006), p. 273s.222
 Cf. the Extradition Act 2003.223
 §§ 2ss. IRG (Gesetz über die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen).224
 §§ 80ss. IRG.225
 An unofficial translation can be downloaded at: http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/-226
summaries/summaries_assets/docum ents/P_1_05_full_GB.pdf; for a discussion of the
judgment see also Fichera, 15 ELJ (2009), p. 82.
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apart from those mechanisms ascribed to mutual recognition.  A surrender219
procedure sounds less consequential than an extradition.  This is reinforced by the220
fact that “surrender”, or, in the German version “Übergabe”, also has a meaning in
classical legal aid: it refers to the stage after an extradition request has been granted.
When the request is executed by handing over the suspect to the foreign authorities,
this factual act is called surrender. This terminology brings extradition within the
European Union closer to intra-state cooperation.221
However, Member States and scholars reacted very differently to this.  While222
English doctrine - though not the legislator  - in the main took this on and changed223
its terminology, this is quite different in Germany. Courts and academics in the main
still speak of extradition. Also the law implementing the framework decision still calls
this procedure extradition and does not systematically differentiate between this and
extradition to non-Member States.  They are covered by the same statute which224
only provides for some complementary and modifying provisions regarding intra-
European procedures.  Therefore, there was no major rupture in the understanding225
of this procedure.
The most far-reaching debates about the nature of surrender arose in Poland. In the
Polish law implementing the framework decision and in the famous ruling of the
Polish Constitutional Court  of 27 April 2005, we can see how a new terminology226
 “The extradition of a Polish citizen shall be forbidden.”227
 The law was not declared void, however, for another 18 months, during which the228
Constitution was amended.
 Or the “misnomer” according to Plachta, 11 EJCCL (2003), p. 190. 229
 Cf. for the contradictions Plachta, 11 EJCCL (2003), p. 190 ss.230
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and a new conceptual approach can in themselves and without further, more
concrete legal measures, influence the specific legal position of an individual. The
decision of the court is highly interesting in many respects; however, I will confine
myself to those issues directly concerned with the concept of surrender.
The Polish Constitution, under its Art. 55(1),  prohibited the extradition of a Polish227
citizen. Nonetheless, Art. 607t(1) of the Polish Criminal Procedure Code allowed for
the surrender of a Polish citizen to EU Member States under certain conditions
following the transposition of the framework decision. A Polish citizen, Maria D., was
facing surrender to the Netherlands. The competent regional court put the question
of the constitutionality of Art. 697t(1) before the Constitutional Court. The main
argument in favour of this legislative decision was that a surrender procedure was
something totally different from an extradition procedure and could, consequently,
not be subject to this constitutional provision. The differences discussed were the
abolition of classical grounds for refusal, mainly the absence of a dual criminality
requirement, and the juridification of the procedure.
It is remarkable that this should have been put forward and taken seriously in law-
making and legal argumentation. If anything, surrender is a highly intensified and
streamlined form of extradition. The Constitutional Court rightly argued in this manner
and stated that the provision would apply at least a maiore ad minus to the more
infringing surrender.228
That the re-naming  of the extradition procedure between Member States and a229
reorientation of the terminology of judicial cooperation could have such a bearing on
the legal discourse clearly demonstrates the power of concepts. For when the
framework decision was agreed on, there was no idea as to the exact implications of
these new concepts.230
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Other frictions of this kind are to be expected. While new concepts are constantly put
forward without any systematic and theoretical underpinning, the Member States are
not well equipped to provide these through their traditional principles that are tailored
to a different setting. It is important to develop a common frame for the further
development of judicial cooperation.
Mutual recognition is thus a complex multifaceted policy concept that has links both
to classical legal aid and to the dynamics of the internal market. It is also an
expression of the tension within the area of EU judicial cooperation between national
sovereignty and positive sum cooperation. Some of the paradoxes of mutual
recognition are reflected in the  debate on mutual trust. Trust is generally regarded
as a precondition for mutual recognition and a way to deal with the hybrid nature of
judicial cooperation that is meandering between mutual recognition and
harmonisation. What exactly the concept of mutual trust means and how it influences
judicial cooperation will be dealt with in the next chapter.

  Delius, Ausländische Strafurtheile, p. 515, translation by author.231
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Chapter  4 Mutual trust and mutual recognition
As can be observed from this debate, new concepts, forms and terminology play an
important role in European Criminal Procedure just as they do in other areas of
Union law. New concepts seem to possess a great integrative force that cannot be
easily equalled by integration through law. Far-reaching legal acts require a prior
understanding of its intricate functioning and agreement of specific goals, which is
not easily reached. The mere adoption of a new concept - in being more flexible and
open to the imagination - often leads to a new dynamic. The concept thus becomes
self-fulfilling and helps to pave the way towards a favourable reception of legislative
proposals.  A particularly important example of a development like this is the
approach towards mutual trust. The concept of mutual trust is almost omnipresent.
Starting with the 19th century, it has been named as the basis for mutual recognition
in criminal matters. Since mutual recognition has come to the fore of judicial
cooperation, mutual trust has therefore experienced a similarly steep career. In some
respects, it seems to have gained an even higher priority for new legislative efforts
and taken the place of mutual recognition. This is a little surprising, since there
seems to be even less agreement on what trust means and what its problem-solving
capacity is.
In the early stages of mutual recognition in judicial cooperation (both in civil and
criminal matters), trust was mainly treated as a given social phenomenon that was
the motivation for entering into treaties with other states. As such it is no applicable
legal rule in itself, but rather the rationale behind judicial cooperation in general and
mutual recognition in particular. As Delius put it in 1896 : „In view of the trust that a231
state cannot, as a rule, deny to the courts of another civilised state [...], it does not
appear presumptuous to propose an amendment of the current law so that the
enforcement of foreign penal sentences be possible, if reciprocity be guaranteed.” 
 Cf. Blobel/Späth, 30 ELRev. (2005), p. 540 ss. on these views; see also de Hoyos Sancho,232
Montserrat, in: ead. (ed.), p. 42: “stated intention”.
 See below in this chapter and in chapter 7.233
 See below for examples form the case law of the ECJ that are indicative of such a234
conception.
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However, its practical application has long outgrown these modest beginnings. The
notion of trust features more and more prominently in all legal acts and policy papers
concerning mutual recognition; it is often referred to as a “principle” of mutual trust,
and it has established itself as a legal concept in the case law of the ECJ. As such,
it is generally used to explain why obstacles to mutual recognition are no longer
needed and a higher degree of cooperation is possible.
This development is often criticized by scholars as transforming mutual trust into a
mere postulate, imposed from above,  that does not reflect the real level of trust232
between states which may be lower than claimed. As a result, there is a call for trust-
building measures, often through approximation and harmonisation of fundamental
rights standards, which is now answered by the Commission.233
Some, however, see the potential of trust in functioning as a behavioural frame that
need not have a strong factual basis, letting suffice the technical process of
cooperation.234
The idea that mutual trust is necessary for a close cooperation between several
sovereign states is in itself not surprising. Obviously, cooperation will only be
effective and fruitful if the agents trust in each other. Therefore, mutual trust is rightly
considered as a basis of mutual recognition. Yet the exact functions of mutual trust
and its interrelation with mutual recognition are anything but clear. Is it a factual or a
legal concept? Is it the prerequisite or the result of mutual recognition? Does trust
require harmonisation or render it superfluous? 
The theoretical starting point must be the notion of mutual trust in a broader
conceptual context. Mutual trust in judicial cooperation is basically an extrinsic factor.
It refers to an extra-legal idea that everybody has a general understanding of. This is
why it is rarely defined by those who use it. However, a theoretical analysis in the law
 Blobel/Späth, 30 ELRev. (2005), nt 71.235
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is still missing. This is why it is so important to take into consideration the works of
economics and social sciences, where more thorough analyses have been
undertaken. In the law, trust has mainly been dealt with between private parties in
contract law (good faith) or as the trust of an individual vis-à-vis the state, its
legislation and administration. The trust between states in each others’ legislations
and of foreign judicial authorities in each others’ decisions in cooperative relations
has not been given priority. In economics and social sciences however, the special
role of trust in cooperation has been under scrutiny for a long time.
I will therefore look briefly at the main traits of definitions of trust in cooperative
relations in the social sciences. While I am aware that it would be well beyond the
scope of this work to attempt any exhaustive evaluation of these approaches, I still
believe it is important to outline some fundamental assumptions that can help to
structure the legal debate. Against this background, I will look at the notion of mutual
trust in cooperation in criminal, in civil and in asylum matters as it appears in the
case law of the ECJ, in legislative approaches and in the academic debate. Its
application in the context of cooperation in civil matters is particularly interesting in
that it shows how the ECJ tends to develop mutual trust into a true normative
principle, instead of only dealing with it as a factual basis, or a telos. The comparison
to European Civil Procedural law is also rewarding since the recognition of final
judgements (as a form of mutual recognition) in civil law is much older than in
criminal law. Thus, problems that are only now emerging in criminal law might have
been successfully addressed by civil law. After that,  I will render my own analysis of
what mutual trust in judicial cooperation in criminal matters means, how it could be
used to improve judicial cooperation, but also what its limitations are.
4.1 Trust in society
While Luhmann could still complain in 1968 that literature with trust as its main focus
was sparse, this certainly no longer holds true. The importance of trust in a complex
environment has long been at the heart of social theorizing.  235
 Gambetta, Can we trust trust? p. 218; Luhmann, Vertrauen, passim, esp.  p. 38.236
 Seligman, The problem of trust, p. 21.237
 In the first edition of Vertrauen in 1968; his notion of trust m ight however have changed as238
his systems theory advanced further.
 As distrust is the functional equivalent and reduces complexity through negative239
expectations.
 Luhmann, Vertrauen, p. 29.240
 Blobel/Späth, 30 ELRev. (2005) nt 61.241
 Axelrod, The evolution of cooperation, p. 169ss.242
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What most theories on trust agree on is that trust presupposes a degree of
uncertainty that the trustor has in relation to the actions of the trustee. One actor
relies on the future behaviour of another actor without knowing if his expectations will
be met, because that actor has the freedom to disappoint.  When one party exerts236
control or force, or when it knows the outcome for certain, it need not - in fact, cannot
- trust. One “trusts [...] when one cannot know, when one has not the capabilities to
apprehend or check on the other and so has no choice but to trust.”  Therefore, this237
uncertainty is a constituent element of trust.
But trust is also the mechanism that helps us to deal with this uncertainty. As
Luhmann explained early on,  trust (and even distrust ) serves to reduce social238 239
complexity and thus enables us to make an intuitive decision because it structures
the environment in a categorically preformed way. By deciding between trust and
distrust, the actor effectively deals with, or reflects, contingency.  240
Whether a certain degree of pre-existing trust is necessary for successful
cooperation is under constant debate, though it is required by most models.  As an241
example of the opposite view, we can take Axelrod who argues from a game-
theoretical perspective that cooperation can emerge without trust when it is beneficial
to the actors and there is the probability of future interaction so that cooperation can
be maintained through reciprocity.  Similarly, cooperation could emerge accidentally242
rather than intentionally, and the actors could decide to uphold this pattern. Trust
may then follow cooperation. This is an interesting thought because its underlying
arguments are comparable to the approach that treats trust as a behavioural frame
in judicial cooperation, which we will deal with later. There, actors are required to
 Gambetta, Can we trust trust? p. 234.243
 Gambetta, Can we trust trust? p. 234.244
 Walker, The problem of trust, p. 31.245
 Luhmann, Familiarity, p. 97s., defines confidence as a situation where alternatives are not246
considered, whereas trust requires a situation of risk and a conscious choice in the face of
possible disappointment.
 Lipset/Schneider, The Confidence gap.247
 Walker, The problem of trust, p. 22.248
 This becomes even more obvious when we accept the idea that security necessitates249
confidence in the absence of threats to one’s social and material environment, cf. Walker, The
problem of trust, p. 21.
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cooperate independently of their expectations which is regarded as the essence of
trust; however, positive expectations might nonetheless follow. 
Somewhat related to this idea is the “as-if”- approach. In the absence of pre-existing
trust, it can be necessary to act as if one trusted “until more stable beliefs can be
established”.  The evolution of trust requires ”trusting trust“ , a “leap of faith”.243 244 245
Successful cooperation can then in its turn reinforce trust, so that the trust invested
will ideally initiate an upward-moving spiral. It is related to models of cooperation
without trust because it does not require trust for the “first move”, or rather, only trust
in trust and not in the other party.
While there is wide agreement on some elements of trust, the differentiation between
trust and confidence is all but clear.  Some theorists  hardly draw any distinction246 247
at all. The most convincing approach differentiates, among other things, along the
lines of certainty. While trust is extended to the unknown, confidence is an
expectation that has its basis in fact and knowledge. Trust is “that in which we must
invest when we do not - or do not yet - have confidence in the workings of the
institutions or the behaviour of other agents. In other words, while confidence is an
accomplished state upon which we can more or less passively rely; trust is an active
way of building confidence.”  248
On an EU level, confidence can thus be described as a state that legislation intends
to realize and reinforce,  whereas promoting trust instead implies that it is249
necessary to trust because confidence has not yet been achieved. Trust will probably
always be needed in EU cooperation since it is impossible, despite all efforts to
 Walker, The problem of trust, p. 30s.250
 Art. I-41 [1b], see below for a more thorough analysis.251
 The German version still speaks of “Vertrauen”, the Dutch of “vertrouwen”, the French of252
“confiance” etc.; for an etymological analysis see Blobel/Späth, 30 ELRev. (2005), p. 535s.;
personally, I doubt the usefulness of etymology as an interpretation device  in law.
 Cf. for example the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal253
matters of the 15 May 1972, ETS No. 073: “in a spirit of mutual confidence”; Van
Hoek/Luchtman, 1 Utrecht Law Review (2005), p. 2; for the differences of the “old” and the
“new” notion of trust and their merger by the ECJ cf. Flore, Confiance, p. 18s.
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further common action and mutual knowledge, to reach a state where every agent in
judicial cooperation knows the law and practice of all others and can thereupon form
positive expectations.  The official terminology however treats both words as250
synonymous. While trust is more widely used in all legal acts, policy papers,
judgments etc., it is sometimes substituted for confidence. This seems to happen
randomly rather than as the result of any differing conceptual understanding. The
draft Constitutional Treaty, for example, spoke of “promoting mutual confidence”,
although “mutual trust” would have been preferable - or at least acceptable - in this
context.  One should, however, hesitate to draw any conclusions as to the251
legislator’s conception from this. Although any language can explain the two
concepts of trust and confidence, there is not often a semantic equivalent to this
terminological couple. Thus, other language versions of official texts always use the
same word, even when the English language version differentiates.252
These basic ideas will allow us to analyse the notions of trust in the EU judicial
cooperation much better and help to tackle a volatile legal concept.
4.2 Trust in the law
As we have seen above, trust is one of the major reasons for states to enter into a
fixed framework of judicial cooperation. Even the classical extradition treaties
necessitated a certain degree of trust so that states would agree on certain rules and
abide by them.  Trust in this sense has three elements. It means  that one state253
considers the other states’ legal systems to be compatible enough with its own, that
it considers the fundamental rights standards to be adequate and that it expects the
other to fulfill its obligations under the treaty as well. The Luhmannian notion of
 This basically resembles a rule of non-inquiry, cf. Van Hoek/Luchtman, 1 Utrecht Law254
Review (2005), p. 2s.
  See de Groot, Mutual Trust, p. 85, 87s., with further references.255
 Apap/Carrera, European Arrest W arrant, p. 4, 16.256
 Comment on Art. 28; Report published in OJ C 59/1 of 05.03.1979.257
 Brussels I-Regulation (44/2001/EC of 22 December 2000), recitals 16 and 17; Brussels IIa-258
Regulation (2201/2003/EC of 27 November 2003), recital 21; Regulation on insolvency
proceedings (1346/2000/EC of 29 May 2000), recital 22.
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complexity reduction has a lot to do with this. 
When states decide to cooperate and recognise each others’ decisions, they
effectively channel future judicial decisions in a certain direction. They thereby render
further inquiry into this matter superfluous. This is a great advantage over case-by-
case agreement between states that must be reached in the absence of a general
extradition treaty. It will allow the judicial authority to avoid looking into the
complexities of foreign procedural and substantive criminal law.  A principle of254
mutual trust as such was, however rather foreign to the courts of all the Member
States save, perhaps, the Netherlands.255
Thus, trust is not only the basis for classical treaties on legal aid, but even more so
for all EU measures based on mutual recognition.  It features more and more256
prominently both in legal acts, and in policy papers.
In civil matters, trust was at first only mentioned as a reason for the absence of
review on the substance of jurisdictional questions and the assumption that any court
has applied its rules on jurisdiction correctly in the Jenard-report on the Brussels
Convention.  Over time, however, it was elevated to a “principle” of mutual trust in257
the Brussels I- and Brussels IIa Regulations, the Regulation on insolvency
proceedings and the like, and features in the respective recitals  as the justification258
for automatic recognition, for efficient and rapid cooperation and for minimizing
grounds for non-recognition and shifting them to the appeal stage. In measures of
criminal procedure, it is just as important.
This is a similar line of argumentation as in criminal matters. Although mutual trust is
not referred to in the conclusions of Tampere, it is invoked by the  programme of
 OJ C 12/02 of 15.01.2001.259
 Recital 10 of framework decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002.260
 Recital 8 of framework decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008.261
 Council Doc. 17024/09, p. 25, 37. The Stockholm conclusions seek "to foster a genuine262
European judicial and law enforcement culture" (p. 8).
 Framework decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003, recital 4 of the preamble “confidence”.263
  The concept of trust is not restricted to judicial recognition. It is in fact an inherent part of264
the development of the internal market and is often said to underlie the famous Cassis de
Dijon ruling and the W hite paper on completing the internal Market of 1985 and, in this area as
well, it is found in many acts requiring recognition. Cf. to this: Blobel/Späth, 30 ELRev. (2005),
p. 533s.; if trust in judicial cooperation is again introduced to create a parallelism to the
common market dynamic, the same criticism as with m utual recognition applies, cf.
Nettesheim , EuR 2009, p. 39.
 Gambetta, Can we trust trust? p. 234; Walker, The problem of trust, p. 23.265
84
measures to implement the programme of mutual recognition in criminal matters.259
In legal acts, a “high level of confidence” is seen as the justification for, among
others, the mechanism of the European Arrest Warrant  and the European260
Evidence Warrant,  the 2009 Stockholm Programme,  and the framework decision261 262
on the execution of freezing orders.  At the moment, trust is incessantly put forward263
and named as the basis for measures in EU criminal law cooperation, and, as we will
see, particularly in very controversial areas.264
This leads one to wonder whether there might not be a purpose in the very
mentioning of trust itself. It is a feature of trust that its declaration can encourage the
other party to commit in turn and thereby accept the trust vested by the other party.265
A mere rhetoric of trust in the EU could therefore be conducive to real trust.
For a more profound analysis of the concept of mutual trust I will take into account
the case law of the ECJ with regard to mutual trust. The rulings of the ECJ have, in
fact, had a greater influence on the mechanisms of trust than any theoretical debate.
I will then look at the approach of legislation and EU policy in criminal matters and
finally discuss this concept with regard to current doctrine, define the concept of
mutual trust as I understand it and illustrate its functions and limitations.
4.3 Trust as a legal principle in civil procedure
In civil matters, the ECJ has rendered several very important judgments concerning
 Cf. Jandoli, IIC 2000, p. 783ss and Thode, BauR 2005, p. 1533ss.266
 Now Art. 27(2) Brussels-I Regulation.267
85
mutual trust. Three of them have contributed towards establishing a true legal
principle of trust and are particularly helpful in understanding the ECJ’s notion of the
relation of trust and fundamental rights.
The decisions in Gasser and in Turner v Grovit were both concerned with problems
of torpedo-litigation.  Thereby, a party that might be sued seeks a declaration for266
non-liability as a procedural tactic; mostly a very slow and incompetent forum is
chosen merely to prevent the other party from enforcing its claims. The ECJ started
with a relatively modest take on trust. In Gasser, it mainly used trust as a strong
interpretative tool. In Turner v Grovit,  it develops a principle of mutual trust that has
a specific legal content. In Zarraga, the latest and most far-reaching decision, it
requires trust as a principle to be applied even when its factual basis has been
undermined by a manifestly false statement of the court of the state of origin.
All these decisions take it as an element of trust to leave the solution of a
fundamental rights problem to the state of origin. 
Another important factor running through the case-law is the pivotal role that a
uniform allocation of jurisdiction plays in connection with the development of a
principle of mutual trust.
The ruling in Gasser
MISAT, an Italian company, feared to be sued by the Austrian Gasser for breach of
contract in Austria and therefore sought a negative declaration for non-liability before
a court in Rome, despite an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of Austrian courts.
According to Art. 23 Brussels Convention  any court second seized would have to267
stay its proceedings. When Gasser later brought an action for payment in Austria,
the question arose whether the jurisdiction clause gave the Austrian courts the right
to deviate from the lis pendens-rule so that the prorogated forum could prevail, or if
the courts of the prorogated forum could at least decide on the jurisdiction of the
court first seized, and, more importantly, if this was at least exceptionally permissible
  In Gasser the question related to more than half a year for a decision on jurisdiction and268
three years for a first instance decision on the merits in Italy, para. 59s. of the judgment.
  ECJ judgment of 24 January 2004, C-116/02 - Gasser.269
  Para. 71.270
  Para. 72.271
 Para 71, 83, 92 of the opinion.272
 Para 72.273
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when in the courts of one Member State certain proceedings were excessively
protracted, causing one party extreme disadvantages.  The ECJ very concisely268
rejects this idea.  Since no express mention of this situation is found in the269
Convention,  the mutual trust in “each other’s legal systems and institutions” as the270
basis of the Convention precludes subjecting the lis pendens rule to the quality of
proceedings before another Member State’s courts.  Any problems concerning the271
access to justice for parties affected by this kind of litigation are not discussed.
Basically, the notion of trust is used as an argument against a more limited
understanding of the lis pendens-rule. This form of purposive interpretation is not yet
very unusual. However, by not addressing the fundamental rights concerns raised by
the referring court, even though they were based on systemic problems, it is already
implied that trust will be given an abstract meaning. Once it has been declared as the
basis of a certain form of cooperation, the ECJ does not question its factual basis. 
Interestingly, the Court did not fully follow the line of argument of Advocate General
Léger. Instead of relying on the trust between states in their respective justice
systems, he stressed the importance of the classical legal concept of trust that
private parties in international trade need to have in their (jurisdiction) agreements
and used this sort of classical legal understanding of trust in favour of a derogation
from the lis pendens rule in such cases.272
A second important issue is the relation of trust and jurisdiction. Mutual recognition
is regarded as the basis of the compulsory system of jurisdiction that the convention
lays down. Surprisingly, simplified recognition and enforcement on the basis of
common, rather than national, rules, are regarded as a “corollary” of this allocation of
jurisdiction.  In criminal matters, simplified recognition has been introduced without273
 Cf. also Klip, EU Criminal Law, p. 424.274
  ECJ judgment of 27 April 2004, C-159/02 - Turner v Grovit.275
 This ruling caused a lot of discussion because it curtailed the scope of a very important and276
ancient tool of English civil procedure. In fact, these injunctions had already been established
in the 15th century in equity to prevent proceedings in a common law court, Ingenhoven,
Rechtsschutz, p. 276.
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any allocation of jurisdiction, so that, if anything, jurisdiction might become the
corollary of mutual recognition. The connection of jurisdictional rules and recognition
in civil matters highlights how important it is to have some degree of minimum
harmonisation for mutual recognition. It is logical that states should first agree on the
conditions under which a judgment should be recognised and should collectively
agree on the courts best placed before giving judgments an EU-wide
enforceability.  The criminal law approach of reducing a uniform allocation of274
jurisdiction - of even just the reduction of jurisdictional conflicts - to an afterthought,
on the other hand, seems the wrong way around. It is again indicative of the
tendency to use mutual recognition in criminal matters as a seemingly easy way to
cooperate without any loss of sovereignty and any visible collective authorship.
The strong connection of trust as a legal principle to the allocation of jurisdiction
remains a major line of reasoning in decision in civil matters. 
The ruling in Turner v Grovit
The case of Turner v Grovit  treats the question of whether anti-suit injunctions275
prohibiting one party from litigating abroad are still a valid instrument in a common
European judicial space characterized by a unitary regime for the allocation of
jurisdiction in Continental-European tradition.  That English courts saw it necessary276
to issue anti-suit injunctions to counter abuses of European litigation shows that a
substantive trust is not fully established between the courts of the Member States.
The ECJ did not content itself with this state of facts but interpreted mutual trust as
a legal principle, as a legal imperative to be followed by the courts of the Member
States.
Anti-suit injunctions are issued to restrain one party from initiating or continuing
proceedings against the party seeking the injunction if the proceedings in another
 They rather seem to have tried, as long as possible, to avoid any reference to the ECJ,277
surprisingly regarding any possible doubts as to the lawfulness of this action as unfounded; in
Continental Bank,  a case similar to Gasser but involving an anti-suit injunction, the question
was declared to be an acte clair, Lord Steyn in Continental Bank N.A. v Aeakos Compania
Naviera S.A. and Others, CA [1994] 1 W LR 588, p. 599 with further references,  in response
to the defendant who had demanded that the question be referred to the ECJ.
  I will refer to the Regulation although the decision was still based on the Convention in278
order to draw more general conclusions.
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forum are vexatious or oppressive, unconscionable or contrary to an obligation, i.e.
jurisdiction or an arbitration clause. They are issued in personam and do not
immediately affect the foreign proceeding itself. Any violation can result in damages
and constitutes a contempt of court, giving rise to fines and other penalties. England
will not recognise a foreign judgment contrary to an injunction on grounds of public
policy. In cases of perceived abuse English courts did not hesitate to issue anti-suit
injunctions even in cases governed by the Brussels Convention.277
Turner was a Briton domiciled in England and had worked under the management of
Grovit first in England, then in Spain. He later started proceedings before the
Employment Tribunal in London for unlawful termination of the contract. When
Turner got awarded damages, another company of the employer’s group  instituted
proceedings in Madrid against Turner for terminating his contract untimely, claiming
high damages in turn. The House of Lords referred the question to the ECJ whether
an English court could issue a restraining order against a defendant instituting
foreign proceedings in bad faith to obstruct the English proceedings in cases where
the Brussels Convention applied.
Issuing an anti-suit injunction in a case like this is problematic because according to
the mechanism of the Brussels I regulation  the English court could have continued278
its own proceedings while the Spanish Court would have ruled on its own jurisdiction
of its own motion and, had it judged on the identity of the parties and the matter in
dispute in the same manner, it would have stayed its proceedings or dismissed the
action according to Art. 27. The question is therefore whether the functioning of Art.
27 must be regarded as exhaustive. 
The ECJ answered clearly in the affirmative. The importance of this decision lies in
  Blobel/Späth, 30 ELRev. (2005), p. 285.279
  Para. 30ss.280
  Namely, that mutual recognition is a “corollary” to jurisdiction, para. 24.281
  Para. 25s.; see also Harris, 115 LQR (1999), p. 579.282
 The in personam effect was seen as artificial, since the party could be forced to withdraw its283
actions abroad through fines, so that the foreign court would never have an opportunity to
answer jurisdictional questions differently from English courts, para 27; cf. also Kruger, 53
ICLQ (2004), 1035; this had been the main argument of the proponents, cf. the submitted
observations of the UK government, para. 21 of the judgment, and the Court of Appeal
decision,  [2000] QB 435 (CA 1999).
 Para. 28.284
 W hich he sometimes refers to as a principle.285
 Para. 31 of the opinion.286
 Para. 31, 33 of the opinion.287
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the decisive weight  the court attributes to a concept that was before merely a279
justification, a part of the ratio behind the Brussels Regime. Following AG Colomer’s
reasoning who saw a contradiction to the spirit of mutual trust in issuing an anti-suit
injunction,  the court carefully establishes a principle of mutual trust.  It reiterates its280
ruling on trust from Gasser  and defines it as an element of this mutual trust that a281
court has to rely on the conviction that each Member State’s courts will be able to
judge with the same authority on questions of jurisdiction. The mere fact that an anti-
suit injunction will deprive the court second seized of the possibility to decide on its
own jurisdiction is seen as a violation of this principle.  Instead of trusting the282
Spanish court to stay its proceedings if this should be necessary, the English court
placed its own evaluation higher.  Any assessment as to the appropriateness of283
foreign proceedings, or criticism of the defendant for bringing them, is regarded as
contrary to the principle of mutual trust.  Advocate General Colomer even attempts284
to give a specific definition of mutual trust.  He states that trust in general285
“presupposes that each State recognises the capacity of the other legal systems to
contribute independently, but harmoniously, to attainment of the stated objectives of
integration”.  Additionally, in applying common rules on jurisdiction, trust means that286
there are no superior national authorities and that they meet on an equal footing.287
Thus, the notion of trust is complemented by the elements of a common goal and is
based on equality.
The case of Turner v Grovit therefore gives a striking example of how the concept of
 ECJ judgment of 22 December 2010, C-491/10PPU - Zarraga.288
 Recital 21.289
90
mutual trust is developed by the Court of Justice. The ruling shows that in its view
mutual trust is not only a concept that is behind the European system of civil
procedure, but a legal principle that may be applied in order to decide a particular
case. Once more, uniform allocation of jurisdiction is one of the main reasons that
allow the Court to rely on mutual trust so fully. The AG’s notion of independence in
contributing toward the common goal of integration and of equality in doing so is
dependent on the fact that states have agreed beforehand why the assessment and
decision of one Member State’s court should prevail in a certain case. If a state
accepts in advance the competence of another state’s courts, it must adhere to this
system of jurisdiction also in disputed cases. 
The ruling in Zarraga
Recently, the ECJ took the notion of trust much further. The Zarraga case  is a288
decision concerning mutual recognition in family law, namely concerning the
simplified recognition of judgments concerning the return of a child according to the
Brussels IIa Regulation. Like all other mutual recognition instruments, the Regulation
states mutual trust as the basis for this simplified recognition mechanism that keeps
grounds for refusal to the minimum.289
The case deals with two questions of the greatest possible importance in the area of
mutual recognition in general and provides some perspectives on criminal law.
The two questions of particular interest were if a state might exceptionally assume a
power of review even within a system of automatic recognition and enforcement if the
decision to be enforced contains a serious infringement of fundamental rights and
secondly, whether enforcement is still mandatory when the certificate issued by the
Member State of origin that makes a decision enforceable contains a declaration
which is manifestly inaccurate.
Zarraga, a Spaniard, had married a German woman and they had a daughter. The
family’s habitual residence was Spain. When the parents separated and started
 Para. 49; it did not, however, subscribe to the view that the certificate was actually wrong.290
91
divorce proceedings, the father was provisionally awarded rights of custody by the
Court of First Instance and Preliminary Investigations No 5 of Bilbao, whereafter the
daughter lived with her father. After having moved back to Germany, the mother did
not send her daughter back to her father after an agreed visit. The Spanish court
then issued several provisional measures according to which the daughter could not
leave Spain with her mother (if she should have returned) and continued its main
proceedings. A date was fixed for hearing the views of the mother and daughter, but
neither attended. This  was mainly due to the fact that the court could not guarantee
mother and daughter to be able to leave Spain after the hearing (in view of the
provisional measure). Hearing the daughter via video conference was denied. The
father was then awarded sole custody in the main proceedings. An appeal against
this based on the missing hearing of the daughter was dismissed, since she had
been notified but voluntarily not appeared. The court did however take into account
the hearing before the German court. In the German proceedings the father asked
for the return of his daughter. This was denied by the Oberlandesgericht Celle, even
when a certificate according to Art. 42(2) of the Brussels IIa-Regulation was issued
by the Spanish court which should have led to immediate recognition of the decision
to return the daughter. The Oberlandesgericht did not want to enforce this judgment
since the Spanish court had not heard the child’s statement. In the opinion of the
Oberlandesgericht the certificate was incorrect, because it stated that the court had
fulfilled its obligations to hear the child but, according to the Oberlandesgericht, in the
light of Art. 24(1) of the Charter, greater effort should have been given to fulfill the
requirement of providing an “opportunity to be heard” within the meaning of Art. 42(2)
of the regulation and no actual hearing had been held.
The ECJ held that, among other reasons, the allocation of jurisdiction and the lack of
grounds for refusal obliges the courts of another Member State to declare any
judgment enforceable that is certified with the content outlined in the Regulation,
even if the content should be incorrect.  The system of mutual trust dictates,290
according to this view, that any fundamental rights issues must be left to resolve
within the legal system of the Member State of origin, since all states have to trust
 Para. 70.291
 Para. 98292
 Para. 128 of the opinion.293
 Para. 140 of the opinion.294
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that “their respective national legal systems are capable of providing an equivalent
and effective protection of fundamental rights [...]”.291
Advocate General Bot was even more explicit in his opinion: “The mutual trust and
recognition which govern Regulation No 2201/2003 are accordingly intended to
create, in the European judicial area, a system which resembles so far as possible
the situation which pertains within a single Member State...”,  “...the level of mutual292
trust between the Member States in the capacity of the courts of the other Member
States to ensure genuine protection for those rights made it possible to take that
logic to its ultimate conclusion and confer on the final judgment delivered by the court
with territorial jurisdiction a specific enforceability which cannot be challenged in the
other Member States.”  “Even if the child has not been given an opportunity to be293
heard, contrary to the information provided on the certificate issued under Article 42
of Regulation No 2201/2003 and in breach of the provisions of that article and of the
fundamental right under Article 24(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, that regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the court of the
requested Member State may not oppose the enforcement of a certified judgment
ordering the return of a child delivered on the basis of Article 11(8) of that
regulation.”294
If we take this line of reasoning seriously, it shows an understanding of trust that
strips it of any meaningful empirical content. If trust is a certain expectation you form
of another’s behaviour in the absence of full knowledge, any exact previous
knowledge of sure disappointment erodes trust. When the ECJ and the AG still ask
a Member State to have trust in the face of false statements and knowledge of
breach of fundamental rights, it basically renders a definition of trust as a behavioural
frame. Trusting is then the outward behaviour of cooperation and trust is just a code
for a model of cooperation without any substantive trust. It seems that the ECJ
subscribes to those models of cooperation that see a possibility for cooperation
 Gambetta, Can we trust trust? p. 234, see above.295
 Peers, 48 CMLRev. (2011), p. 693 nt. 224.296
 In the Mantello case, ECJ (Grand Chamber) judgment of 16 November 2010, C-261/09: the297
law of the issuing Member State of a European Arrest W arrant is decisive for the question of
whether the person has been finally judged in that country; the executing Member State may
not decide on this; cf. also the case note of Ouwerkerk, 48 CMLRev. (2011), p. 1687.
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without trust, and just renames it trust. Or, in other words, states are expected to
behave “as if” they trusted each other, only that the pretence is not a first step until
more stable beliefs can be established.  Rather, it is an eternal and static “as-if”-295
approach. The dangers of this are obvious, so that this decision has been called the
“low point” of the doctrine of mutual trust.  It also leaves open a very important296
question concerning the responsibility for maintaining fundamental rights standards.
If a state knowingly assists in a return of a child that will result in a flagrant breach of
fundamental rights, it might itself be responsible for it both under the Charter and the
ECHR / Art. 6 TEU. The interpretation of a Regulation contrary to primary law would
then not be possible. We will deal with this question in the part on fundamental
rights. It seems that this fundamental rights angle could be the key to the end of this
far-reaching legal trust concept.
The idea of a European judicial space modelled to resemble the situation within a
single Member State also shows the inherent belief that closer cooperation is always
good, even though the goal might be unclear. In actual fact, the idea of a single state
seems to rely on ‘common market dynamics’ once more, despite its being obvious
that a European judicial space should and must be quite different from a single
Member State.
The problems with incorrect certificates that are the basis for recognition could arise
in criminal matters in a very similar way. As outlined above, most mutual recognition
instruments contain a warrant or similar document that certifies certain aspects in a
specified form. These could also be wrong, and this could be known to the executing
authority, whereby fundamental rights problems might arise. The related question of
whose view on the fulfilment of certain requirements is decisive has already been
under scrutiny by the ECJ.297
  ECJ judgment of 11 February 2003, C-187/01 and C-385/01.298
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In criminal procedure, on the contrary, no such system of uniform allocation of
jurisdiction is adopted, nor is it likely to come into force in the medium term. The
cooperation has no equal duration and intensity. However, there are at least strong
hints that mutual trust might be applied as a legal principle in this area of law as well.
4.4 Trust as a legal principle in criminal procedure
As outlined above, in criminal procedural law the concept of mutual trust is regularly
invoked. However, the case law of the ECJ is not yet as elaborate in transforming the
concept of mutual trust into a legal principle. This seems, however, due to the more
limited competences that the ECJ had according to the ex-Art. 35 EU and the relative
novelty of this area of law rather than to a different understanding on the side of the
court. Moreover, the ECJ already indicated a similar interpretation in joint decisions
Gözütok/Brügge.  In both of these cases, the question concerned the interpretation298
of Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention (ne bis in idem), namely whether the decision
of a public prosecutor to discontinue proceedings against an individual can mean that
a person’s trial has been “finally disposed of”.
Gözütok was a Turkish national, domiciled in the Netherlands. In his snack bar, the
Dutch police twice seized considerable amounts of drugs in 1996. When Gözütok
accepted the prosecution’s offer to pay a certain sum of money (“transactie”),
proceedings against him were stopped with the effect that any future proceedings on
the same grounds are barred in the Netherlands (Art. 74(1) of the Dutch criminal
code). German authorities found out about his activities and later arrested Gözütok
in Germany in 1997, assuming jurisdiction on the basis of § 6 Nr. 5 German Penal
Code (StGB). The Oberlandesgericht Köln referred the above-mentioned question to
the ECJ.
Brügge was a German national, resident in Germany, who was accused of having
wounded a Belgian woman in Belgium. After the German prosecution had
discontinued the proceedings following a payment of 1.000 DM according to § 153 a
 In Germany, according to § 153 a para. 1 s. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Brügge299
could not be prosecuted on the basis of the same facts again unless the legal evaluation
changes (from a Vergehen to a Verbrechen, an offence that carries a minimum prison term of
one year; so-called eingeschränkte materielle Rechtskraft).
  Para. 30s.300
  Para. 33.301
  Cf. also Flore, Confiance, p. 18.302
 See also Conway, 13 EJCCL (2005), p. 280.303
  Only this understanding of Art. 54 will support the full free movement of persons instead of304
endangering persons who have committed only minor offences and consequently not been
subject to a court trial. It also tries to contradict the literal, systematic and historical
interpretation of Art. 54-58 of the convention as advanced by several governments which seem
to further the opposite view , cf. Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht, p. 497ss.
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German Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO), proceedings were started in Belgium.
The Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg Veurne referred a similar question, wanting to
know whether the Belgian proceedings could continue.299
The ECJ interpreted the questions as meaning if a case can be considered “finally
disposed of” even if no court or tribunal is involved in the proceedings and the final
order does not take the form of a judicial decision. It simply states that, in the
absence of a contrary provision in the Schengen Convention, it must suffice if future
prosecution is barred in a Member State and some kind of atonement has been
done.  It then makes a very significant statement: since nowhere in the Schengen300
Convention any degree of harmonisation or approximation of national laws is
required for the full application of Art. 54, this means that “there is a necessary
implication that the Member States have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems
and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other Member
States even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were
applied”.  This clearly shows that the court regards mutual trust as a legal principle,301
since for a social phenomenon this would be circular : the court deduces trust from302
the unlimited scope of Art. 54, since such a far reaching mechanism of recognition
requires trust.  The first mentioned trust must thus be a normative concept, while303
the second is the factual state of trust.  This shows the terminological, but also the
conceptual, confusion that generally exists with regard to trust. The judgment,
however, is not solely based on this principle but also relies on purposive
interpretation to promote free movement.304
  Para. 124 of the opinion, highlighted by author.305
 Para. 41.306
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As concerns the principle of mutual trust, AG Colomer was actually more radical than
the court: “This shared goal [an area of freedom, security and justice] cannot be
achieved without the mutual trust of the Member States in their criminal justice
systems and without the mutual recognition of their respective judgments, adopted in
a true common market of fundamental rights. Indeed, recognition is based on the
thought that while another State may not deal with a certain matter in the same or
even a similar way as one's own State, the outcome will be such that it is accepted
as equivalent to a decision by one's own State because it reflects the same principles
and values. Mutual trust is an essential element in the development of the European
Union: trust in the adequacy of one's partners' rules and also trust that these rules
are correctly applied.“305
While his definition of mutual trust is much the same as that of the court, Colomer
tries to tie mutual trust and mutual recognition back into a common market language.
The futility of this has been amply described above. What exactly a common market
of fundamental rights is supposed to be remains in the dark, and why this common
market should be necessary for mutual trust and mutual recognition is equally
unclear. Obviously, fundamental rights are not going to be marketed in different
countries. If this only means that different fundamental rights standards are going to
be treated as equivalent by judicial authorities, it would have sufficed to say so. The
apparent overall coherence of EU law implied by such language on the other hand is
both misleading and confusing.
In Bourquain, another - very peculiar - case concerning the ne bis in idem- principle,
the ECJ merely reiterated its understanding of trust in Gözütok/Brügge. Advocate
General Colomer, however, seized the opportunity to give a new analysis of the
concept of mutual trust. In his view, the past understanding of mutual trust has been
utilitarian vis-à-vis mutual recognition  and has been applied as a legal principle:306
“Although it must be assumed that there is, between the States, a respect for certain
conditions, especially regarding fundamental rights, experience shows that mutual
 Para. 45 of the opinion.307
 Para. 46.308
 Para. 107 nt. 87 of the opinion. In this case, the Court did not follow her opinion.309
 Overstating, in my view, the varying values that are expressed in criminal law and their310
incompatibility with recognition. After all, many current forms of criminal law and procedure are
not necessarily an expression of deep cultural beliefs of the public, but the result of a historical
development based on many accidental factors as well. Even if there should be great cultural
differences expressed in criminal law, this does not mean that states are not willing to
overcome them in a common interest, cf. Sugmann Stubbs / Jager, KritV 2008, p. 66 nt. 32; cf.
for ideas on criminal law as a constitutive element of European identity Hildebrandt, 1
Crim.Law and Philos. (2007), p. 57.
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trust applies in a similar way to a normative principle which encapsulates the
interpretative rules concerning obligations relating to the ‘third pillar’, fulfilling a role
similar to that of loyal cooperation.”  The problems arising from this could,307
according to his view, be solved through harmonisation of procedural and substantive
criminal law, or in the absence of this, through supplementing the cooperation
system through a reference framework of fundamental rights. This corresponds to
the observation that mutual recognition, though originating from the field of inter-state
cooperation, has materialised in individual safeguards.  308
This is the first time any of the institutions have acknowledged the fundamental rights
problems that might follow an overly functionalist view of mutual trust. The Court
itself, however, did not pursue this thought. Any clear take on mutual trust cannot
really be distinguished. There seems to be a great difference of opinion as regards
mutual trust. Advocate General Sharpston, for instance, suspects in her analysis in
Gasparini  that mutual recognition and mutual trust are just “different names for the309
same principle”, that in fact the ECJ prefers trust, while the other institutions use
recognition. She - unsuccessfully - argues that trust is not a sensible basis for ne bis
in idem. The fact that trust has an important place in the Court’s jurisdiction in
criminal cases has often been attributed to the fact that it has arisen in cases
concerning ne bis in idem, where trust is generally conducive to freedom. This might
be the reason why AG Sharpston tries to limit the application of the principle of
mutual trust and recognition. Since she follows a very traditional, nation-state-based
approach to criminal law in the EU,  she argues for a substance-based definition of310
ne bis in idem, where a judicial decision barring further proceedings due to the fact
 ECJ, reference for a preliminary ruling, lodged on 27 July 2011, C-396/11 - Radu.311
 ECtHR judgment of 21 January 2011, no. 30696/09 - M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. 312
 The presumption of Convention compliance was outlined in the Bosphorus case and stated313
that, when parties to the Convention have given power to an international organisation that has
an equivalent degree of fundamental rights protection such as the EU and apply EU measures
without any margin of appreciation, they can rely on the presumption of Convention
compliance, unless the protection is manifestly deficient in a given case, cf. ECtHR judgment
of 30 June 2005, no. 45036/98 - Bosphorus.
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that they are time-barred should not partake of this protection. Thus criminalisation
– which she calls “safety” – should prevail over free movement and recognition in
such cases.
4.5 Outlook 
If the ECJ really only follows a broad approach towards trust in criminal matters
because the ne bis in idem-principle is conducive to freedom, or if it will do so
irrespective of fundamental rights as it does in civil matters, remains speculative. The
Court will soon have a chance to clarify its approach as a case concerning the
responsibility of the executing state in judicial cooperation for fundamental rights
violations in the issuing state is now pending.  311
If we take into account the recent development of asylum law, the Court may well
take a more critical approach to absolute, or normative, views on trust. The
jurisdiction of the ECtHR seems to have had some influence on this. It has now
decided in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece  that a state is in breach of its obligations312
under the ECHR when it transfers an asylum seeker to another EU Member state
that is primarily responsible under the EU’s Dublin-system when it knows that the
person will be subjected to detention and living conditions that are contrary to
Convention rights. At least when the transferring state has a discretionary power to
assume responsibility, it cannot rely on inter-state confidence or a presumption of
equivalent protection in that Member State.  It follows that neither a state’s313
accession to the ECHR nor the transfer of powers to an EU system can build an
irrebuttable presumption that another state will honour its obligations with regard to
fundamental rights. Since then, Advocate General Trstenjak has given two similar
 Joint cases C-411/10 and C-493/10.314
 Opinion in N.S., para. 131, 133.315
 Peers, The death of ‘Mutual Trust’?.316
 ECJ judgment of 21 December 2011,  joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 at  para. 99ss.317
 At para. 100.318
 Both the ECJ and the ECtHR refer to the unanimous reports of international non-319
governmental organisations, correspondence of the UNHCR and Commission reports on the
evaluation of the Dublin system that expose degrading living conditions, cf. the ECJ at para.
90, ECtHR in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece at para. 347ss.
 At para. 86, 89.320
 The judgment relies heavily on the judgment of the ECtHR in M.S.S. v. Belgium and321
Greece, cf. para. 86ss. and the factual findings of the ECtHR.
 It m ight have done do so in the case of Pianese v. Italy and the Netherlands (no. 14929/08)322
with regard to the European Arrest W arrant in a case where, inter alia, the Dutch courts had
relied on a presumption that Italian courts would respect the right to liberty of Art. 5(1) ECHR,
but with a decision of 27 September 2011, the application was considered inadmissable for
being out of time (Art. 35(1) ECHR) in this regard and out of time and manifestly ill-founded
(Art. 35(3) ECHR) as to his other complaints following a partial decision of 15 June 2010.
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opinions on the 22 September 2011 in the now joint cases of N.S. and M.E.,314
stating that “the conclusive presumption that the asylum seeker’s fundamental rights
will be observed in the Member State primarily responsible for his application is
incompatible with the Member State’s duty to interpret and apply Regulation No
343/2003 in a manner consistent with fundamental rights [...].” Only a rebuttable
presumption might be acceptable.  This development has been discussed under315
the heading of a possible “death of ‘mutual trust’“.  The ECJ has mainly followed316
this reasoning  and, significantly, added that any secondary legislation requiring317
such a conclusive presumption might itself be contrary to fundamental rights.318
Even though the observations on mutual trust and fundamental rights might be of
general validity, it still does not seem to me that the ECJ will in the future reduce the
scope of the principle of mutual trust generally. After all, the opinions were rendered
in an area of most systematic fundamental rights violations by one Member State
that are more or less generally acknowledged.  The systemic nature of the319
deficiencies of the conditions for asylum seekers in Greece were an important
argument in the judgment.  Furthermore, any other reasoning would have resulted320
in an open conflict with the ECtHR . The ECtHR has not yet  taken a similar321 322
approach in criminal matters. 
 Green Paper “Strengthening mutual trust in the European judicial area – A Green Paper on323
the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of detention”, COM/2011/327fin.;
Stockholm Programme, Council Doc. 17024/09, p. 25, 37; Green Paper “The Presumption of
Innocence”, COM/2006/174fin., p. 3; Green Paper on the approximation, mutual recognition
and enforcement of criminal sanctions in the European Union, COM/2004/334fin., p. 10, 12;
Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the Community and the
establishment of a European Prosecutor, COM/2001/715fin., p. 17, 48ss.; Programme of
measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters, OJ
C 12/10 of 15 January 2001; Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in crim inal
proceedings, recitals 4, 6, 7, 9, 12; Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18
December 2008 on the European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects,
documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters, recital 8; Council Framework
Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the European Union of orders
freezing property or evidence, recital 4; Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June
2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States,
recital 10; ECJ judgment of 11 December 2008, C-297/07 (Bourquain), para 37; ECJ judgment
of 28 September 2006, C-467/04 (Gasparini), para 30; ECJ judgment of 11 February 2003,
C-187/01 and C-385/01 (Gözütok/Brügge), para 33.
 Similarly Nettesheim , EuR 2009, p. 28, concerning European citizenship.324
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4.6 Criticism and Consequences
From all that we have seen, it seems the only one thing that can be said about
mutual trust with any certainty is that it is a most variable concept. Almost all activity
in the area of freedom, security and justice is to some degree concerned with the
idea of mutual trust. Hardly any policy document, new piece of legislation or judicial
decision does not at least give a passing reference to it.  The focus has been so323
much on promoting mutual trust recently that one could almost presume a shift of
focus from mutual recognition as the driving concept toward the newer concept of
mutual trust. Given this, it is surprising that it is hardly ever defined or explained by
those who use it. It is interchangeably referred to as respect, a presumption, or
confidence. The conceptual vagueness might serve its own purposes. In the eyes of
the Commission and the Council, leaving the exact implications of trust open is
advantageous as it guarantees that it stays a dynamic concept, and one that many
(differing) hopes can be vested in. As for the ECJ, it is not unusual that it does not
first define a concept and then deduct principles from it, but that it follows the reverse
method, so that its conceptual understanding becomes clearer only from the entirety
of its judgments.324
It seems to be the common understanding of most that trust between “Member
 Flore, Confiance, p. 20.325
 See above.326
 Blobel/Späth, 30 ELRev. (2005), p. 535, identify it as a subcategory.327
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States” is necessary for mutual recognition. Not even this is clear, however. At the
high point of the principle of trust - the inclusion in Art. 41(1) of the draft
Constitutional Treaty - mutual confidence was to be promoted “on the basis of mutual
recognition”, so that the relation between the two was essentially reversed, and
cooperation was supposed to bring along the confidence needed.325
If we try to shed light on the basic division between a factual and a normative
concept, one aspect is obvious: regardless of the initial significance of mutual trust,
the ECJ tends to develop it into a true legal principle that - in the analysis of
Advocate General Colomer  - resembles the duty of loyal cooperation.  This must326 327
be taken into account in all areas where mutual trust is used since it carries specific
implications.
But the area of civil procedure also shows the negative tendency that such a
juridification of mutual trust may lead to. The ECJ has not finally dispelled the
concerns raised by the Member States’ courts. Although both Gasser and Turner v
Grovit might have been decided correctly, in both cases the national courts were
faced with pressing problems. This mistrust they had towards the foreign courts that
was based on previous experience cannot easily be overcome without addressing
the fundamental rights issue behind it. Even more so in Zarraga, the German court
was asked to participate in what was, in its own estimation, a flagrant violation of
fundamental rights. 
In the ambit of criminal procedure, the question of factual mistrust is even more
pertinent, owing to the special nature of criminal law as an integral part of national
sovereignty. But as we have seen above, mutual trust has taken a similar direction in
the case law of the ECJ on cooperation in criminal matters. Trust is invoked although
it has no factual basis – the fact that Gözütok and Brügge reached the ECJ in the
first place shows that there is still a great scepticism in practice between the Member
States. In criminal proceedings especially it seems to be very difficult for states to
 “Almost blind”: Mitsilegas, Trust-building measures, p. 280; Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 129.328
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accept differing values of other states and waive their own ius puniendi. The decision
of Gözütok was less about the exact interpretation of Art. 54 of the Schengen
Convention than about lack of trust - or more correctly, about disapproval: the
German prosecution did not want to accept – that is to recognise – the differing
Dutch law and policy on drugs; it considered it too lenient. Similarly, in Brügge, the
Belgian authorities did not want to put up with the “lean” German law. It is clear that
there is a great need to enhance Member States’ readiness to recognise different
legislations.
This is often called „blind“ or „imposed“ trust.  When we look at it more closely, we328
will see that the charge of relying on “blind” trust refers to two different situations:
When it refers to far-reaching measures that the Commission and Council want,
basing it on trust without any factual basis, it refers to the complete leap of faith that
is required, and where the possible outcome cannot be assessed beforehand. When
it is raised against trust as a normative concept and the way the Court uses it to
order a certain performance despite a known outcome, it is something different. In
reality, it has nothing to do with trust. In such decisions, the Court deviates from the
basic assumption that some degree of uncertainty is necessary for trust. If a Member
State does not want to recognise another Member State’s decision, it already knows
the outcome, and it is not mistrust, but simply disapproval. So, in Gözütok and
Brügge, states disapproved of each others’ legislations and the decisions based on
them. Similarly, in Zarraga, the German court disapproved of the proceedings that it
had been informed of. In these situations, trust as the decision to form positive
expectations in the face of uncertainty is impossible. If the Court “orders” trust, it is
obsolete. If the agents are not free and trust is no longer conditional on the behaviour
of the others it cannot and need not exist. Coercion is not a way to enforce trust; it is
an alternative to trust in cooperation, and a rather shaky one. If we then still expect
the actors to trust, even though they know and disapprove the outcome, by saying
that they should consider these as equivalent, or equally good, or equally compatible
with fundamental rights, the concept of trust acquires almost religious overtones,
since it requires the agents to live with a paradox and live with their ineptitude to form
 Cf. e.g. the article in The Telegraph of 26 July 2010 “Britons to be spied on by foreign329
police”, available under http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/ 7909314/
Britons-to-be-spied-on-by-foreign-police.html, on the European Investigation Order.
 Cf. Impalà, 1 Utrecht Law Review (2005), 56ss.330
 Commission report on the implementation since 2007 of the Council framework decision of331
13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between member
states, COM/2011/175fin., p. 5.
 De Biolley, Confiance, p. 181 s., wants to further co-existence of legal orders and prefers332
direct contact over harmonisation.
 See e.g. de Hoyos Sancho, in: ead. (ed.), Criminal Proceedings in the EU, p. 42ss., with333
further references.
 Nilsson, Mutual trust, p. 38, on Gözütok.334
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an opinion of the facts before them, or blind themselves. In such situations, trust can
at best exist as a second order trust in general, but not in the particular case.
In contrast to this far-reaching approach to trust, we find the factual situation. Many
people do not have trust towards foreign judicial and police authorities.  Many329
authorities do not believe that a case will be dealt with in accordance with common
fundamental rights standards, even though they might generally trust their
counterparts. Even states and governments do not trust – although they agree first,
they may later draw back in the implementation stage.  Thus, for example, the330
framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant has not yet been fully
transposed by all.331
At this point, harmonisation comes in. While many still think that harmonisation is
unnecessary  and the ECJ stresses that measures requiring recognition are based332
on trust and do not require any degree of harmonisation - that in fact it is an
alternative - most scholars have recognised that some degree of harmonisation is
needed.  In fact, for this view, trust provides the link between mutual recognition333
and harmonisation. The concept of trust is the ambiguous dividing line for those who
want recognition to go along with harmonisation and those who want it to stand on its
own. Depending on this preference, trust as an a priori concept is used as an
argument that harmonisation is not needed; or alternatively, another notion of trust,
its basis in reality, is used to require a greater degree of harmonisation.
That mutual trust is sometimes a mere postulate, imposed from above, or just
“declared”,  has now been accepted even by the Commission, so that increasingly334
 See the examples in the following paragraphs.335
 Commission report on the European Arrest W arrant, revised version, COM/2006/8fin., point336
2.2.3.: “Contrary to what certain Member States have done, the Council did not intend to make
the general condition of respect for fundamental rights an explicit ground for refusal in the
event of infringement. A judicial authority is, of course, always entitled to refuse to execute an
arrest warrant, if it finds that the proceedings have been vitiated by infringement of Article 6 of
the Treaty on European Union and the constitutional principles common to the Member States;
in a system based on mutual trust, such a situation should remain exceptional.” It would have
been preferable if the Commission had meant that infringements of Art. 6 ought to remain
exceptional, rather than refusals based on it.
 Commission Communication “Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of337
Fundamental Rights by the European Union”, COM/2010/573fin.
 P. 3s.338
 Similarly already in the Communication on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions in339
crim inal m atters and the strengthening o f  m utual trust between Mem ber States,
COM/2005/195fin. in the wake of the Hague programme.
 Green Paper of 14 June 2011 “Strengthening mutual trust in the European judicial area - a340
Green Paper on the application of European criminal justice legislation in the field of detention”
COM/2011/327fin. This is part of the procedural rights package in the wake of the Roadmap
for strengthening procedural rights of suspected persons in criminal proceedings.
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it tries to promote trust actively.  One of the main areas in which trust seems to be335
lacking is the protection of fundamental rights. Just as mutual trust is supposed to
serve and further mutual recognition – a utilitarian understanding according to AG
Colomer – fundamental rights are therefore now promoted to further mutual trust. If
states are unwilling to cooperate due to a possible violation of fundamental rights in
another Member State, this is often described as distrust which hinders mutual
recognition. 
A supposed existence of sufficient fundamental rights protection on a general level
is often used as a reason to require trust and not exercise control on a case by case
basis.  Thus, many proposals tackle fundamental rights in this way. The336
Commission Communication on the implementation of the Charter  even seems to337
regard it as one of the main aims of effective fundamental rights protection to help
promote confidence, so that its lack does not “hinder the operation and strengthening
of cooperation machinery in the area of freedom, security and justice”.  Overall, the338
Commission today repeatedly stresses that a factual, real trust in fundamental rights
protection of all Member States should be built in order to achieve closer judicial
cooperation.339
Similarly, the recent Green Paper on mutual trust and detention conditions,  intends340
 P. 3.341
 The paper is a curious mixture of ambitious ideas and a simplistic presentation, trying to342
illustrate its point through the stories of “Peter”, “Anna” and “Hans”.  
 ECtHR judgment of 21 January 2011, no. 30696/09 - M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.343
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to promote trust so that mutual recognition can operate more effectively. It also
regards mutual trust as the “necessary counterbalance to judicial co-operation
measures that enhance the powers of prosecutors, courts and investigating
officers”.  That seems to imply that trust and fundamental rights are basically the341
same - how else could trust counterbalance powers of prosecutors? - but it might be
due to terminological inconsistencies.  The functionalist view on fundamental rights342
in this particular case might partly be due to competence issues, since the EU needs
to justify its involvement in detention conditions, but it is regrettable that efficient
cooperation rather that common European values are regarded as the primary basis
for creating better detention conditions, and that the latter are only alluded to in
passing. It seems to me that through mutual recognition which greatly enhances
effectivity and enforceability of prison sentences, there is already a basis for EU
involvement in this area.
And secondly, on a general level, it appears wrong to me to remove fundamental
rights from the heart of mutual recognition and cooperation and make them an
auxiliary to mutual trust. Such a functionalist view of fundamental rights openly
lowers their value because it implies that, if more Member States were willing to
“trust” each other and cooperate in the face of low human rights standards, this
would be acceptable for the European Union’s area of freedom, security and justice.
Only if Member States’ judicial authorities begin to mind, and throw sand in the gears
of the so-called cooperation machinery, fundamental rights seem to have a meaning
- being oil for that very same machinery. This is more than just a theoretical problem.
When Member States raised the argument of inter-community trust before the
ECtHR in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece  so as not to have to assume responsibility343
for asylum proceedings, it seems that this cynical view of “trust” was adopted
because states did not mind to cooperate when an Afghan asylum seeker’s
fundamental rights were at stake. According to the functionalist approach to
fundamental rights, this would not require the European Union to concern itself with
 Advocate General Colomer acknowledges as much in his opinion in Bourquain, cf. above.344
 Stockholm Programme, OJ C 115/1 of 04.05.2010, p. 8; Meyer, EuR 2011, p. 193.345
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establishing new or upholding its already established standards for fundamental
rights in this area - only now the ECtHR has stepped in.
Fundamental rights should, from the beginning, be an integral part of judicial
cooperation through mutual recognition because this sort of mechanism is
particularly dangerous for them and poses new and particular problems. Rights are
not there to make recognition instruments function more smoothly. This reverses the
order. They are a precondition. One must agree beforehand what one wants to
recognise under what fundamental rights standards.
Also, by making fundamental rights a vehicle for trust and cooperation, the individual
is removed from the centre.  Fundamental rights are not there to promote and help344
cooperation, but to protect the individual and safeguard him in criminal proceedings
and also in judicial cooperation. It is encouraging that the recent Stockholm
Programme and the Treaty of Lisbon focus more on the individual.  Fundamental345
rights are not something that has to be made effective as a counterbalance to judicial
cooperation; it is inherent in cooperation, an integral part of it. Cooperation needs to
serve security and freedom equally; at the moment, it is just serving one of them, and
then trying desperately to “counterbalance” its ill effects. In an area of freedom,
security and justice there must be some common values and rights beyond minimum
standards. The fundamental rights discussion should be more visionary and less
nationally confined.
If we speak about common standards in cooperation, the questions asked should not
be functional. The main point is not how to achieve ever more cooperation, and how
to achieve trust insofar as it is necessary for it. It should be a substantive question as
to what the conditions are under which we want to make recognition more effective.
What individual rights, what procedural safeguards and what degree of compatibility
do we as a community consider necessary in order to make a decision enforceable
everywhere throughout the Union? If agreement could be reached on these points,
and their application secured, trust and confidence would follow by themselves and
 A way to ’pull off’ the paradox, expressed also in the Union’s motto United in diversity; cf.346
Nuotio, Significance, p. 210; Möstl, 47 CMLRev. (2010), p. 405.
107
could be furthered by flanking measures. Trust can only be a policy concept, but it
cannot be the basis to fill a vacuum of legal measures for the protection of
fundamental rights.
What then, is trust? It is important to acknowledge that trust is a concept with
inherent limitations. It cannot solve all that it is burdened with. The different positions
on trust, and especially on trust and harmonisation, are just two extremes. If we have
complete procedural and substantive harmonisation and application of these rules,
i.e. if all concerned in judicial cooperation know that all others will adhere to the exact
same standards, trust is rendered redundant. With no harmonisation, and no shared
goal or values, trust on the other hand is a pure gamble. It also becomes dangerous,
as trusting makes the other’s actions more effective. Trust, like recognition, is a
concept to deal with diversity;  the question that concerns us here is what its legal346
implications are, and what legislative activity must be connected with mutual trust.
Some harmonisation is certainly necessary, but I think that this harmonisation need
not be of substantive criminal law. More important is the harmonisation of procedural
measures. Most important, in my view, is the uniform allocation of jurisdiction. The
creation of fundamental rights should be advanced independently of this.
Let us first look at the nature of mutual trust. As we have seen, it is often interpreted
as a legal principle by those who think no harmonisation is necessary for it. To my
mind, however, it is only a sublegal category and cannot convincingly be transformed
into a normative concept. Firstly, there is no legal basis for it. While mutual
recognition is now mentioned in the TFEU – even though that does not necessarily
transform it into a legal principle – the inclusion of trust or confidence as envisaged
by the draft Constitutional Treaty was unsuccessful. Trust is instead introduced into
the debate as a mechanism that is supposed to further mutual recognition. If it is
mentioned in legal acts, it is mainly found in the preambles. The binding value of this
 See for the debate Blekxtoon, Commentary, p. 219, and Tinkl, Rechtsstellung, p. 76s., who347
follows the opposite view.
 Fletcher/Lööf/Gilmore, EU Criminal Law, p. 52, criticize it as a concept “twice removed”348
from the ex-Title VI EU.  Some, on the other hand, believe it may even be part of the general
principles of Union law, cf. Blobel/Späth, 30 ELRev. (2005), p. 535.
 Fletcher/Lööf/Gilmore, EU Criminal Law, p. 214.349
 See above 4.1.350
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is doubtful.  Its legal link is therefore very remote.  More important than the347 348
question of a basis for it in legal texts (which, after all, could simply be created) is the
substantial ineptness of the notion of trust to be transformed into a normative
concept. The instant that trust is used as a normative principle, or worse, a legal rule,
is so much disconnected from the meaning of the term „trust“ in sociology and
ordinary language, that there seems no point in keeping it. It then just is a rule that
tells judicial authorities to recognise foreign decisions under all circumstances and
compensates for deficiencies in clarity of the underlying legal acts. This is not a very
promising route. Factual trust is important for cooperation, but not so much for trust
as a normative concept, because in fact the law could just require judicial authorities
to act in a certain way, independently of their feeling and expectations,  but for349
cooperation to work efficiently. Experience shows that, even in a strict legal
framework, both abuse of trust and distrust may carry the day, because there is
always a way around trusting. For governments, they can begin to breach trust by not
implementing legislation properly. Judicial authorities have the possibility to use the
grey areas of the law when they do not trust, to slow proceedings up, not to adhere
to procedures properly, or to find ways around it. Similarly, courts can circumvent
certain questions and not ask for a preliminary ruling. As we have seen, the
possibility of cooperation without trust is doubtful. But even if we followed an
approach that accepted this, it would require the application of reciprocity.350
Reciprocity in a strict meaning is however just what the European sphere was
supposed to overcome. As we have seen above, states may not revert to this rule in
the EU. However, it  will certainly be done in practice, as the example of the reactions
of Spain and other states towards Germany after the judgment of the Constitutional
 The uncertainty is well reflected in the minutes of evidence of 18 January 2006 of the House351
o f  L o rd s  S e le c t  C o m m i t t e e  o n  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n  ( a v a i la b le  a t  h t t p : / /w w w .
publications.parliam ent.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/156/6011805.htm) where Andy
Burnham, MP, clearly states that the system would break down if states were to return to a tit-
for-tat approach, but he also stresses the importance of reciprocity and a possible change in
attitude, should the situation in Germany and other states not be resolved, cf. the answer to
questions 50 to 59.
 Cf. for general observations on “aspirational taglines” Fletcher/Lööf/Gilmore, EU Crim inal352
Law, p. 20.
 This corresponds with the importance practitioners expressed for this kind of flanking353
measures, Wahl, Perception, p. 142ss.
 Cf. for the area of police cooperation Rijken, 2 Utrecht Law Review (2006), 116.354
 Flore, Confiance, p. 28.355
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Court on the transposition of the European Arrest Warrant show.351
As a policy concept, trust should be used sparingly. It is important, but more so when
it stays a background narrative that binds together legislation and soft measures. It
cannot be taken down to the level of practical legal application.
If we look at the content of mutual trust in judicial cooperation, we see that trust can
play a part both on a more abstract level between governments or Member States
and on an operational level between judicial authorities. While trust can work as a
postulate on the first level, as a well-phrased aspiration,  because political will is352
often more important than a factual situation, it will be sabotaged at the second.
Therefore trust is something that mainly needs to be strengthened on an operational
level, through exchange of information, training, networks etc.  A paradoxical effect353
of more knowledge, however, can be that it might be detrimental to trust in that it
leaves less room for illusions.  This is because trust is always intersubjective and354
might be strongest when there is less reason for it.355
What legal implications does trust have, then? As indicated before, mutual
recognition requires us to ask what the conditions are under which states should
cooperate. To agree on these common standards and to harmonise laws that are
necessary for the protection of these standards, must be part of any cooperation
framework. Trust is the effect that these measures should have. If we have already
built this kind of fundamental rights framework, and continue to do so in acts
requiring mutual recognition, then we can say that we might want to promote trust
 For this aspect of jurisdiction see below.356
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through flanking measures, as there is already a basis for it. These should lead to the
expectation between judicial authorities that the other Member States’ authorities will
apply measures requiring mutual recognition lawfully, that they pay respect to all
fundamental rights provisions relevant to a case, and that these provisions are
adequate with regard to the common values of the Union.
I think that harmonisation is necessary mainly in the area of fundamental rights and
that EU legislation should resolve fundamental rights problems at the earliest
possible stage in legal acts requiring mutual recognition besides the more general
fundamental rights frameworks. This should be done first and foremost because of
the intrinsic value of fundamental rights, and the common cause that they present for
the Union, not primarily to build trust in order to facilitate recognition. That may or
may not be the effect it sometimes has. Granted, this sounds like a play on words,
but in practice it will make a difference in the extent and scope of proposals. It will
always make differences in practice, particularly in court decisions, whether a
functionalist or a non-functionalist approach lies at the bottom of legal rules. As
fundamental rights are part of judicial cooperation, it becomes necessary to work
more narrowly on a possible legal and theoretical framework that can help to develop
a coherent approach to fundamental rights in judicial cooperation. The EU offers
great chances of finding a framework that does not have a blind spot in judicial
cooperation, as is often the case with nation states. It is optimal for taking into
account specific dangers for fundamental rights in transnational proceedings and
trying to adapt the fundamental rights framework to this. The last chapter of the
thesis will be dedicated to this attempt.
The second major area requiring harmonisation is the area of jurisdiction. In this
regard, I consider a more functionalist approach to trust acceptable, because
jurisdiction is not just a question of individuals’ rights,  it is also asking states to give356
up their own ius puniendi, an important part of their sovereignty. Member States will
be more willing to accept each other’s judicial decisions if they know why they should
be relying on one state’s estimation more than on another’s or their own. The
  Such as the principle of maximum punitivity, cf. Deiters, ZRP 2003, p. 359 ss.357
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importance of this for recognition in civil matters has been amply highlighted by the
ECJ. The distrust that judicial authorities often feel towards the criminal laws of
another state might be lessened if there was a reason why that state’s law should
prevail. If states agree beforehand through abstract rules on the most appropriate
forum, they might be more induced to accept laws that, for example, in their
estimation, are too lenient, as in Gözütok/Brügge. A Member State’s readiness to
recognise a foreign judgment will certainly increase if the authorities of the
sentencing state were competent according to its view. A state can accept that
another state’s criminal law prevails in a specific case if this is due to a rule
applicable in all Member States. The state authorities would know that, in a parallel
case, its own criminal law would have prevailed. The law that is applied would then
not depend so much on chance as it is the case now (for example, currently
prosecution authorities might have to compete in terms of who is faster in
prosecuting the defendant). Additionally, this would be in line with the idea of a
common European judicial space. 
Such a uniform allocation of jurisdiction would also resolve different problems in
other areas of mutual recognition in criminal matters  and therefore be a means to357
build up mutual trust. The adoption of a legislative act would be an anticipated
declaration of mutual trust on the part of the Member States and therefore fulfill a
positive function of encouraging trust. The negative process of the postulation of
mutual trust that in effect leads to factual distrust could be stopped by measures of
this kind. How the idea of jurisdiction features in judicial cooperation will be the point
of chapter 6.
It must be noted, however, that the problems discussed under the name of failure of
trust can never be totally resolved. Even the highest level of harmonisation cannot
exclude the possibility that some courts will hold a circumstance to be a violation of
fundamental rights, while others will not. In these cases, it is futile to discuss the
substantive issue. In law, the question of who decides, whose estimation is decisive,
is always central, in fact, just as central as the substantive issue itself. If we build a
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system of mutual recognition built on the trust that a uniform allocation of jurisdiction
brings about, cooperation will be a lot more efficient, because it will avoid frictions.
But we must see that frictions do sometimes serve the individual, because one agent
can correct the mistakes of other agents. If closer integration is wanted, cases where
a court cannot step in to do this will occur, just as they do on a national level.
 This is clearly stated by the European Council in the recent Stockholm programme: “The358
protection of the rights of suspected and accused persons in criminal proceedings is a
fundamental value of the Union, which is essential in order to maintain mutual trust between
the Member States and public confidence in the European Union.” (Council Doc. 17024/09, p.
17).
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Chapter  5 Mutual recognition in the law of
evidence-gathering
Every criminal procedure, be it domestic, foreign or transnational, necessitates great
sensitivity to individuals’ rights.  In such procedures, the state has great powers as358
opposed to the individual and there is a great risk that his rights could be infringed.
I am only addressing the problems that arise for individuals’ rights specifically
through a transnational or supranational procedure as opposed to purely domestic
procedures and the question of European activity in that respect. 
Difficulties for the individual are mainly based on two particularities of judicial
cooperation. 
First of all, frictions occur because in one instance of judicial cooperation, different
aspects of different legal systems are applied at different stages of the procedure.
Apart from the national substantive and procedural laws, there are the European
rules on judicial cooperation as transposed by the affected Member States. While
each system of law might in itself be well-balanced, there are few rules on how to
reach this same balance in a combination of different legal systems. I am going to
illustrate this aspect of the issue by analysing the frictions that occur in an area that
is emblematic for the problems in judicial cooperation: the area of judicial
cooperation in evidence-gathering.
The second problem occurs not because different legal systems are applied only in
part, but because there is a conflict as to which legal system will be applied, even as
a whole. This is, therefore, the question of jurisdiction that is responsible for many of
the legal and political issues in judicial cooperation as has been outlined before and
will be dealt with more thoroughly in chapter six. After analysing the legal issues of
jurisdiction in international and European criminal law settings I will develop a
 Cf. Bar, Das Internationale Privat- und Strafrecht, p. 578.359
 Cf. only Lammasch, Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht, p. 847ss; see also Bassiouni, in: id.360
(ed.), Int. Criminal Law Vol. II, p. 7s. who sees the historical basis in international comity.
 See below in this chapter and chapter 7.361
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theoretical framework according to which questions of individuals’ rights in European
Criminal Procedure should be resolved.
The particular interest of the law of evidence lies in the fact that in this area the
hybrid nature of judicial cooperation in general, and of mutual recognition in that
context, become visible. In order to recognise a foreign evidence order, different
legal systems must interact in a framework that is far from clear: The authorities of
state A issue an evidence order according to their own law and then have to request
state B to collect the respective piece of evidence or conduct the investigative
measure. State B will try to grant this, using another legal regime. State A will then try
to use this evidence in its own trial.
5.1 Development of evidence-gathering
The history of judicial cooperation concerning the collection of evidence is less
complex than that of final sentences: a request to conduct a certain measure was
traditionally granted quite easily.  It was mainly based on international treaties that359
often even contained strict obligations; however, these dealings were not yet called
the recognition of a foreign order.  One of the reasons might be that the collection360
of evidence is much more practical than the enforcement of a foreign final sentence.
If the authorities of state A suppose a certain piece of evidence abroad, they would
not ask the foreign authorities to recognise their order but rather only request the
evidence to be taken. On the other hand, as long as there is no third entity that could
be interested in a free movement of evidence  state B does not care whether state361
A will recognise the evidence it collected as equivalent in a later trial and finally admit
it.
The direct contact between the concerned judicial authorities (e.g. the courts) is said
to have been very common already in the 19  century due to the extreme tardinessth
 See Lammasch, Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht, p. 868.362
 Cf. Lammasch, Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht, p. 853s.363
 Cf. Lammasch, Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht, p. 858s.364
 Bar, Das Internationale Privat- und Strafrecht, p. 577.365
 So difficult that Lammasch in 1887 wished very much for the further development of366
telephoning to be able to question witnesses directly, see Auslieferungspflicht und Asylrecht,
p. 863ss.
 1959 European Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters and its additional367
protocols of 1978 and 2001 (ETS No. 30, 99 and 182).
 Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on368
the gradual abolition of checks at the common borders (OJ L 239/19 of 22.09.2000).
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of the diplomatic procedure, even in states where this practice was unlawful.362
Classical grounds for refusal such as the exception of political crimes or the dual
criminality requirement were maintained.363
Interestingly, the question of the law applicable to the collection of the evidence was
answered similarly to most legal acts of today: the lex fori was to be obeyed, but the
authorities should strive as far as possible to respect the necessary formalities of the
law of the requesting state so as to promote the admissibility in court of the evidence
obtained.  The question of the law that should apply in judging the legality and364
admissibility of the evidence was already discussed. Bar  for example suggested to365
determine the formal value of the evidence according to the state where it was
obtained, leaving its substantive value to the sentencing state.
The actions of the requested state were usually limited to its own territory. It was,
however, discussed whether it should force witnesses to appear in court abroad if
their personal appearance was needed, a difficult question considering the available
modes of travelling and communication.366
At the present moment, the transfer of evidence is still characterized by the classical
mechanisms of legal aid, governed by the Council of Europe Conventions of 1959
and its protocols  and complemented by the Schengen Convention of 1990.  The367 368
Convention of 1959 is the more basic convention that covers most areas of legal aid
apart from extradition and recognition of judgments. It does not require dual
criminality, apparently because it is unclear whether the collection of evidence might
 Cf. Ligeti, Strafrecht und strafrechtliche Zusammenarbeit, p. 141s.369
 See Weyembergh, in: Kerchove/ead. (eds.), La reconnaissance mutuelle, p. 45.370
 “The requested Party shall execute in the manner provided for by its law any letters rogatory371
relating to a criminal matter and addressed to it by the judicial authorities of the requesting
Party for the purpose of procuring evidence or transmitting articles to be produced in evidence,
records or documents.”
 Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member372
States of the European Union (OJ C 197/1 of 12.07.2000) and its protocol (OJ C 326/1 of
21.11.2001).
 2008/978/JHA (OJ L 350/72 of 30.12.2008).373
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not serve the defendant and establish his innocence.  A state can, however,369
declare an exception from this if third persons are affected by a certain measure, e.g.
a search. The convention upholds other grounds for refusal, such as a public policy
exception.  Evidence is collected under the law of the requested state, i.e.370
according to the lex fori (Art. 3).  The EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in371
Criminal Matters of 2000 and its Protocol  were meant to implement some major372
extensions and facilitations, such as telephone-tapping or the questioning of
witnesses via video-conference; the Convention only reached the necessary number
of ratifications in 2005 and entered into force on 23 August 2005, but is still not
ratified by all Member States; the same is true for its Protocol that entered into force
on 6 October 2005.
5.2 Prospects on EU-level: the European Evidence Warrant and its
successors
Let us now look at how the new principle of mutual recognition in judicial cooperation
in criminal matters has affected the law of the transnational collection of evidence. 
On the 18th of December 2008, the Council adopted the framework decision on the
European Evidence Warrant for obtaining objects, documents and data for use in
proceedings in criminal matters,  trying to establish the principle of mutual373
recognition in this field. The framework decision substitutes the Council of Europe
Convention of 1959, but leaves scope for the EU Conventions. It is also meant to
 Council framework decision of 22 July 2003 (2003/577/JHA) on the execution of orders374
freezing property or evidence (OJ L 196/45 of 02.08.2003); cf. Explanatory Memorandum para.
28; see Barbe, in: Kerchove/Weyembergh (eds.), La reconnaissance mutuelle, p. 81ss.;
Stessens, ibd., p. 91ss.
 The proposal for the framework decisions is dated 14.11.2003, COM/2003/688 fin.375
 See below.376
 Cf. Schünemann (ed.), A Programme for European Criminal Justice, p. VIII.377
 See recital 25 of the framework decision.378
 See the report by Gleß, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 38 para. 8.379
 Initiative of 24.06.2010, OJ C 165/22.380
 Cf. recitals 6ss.381
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complement the framework decision on freezing orders  that only provides for374
provisional measures.
After the experiences with the European Arrest Warrant that had shown that mutual
recognition was not always lenient on national legal systems and that a high degree
of trust between Member States did not necessarily exist, the European Evidence
Warrant has been subject to much criticism. This may be the reason why its adoption
has been delayed by several years.  In particular, the lack of procedural375
safeguards, the danger of forum shopping and the unclear legal framework have
been attacked.  In 2006, an international expert group presented a “Programme for376
European Criminal Justice”,  containing a model law that could govern the whole of377
judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the EU. In the following analysis, I will
refer to this work as a conceptual alternative.
The European Evidence Warrant is limited in scope to certain kinds of evidence and
was meant as a first step towards a unitary instrument.  This may be an additional378
reason why Member States were reluctant to implement it into national law. By 2011,
only Denmark the relevant legislation, even though transposition was mandatory by
the 19 January 2011.  Member States’ willingness to implement the framework379
decision on the European Evidence Warrant was probably further diminished by the
European Investigation Order that was proposed in the meantime. The proposed
Directive on the Investigation Order was brought into the legislative procedure upon
the initiative of seven Member States  and is supposed to become the ‘unitary380
instrument’ envisaged earlier.  In December 2011, a general approach has been381
 Council Doc. 18918/11 of 21 December 2011; cf. Council Doc. 7014/12 of 29 February382
2012 for subsequent observations of the delegations.
 Cf. for an analysis of mutual recognition with regard to the European Investigation Order383
Sayers, European Investigation Order, p. 2ss.
 E.g. Art. 33 para. 2 of the Corpus Juris portant dispositions pénales pour la protection des384
intérêts financiers de l’Union européenne, Delmas-Marty (ed.), 1997.
 See also Belfiore, 17 EJCCL (2009), p. 5.385
 Recital 25.386
 Council Doc. 17024/09 p. 22.387
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reached,  which will be considered for the present analysis.382
The framework decision on the European Evidence Warrant and the newly proposed
legislation are both based on the principle of mutual recognition  and have a certain383
link with the idea of a free movement of evidence that was conceived mainly in
connection with supranational criminal proceedings.384
5.3 Scope of the proposed legislation
The scope of the legislation on transnational evidence-gathering was one of the most
contested questions in the legislative process. The type of evidence for which a
European Evidence Warrant may be issued is listed in Art. 4: It encompasses
documents, objects and data, with the very important limitation that it must be
existing and available evidence.  This means that no obtaining of evidence in real-385
time – such as communications interception, hearing of witnesses, or monitoring of
bank accounts – can be ordered via the Evidence Warrant. The same goes for
evidence from the body of persons and evidence necessitating further enquiries.
Historical data stemming from these (e.g. protocols of previous hearings), however,
fall under the scope of the framework decision. This limitation of the Evidence
Warrant would lead to further fragmentation in the framework of judicial cooperation.
The Evidence Warrant was meant for a transitional period.  After the Stockholm386
programme provided a new political basis for a comprehensive system for obtaining
evidence in all cases with a crossborder dimension,  the new proposed European387
Investigation Order shall become a unitary instrument. It comprises all types of
 Art. 3 of the general approach. See also Bachmaier Winter, ZIS 2010, p. 583s.388
 Art. 3; see OJ C 165, 24.06.2010, p. 25.389
 Cf. also Art. 27(b) and (d) for specific provisions.390
 This is a novelty in judicial cooperation and would, for instance, encompass the German391
Ordnungswidrigkeiten; these are minor infractions that are dealt with by an administrative
authority that can order fines without the involvement of a court. In a purely national light, many
coercive measures would be regarded as contrary to proportionality in this context, see
Ahlbrecht, NStZ 2006, p. 71 nt. 18.
 Art. 1, 2 of the respective legislative acts.392
 Art. 11 EEW  / Art. 8 EIO; cf. Belfiore, 17 EJCCL (2009), p. 6.393
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investigation measures, with the sole exception of joint investigation teams.  The388
former exception of certain measures of telecommunication interception  has been389
omitted in the present proposal so that they now fall within the scope of the
European Investigation Order,  just as the obtaining other non-pre-existing data.390
It is important to note that an Evidence Warrant or an Investigation Order cannot be
ordered only for criminal proceedings, but also for certain types of administrative
proceedings concerning punishable infringements.391
5.4 Functioning of the proposed legislation
5.4.1 The order
Like the Arrest Warrant, the Evidence Warrant and the Investigation Order are
(standardized) judicial decisions, issued by a competent authority (judges,
magistrates or prosecutors) in a Member State according to its own national laws.392
One of the most important implications of the principle of mutual recognition is not
only the obligation for other Member States to recognise and execute the decision,
which, as seen above, forms a part of many treaties on legal aid, but the fact that
Member States recognise and execute these orders like their own judicial decisions,
especially without the necessity of transforming them into a new decision.  This393
approach leads to the consequence that a foreign authority has to be considered as
equal to any domestic authority. For example, the decision of a foreign public
prosecutor to conduct a search of the dwelling of a person would have to be
 Art. 13(2) Grundgesetz (German Basic Law); see in general Braum, 125 GA (2005), p. 697,394
690; critical also Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 135; Gazeas, ZRP 2005, p. 21.
 Art. 11(2) EEW .395
 See Gleß, StV 2004, p. 680; Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 131; Rijken, 47 CMLRev. (2010), p.396
1474.
 Art. 12 EEW  / Art. 8(2) EIO.397
 Recital 14 EEW  / Art. 8(3) EIO.398
 Gleß, StV 2004, p. 683; Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 131.399
 As provided by Art. 13 lit. a of the proposal, COM/2003/688 fin.400
 See now Art. 11 (2) and 12 of the framework decision.401
 Art. 8(3a) EIO.402
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executed in Germany notwithstanding the fact that, according to German
constitutional law, such a measure would require a judge’s order.394
5.4.2 The execution
The execution itself is usually carried out according to the laws of the executing state
(principle of “locus regit actum”).  But the notions of mutual recognition and a395
common judicial space are carried further towards the principle of “forum regit
actum” : The issuing state can ask the executing state to comply with certain396
formalities as long as these are not contrary to fundamental principles of law of that
state.  Such a formality may be the presence of a representative of the issuing state397
during the execution.  This might be expedient with a view to the later admissibility398
of evidence in the court proceedings of the issuing state,  but it also leads to rather399
unclear responsibilities and legal bases. Therefore, the framework decision on the
Evidence Warrant differs from the Commission’s proposal in an important point: The
use of coercive measures can no longer be requested by the issuing state,  but is400
in the discretion of the executing state.  Thus the execution can be carried out in401
accordance with the laws of the executing state and a split of the applicable law is
avoided. The proposed directive on the Investigation Order, instead, allows the use
of coercive measures and the assistance of officials from the issuing state, but
subjects these to the law of the executing state,  thereby creating clear402
responsibilities.
 That has been determined according to the procedure set out in Article 2.403
 Schünemann (ed.), A Programme for European Criminal Justice.404
 Cf. Schünemann (ed.), A Programme for European Criminal Justice, p. 265.405
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The 2006 “Programme for European Criminal Justice” deals with the question of the
applicable law in another manner. It proposes a system of transnational procedural
unity under which one single state  is responsible for conducting the investigation403
and the proceedings of the case. Thus, the competent authorities can issue orders
if needed according to their own national law and execute them themselves, or leave
that to the executing state. As Art. 4 para. 1 puts it: “The responsible prosecuting
authority of the investigating State may carry out investigatory acts in all member
States (executing States) or can have these acts carried out by the locally
responsible criminal prosecution authority”.  However, according to para. 2404
“Coercive measures are to be executed by the agencies of the executing State,
coordinated by the locally responsible criminal prosecution authority”. But even if the
executing state carries out a measure, this is only meant as a further safeguard for
the individual concerned. The applicable law is still that of the issuing state.  And405
further (para 3 sec. 1): “Admissibility, form and appealability of the investigatory acts
are determined on the basis of the law of the investigating state.”
For the later admissibility of evidence in the courts of the issuing state, this would be
an ideal situation: the evidence obtained abroad could be treated like any other
evidence and be measured against the same standards. The legal responsibilities
seem to be clear. On the other hand, it does not seem very likely that any authority
in a Member State will be able, even upon close consultation, to apply the foreign law
of every other Member State in a correct manner. Trying to implement this
theoretically well-planned idea might prove to be very time-consuming and
expensive, and it might be better to simply apply the principle of mutual recognition
within a clearer framework than the proposed European legislation gives.
5.5 Dual criminality
The requirement of dual criminality, that is, as seen above, one of the basic
 Recital 16; see also the Commission’s view in the explanatory memorandum on the406
proposal, para. 105; cf. Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 127. 
 The same result is found in ECJ joint cases C-187/01, C-385/01 (Gözütok/Brügge), based407
on the implications of mutual trust.
 See Hamilton, Mutual assistance in criminal matters, p. 65.408
 W hether the “verification” has any substantive meaning is still under debate, cf. e.g.409
SatzgerIZimmermann, From Traditional Models of Judicial Assistance to the Principle of
Mutual Recognition, p. 354.
 Art. 14(1) EEW  (search and seizure) / Art. 10(1a) EIO (any coercive measure).410
 This reverses the functioning of the mechanism in, for example, the framework decision on411
the European Arrest W arrant, where, as a general rule, dual criminality may still be required
and the list of offences is the exception, cf. Art. 2(4), 4(1). 
 Art. 14(2) EEW  / Art. 10(1b) and Annex EIO.412
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principles of traditional judicial cooperation, has long been seen as a chief obstacle
to full effectivity of the principle of mutual recognition. The Council regards it as an
impediment and therefore tries to limit its scope.  Indeed, it would seem406
inconsistent that in a common judicial space, built on mutual trust, a state could not
prosecute an offence committed on its territory effectively only because the relevant
evidence is in – or even has been purposely brought to – another Member State that
has other values and thus other substantive criminal laws. It is the very essence of
mutual recognition (and trust) that one recognises penal laws that are different, not
only those that are equal.407
A limitation of this requirement was therefore already laid down in Art. 51 of the
Schengen Convention.  The framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant408
took this idea further, although an abolition of the principle, as had been the original
plan of the Commission, proved unachievable. The legislation introduced the well-
known and very controversial method of listing certain types of offences for which
verification  of dual criminality is not required.409
A similar, but more far-reaching approach can be found in the legislation on
evidence-gathering. No dual criminality is required where no coercive measures are
necessary  (i.e.: regularly no dual criminality! ) or, if these should be necessary, if410 411
the offence falls within the category of the offences listed.  The list proves to be an412
amended version of the list of the framework decision on the European Arrest
Warrant.
 Braum, 125 GA (2005), p. 694; Gazeas, ZRP 2005, p. 21; Schünemann, ZRP 2003, p. 187;413
id, ZRP 2003, p. 407.
 See for this question Rohlff, Der Europäische Haftbefehl, p. 83ss; for an analysis of other414
possible functions of the principle cf. Asp / von Hirsch / Frände, ZIS 2006, p. 512ss.
 To this connection cf. Klip, 117 ZStW  (2005), p. 901ss.; Deiters, ZRP 2003, p. 361;415
disagreeing: Flore, Reconnaissance mutuelle, p. 74.
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This idea of partially abolishing the requirement of dual criminality is criticized for the
same reasons as were brought forward concerning the Arrest Warrant. While this
approach might serve the aims of mutual recognition, it also causes serious
problems in the relation of the executing state to the persons affected. A state may
be forced to participate in the prosecution of an act that it considers as legal, or even
as the exercise of a fundamental right. Some regard this therefore as a system of
maximum punitivity,  meaning that the legal order which has the strictest penal laws413
in a specific case will prevail over all the others.
In my view, the true problem is that mutual recognition would then only mean the
recognition of the penalization of a certain behaviour and never the recognition of the
decision not to make something punishable. But criminal law is always a fragmentary
approach to setting social norms, and by punishing one special kind of behaviour, the
legislator implicitly declares legal everything else. If we take the idea of mutual
recognition seriously, we should at least consider not only to recognise punishability,
but also to recognise impunity.
The problem of an accumulation of punishable behaviour is often answered by a
simple reference to the historical implications of dual criminality which did not initially
intend to protect individuals,  but was rather aimed at protecting state sovereignty414
and complementing the principle of reciprocity. But this, certainly, cannot be the only
answer.
The important point is that it is not the abolition of dual criminality that makes the
strictest law prevail, but rather the assumption of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  While415
it seems understandable that a state should be able to effectively prosecute an
offence that was committed on its territory even if some evidence should be within a
jurisdiction that judges differently, in cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction this appears
 Cf. Spencer, An Academic Critique, p. 32, with typical examples.416
 See also Deiters, ZRP 2003, p. 361.417
 See Art. 13 (1) lit. f (I) EEW  / Art. 10(1f) EIO (differently).418
 The fact that Germany had not made use of this was even one of the reasons that the419
implementing act was declared void, cf. decision of the German Constitutional Court of 18 July
2005 – 2 BvR 2236/04, para. 94.
 Klip, 117 ZStW  (2005), 901; Fuchs, Regulation of Jurisdiction, p. 369.420
 Cf. Deiters, ZIS 2006, p. 477ss.421
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very dubitable.  For the first case, take the example of a French national who416
commits an illegal act of euthanasia in France. The Netherlands would have to assist
in the evidence-gathering even if the same act had been legal in the Netherlands.
This might be justified with the idea of mutually recognising the French decision of
punishing euthanasia. But in the second case, since France claims extraterritorial
jurisdiction in euthanasia cases regarding their own nationals, the legislation on
evidence-gathering would impose the same obligation to assist if the act had been
committed in the Netherlands. This would then place the decision to punish above
the decision not to punish – throughout the whole of the EU . The Council realized417
this problem and introduced grounds for refusal in cases where the act is seen as
having been committed in the executing state.418
This rule (that is also found in the framework decision on the Arrest Warrant ),419
however, still favours the decision to punish in certain cases of conflicting
jurisdictions. Let us continue the example: If a French national had committed a
lawful euthanasia in the Netherlands, Germany would have to assist the French
prosecutors, because the German law on international crimes would also assume
jurisdiction, had the offender been a German national. Thereby, the French decision
to punish gets more weight internationally than the Dutch decision not to punish, and
for an act committed on Dutch territory. It is clear from this that a real solution can
only be based on a uniform allocation of jurisdiction within the EU.  That would at420
the same time determine the applicable substantive criminal law because of the
traditional – though not necessary  – link between jurisdiction and applicable law.421
Such a uniform allocation of jurisdiction would have the further advantage of solving
problems in other areas of European criminal justice in a consistent way, e.g. of how
 Cf. Vander Beken/Vermeulen/Lagodny, NStZ 2002, p. 624 ss.422
 Art. 14 (2) EEW  / see also Art. 10(1b) EIO; Germany, as it favoured to have definitions for423
the offences (cf. eg. the resolution of the Bundestag, BT-Drs. 15/3831 p. 4 f.), has now the
possibility to opt out concerning certain types, cf. Art. 23(4) EEW .
 Fuchs, Regulation of Jurisdiction, p. 362ss.424
 Staubach, Die Anwendung ausländischen Strafrechts, passim.425
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to secure best the transnational ne bis in idem.422
As long as this is not achieved, the requirement of dual criminality must still be taken
seriously into account. For the European Evidence Warrant, the Council already
shortened the list of offences and set down a maximum penalty of at least three
years as a condition.  423
The already mentioned „Programme for European Criminal Justice“ has another
approach to dual criminality. Because it develops the idea of transnational procedural
unity and seeks the application of a single law to a case, dual criminality is not
necessary for any measure. This is partly atoned for by the fact that only a single
state is competent for the case. The competent state is to be determined at the very
beginning of the proceedings according to a complex procedure including Eurojust
and taking into account every party’s interests. But this mode of determining
jurisdiction is very open in its outcome. Even if it helps to avoid competing
jurisdictions, it cannot give the affected individual the legal certainty as to the
applicable substantive criminal law that is desirable. 
Still another approach is found by Fuchs , who believes the link between the424
jurisdiction and the applicable law to be the real cause of the problem and seems to
favour the application of the substantive criminal law of the offender’s home state.
Although the application of foreign criminal law cannot be rejected as a matter of
principle, this proposal seems to me so wholly incompatible with the primary purpose
of criminal law to regulate the conduct of the people in a certain territory that it does
not really make sense, even if this doctrine was predominant some centuries ago.425
 Williams, ERA-document, p. 23; idem , in: Vervaele (ed.), European Evidence W arrant, p.426
74; Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 137; to this understanding of trust see also above in chapter 4.
 Art. 7 lit. a EEW  / Art. 5a(1a) EIO.427
  Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 138, disagrees with regard to the Commission’s Proposal428
(COM/2003/688fin.), but this point is now clarified by the addition of a subparagraph that states
that the compliance with these requirements shall only be assessed by the issuing state, see
Art. 7 EEW . Instead, Art. 5a(2) EIO drops the word „only“.
 Art. 7 lit. b EEW  / Art. 5a(1b) EIO.429
 Gleß, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 38 para. 25.430
 Art. 6(c) (COM/2003/688fin.).431
  Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 128.432
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5.6 Further safeguards and grounds for refusal
The Commission has taken an active position to promote mutual trust and uses
procedural safeguards in evidence-gathering as a means to establish this basis for
mutual recognition.426
5.6.1 Issuing of the order
Therefore, an Evidence Warrant / Investigation Order may only be issued when it is
necessary and proportionate for the purpose of the proceedings.  Since there is no427
corresponding ground for refusal,  this rather general rule will be interpreted by the428
issuing state only and thus has a mainly exhortatory value.
More important is another provision: the issuing authority must make sure that the
evidence could be collected in similar, purely domestic circumstances.  This429
provision seeks to eliminate the danger of evidence shopping that might arise in
transnational contexts because of the division of responsibilities.  Additionally, the430
evidence must be likely to be admissible in the court proceedings. This last condition
has been expressly stated in the Commission’s Proposal for the Evidence Warrant431
and cannot be found in the adopted and proposed legislation anymore, since the
gathering of a priori inadmissible evidence would already violate the proportionality
principle.432
 For formal requirements see above.433
 Art. 12(2)(a) of the Commission Proposal, COM/2003/688fin.434
 Spencer, An Academic Critique, p. 36.435
 Art. 12(2)(b)(c) of the Commission Proposal.436
 The Parliament wished to cover all persons, cf. legislative resolution of the 31/3/2004437
(P5_TA-PROV(2004)0243, amendment 9.
 Art. 12(2)(b) of the Commission Proposal.438
  Cf. e.g. the case of Malik v Manchester Crown Court and the Chief Constable of Greater439
Manchester Police [2008] E.M.L.R. 19 at para. 73ss. with general criteria for a production order
based on Schedule 5 of the Terrorism Act 2000 in a case where  the document could be used
for a charge against the journalist on the basis of sections 19 and 38B of the same act. 
 See the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights,440
COM/2004/328fin.; the discussion of this by Brants, in: Vervaele (ed.), European Evidence
W arrant, p. 103ss. Lööf, 12 ELJ (2006), p. 421ss.; Aragüena Fanego, in: de Hoyos Sancho,
Montserrat (ed.), p. 131 ss.; the subsequent Council Resolution of 20 November 2009 on a
Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal
proceedings, OJ C 295/1 of 04.12.2009; legislation was adopted as to the right to translation
etc., cf. Directive 2010/64/EU; critically Rijken, 47 CMLRev. (2010), p. 1489s.
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5.6.2 Execution of the order
As to the execution of the Evidence Warrant, the Commission had proposed some
precise substantive conditions  that were not common to all Member States. For433
example, a search of premises shall not start at night time unless unavoidable,  a434
novelty in the UK.  Persons whose premises have been searched shall be informed435
of this . Another protected right is the right of natural persons  not to incriminate436 437
themselves (nemo tenetur).  This might have had practical relevance as concerns438
“production orders”, i.e. an order requiring the custodian of a document to deliver it
to law enforcement.  Although these safeguards were not all-encompassing, they439
have been deleted in the Council framework decision. The stated reason for this was
that the Council aimed at working on a coherent and generally applicable body of
procedural safeguards that would also be valid in other areas of judicial cooperation
in order to avoid fragmentation. This is ironic in the face of the failure of the
framework decision on procedural safeguards and the evolution of the new step-by-
step-approach.440
Even though it is certainly necessary to establish generally applicable rights in judicial
cooperation, this does not render superfluous those rights that are adapted to a
 See Art. 13 EEW  / Art. 10 EIO; cf. Belfiore, 17 EJCCL (2009), p. 7s.441
 Gleß, StV 2004, p. 683.442
 This is no privilege in the sense of Art. 13(1)(d) EEW , cf. Gazeas, ZRP 2005, p. 21; critical443
also Braum, 125 GA (2005), p. 695.
 Cf. legislative resolution of the 31/3/2004 (P5_TA-PROV(2004)0243, amendment 11444
introducing a new Article 15(1)(f), along with more specific requirements. 
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specific area of judicial cooperation and its specific problem. On the contrary, it is
contradictory to adopt a measure with hardly any safeguards that has then to be
transposed by the Member States in the hope of a future coherent approach that
cannot any longer be taken into account by the Member States.
5.6.3 Grounds for refusal
Some other safeguards can be deduced from the grounds for non-recognition. At the
present state, there are only specific, enumerated grounds for refusal. They comprise
inter alia an infringement of the ne bis in idem principle; immunities or privileges in
the executing state and national security interests.  441
It is clear that this rather random selection of procedural safeguards cannot – or at
least should not – be the only set of guarantees in transnational proceedings within
the EU. Otherwise, this would only go to show that EU common policy always leads
to a minimum standard.  One area that has obviously been left out is the possible442
exemption of people from searches who, as witnesses, might refuse to give evidence
(e.g. journalists).  The European Parliament originally wanted to include a reference443
to fundamental rights and the right to a fair trial as set out in Art. 6 TEU as a ground
for refusal.  This last point is in my opinion the best way to ensure procedural rights444
within the current legal framework of EU criminal justice, at least as long as no
agreement can be reached on adopting a more coherent approach to fundamental
rights that are specifically adapted to judicial cooperation.
A general clause on procedural rights is also contained in the „Programme for
European Criminal Justice“ that states: “coercive measures shall not be conducted
if they are incompatible with the ECHR or with the foundations of the law of the
 Art. 4 para. 3 sec. 2, Schünemann (ed.), A Programme for European Criminal Justice.445
 Art. 4 para. 4.446
 Art. 18 EEW  / Art. 13 EIO.447
 Critical Gleß, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 38 para. 66s; cf. however448
now Art. 12(1a) EIO, according to which the transfer of evidence may be suspended pending
the decision regarding a legal remedy under certain circumstances.
 Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 139.449
 Art. 6(2): sole recourse to the courts of the issuing state, with some exceptions.450
 Critical Ahlbrecht, NStZ 2006, p. 74; Gleß, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht,451
§ 38 para. 66, 74.
 Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 139.452
 Cf. e.g. the position mentioned in the Council Doc. 15957/05, p. 4, 38.453
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executing state” . Moreover, there are special provisions for pre-trial custody, the445
confiscation of assets of significant value and the deployment of undercover police
investigators.446
5.7 Legal remedies
The question of legal remedies against evidence-gathering measures is only dealt
with in part by the legislation. Member States are obliged to procure legal remedies
equivalent to the remedies available in a purely national case,  but only after the447
order has been executed.  The substantive conditions for the issuing of the order448
can only be challenged in the courts of the issuing Member State. This might be due
to the fact that otherwise a court would have to apply foreign law.  A similar449
provision is proposed by the „Programme for European Criminal Justice“.  This450
system causes serious impairments on access to justice: Persons who are affected
by an investigation measure might have to initiate proceedings in a foreign legal
system, a foreign language and probably at much higher costs, although they might
never have even left their home country (e.g. when a person’s dwelling is searched
to find a letter).  451
There are several possible ways to address this problem. One rather simple, but
possibly equally ineffective method would be to institute a proceeding of transmitting
claims that are brought in the executing state to the competent foreign authority.452
Other proposals want to exempt bona fide third persons from this provision.  But to453
 A criterion set by Art. 7 lit. b EEW  / Art. 5a(1b) EIO.454
 Klip, 117 ZStW  (2005), p. 910s.455
 See Spencer, An Academic Critique, p. 35ss.; Gleß, in: Vervaele (ed.), European Evidence456
W arrant, p. 122s. Concerning the background of this concept, esp. in the Green Paper on
criminal law protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a
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differentiate between a bona fide and a non bona fide person seems to me almost
impossible, especially as the accused (who is not a third person) might be equally
innocent and have equally little connections with the issuing state. I therefore think it
inevitable that at least certain important rights must be litigible in the executing state
as well. Among these should be at least all those standards that are uniform
throughout the EU, e.g. proportionality or standards of fair trial, as follow from Art. 6
TEU. The requirement of obtainability of the evidence in the issuing state under
similar circumstances,  on the other hand, might indeed prove to be too complex for454
the executing state to control.
If, however, a consistent set of procedural safeguards should be established
throughout the Union, one could in the long term also think of introducing a whole
regime of transnational evidence-gathering that would be applicable in cases such as
these. This regime would complement the law for purely national evidence-gathering.
The judicial control would lie with the national courts of either of the two legal
systems concerned, complemented by the jurisdiction of the ECJ. This would also
correspond to a wide construction of the principle of mutual recognition: the
recognition of an evidence order would bring about a recognition of the legal
responsibilities for the order.455
5.8 Admissibility of evidence
One key problem of transnational evidence-gathering is the subsequent admissibility
in court of the evidence obtained. Without admissibility of evidence, the mutual
recognition of evidence orders would not fulfill its purpose. The question is whether
the principle of mutual recognition has to be extended so far as to oblige every
Member State to accept evidence which was lawfully obtained in another Member
State.  With the treaty of Lisbon, the EU has competence to regulate the „mutual456
European Prosecutor see eadem, ZStW  2003, p. 131ss. 
 Art. 82(2)(a) TFEU.457
 Critical Ahlbrecht, NStZ 2006, p. 73.458
 Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 133 (with regard to Art. 6 of the Commission Proposal).459
 See the Commission Proposal, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 58.460
 Availab le  at h ttp :/ /www.cybex.es/AG IS2005docs /S tudy% 20Law% 20Society-461
%20of%20England%20and%20W ales.pdf
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admissibility of evidence between Member States“.457
In the framework decision on the European Evidence Warrant, there is one article
that directly addresses the questions of admissibility: The use of personal data is
permitted for the prevention of serious threats to public security (Art. 10 (1) lit. c), as
well as for all proceedings “for which the EEW may be issued” (Art. 10 (1) lit. a). This
provision amounts to an abolition of the principle of specialty, because the data
obtained can be used for other proceedings than the one that it was issued for.  If458
this is read only as a general reference to the proceedings for which an Evidence
Warrant may be issued (that are listed in Art. 5), it is feared that this might lead to a
circumvention of the conditions specified for the order of an Evidence Warrant. An
issuing state might order an Evidence Warrant for a specific proceeding while in
reality intending to use the evidence obtained for another proceeding for which it
could not have issued an Evidence Warrant, because it would not have met the
proportionality principle or the other requirements of Art. 7.  It has therefore been
suggested to read the words “may be issued” not as a general reference to Art. 5
only, but as a reference to the specific requirements under which an EEW may be
issued, mainly to Art. 7 of the framework decision.  In my opinion, this is not459
necessary. Since the original gathering of the evidence must be legal to meet the
requirements of Art. 10 (i.e. there must really be a proceeding for which the evidence
is needed and the Warrant may be issued), there is already a safeguard against
circumvention. 
Apart from this, there is no rule dealing with the admissibility of evidence. The
Commission attributes this to the fact that consultation with experts has proved the
need for further preparatory work.  For this purpose, it commissioned the study on460
the laws of evidence throughout the EU  and consulted with the public by the461
 Green Paper of 11 November 2009, COM/2009/624fin.462
 E.g. Art. 12, 17.463
 See Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 134.464
 Mutual assistance in criminal matters, p. 67.465
 Böse, in: Fragmentarisches Strafrecht, p. 248; Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 133.466
 For discussion of examples from the ECtHR case law cf. Esser, in: Marauhn (ed.), p. 49ss.467
 Böse, 114 ZStW  (2002), p. 151; Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 126; the so-called “Beweis-468
würdigungslösung”; for an analysis of possible approaches with a focus on U.S. cases with a
trans-border dimension cf. Gane / Mackarel, 4 EJCCL (1996), p. 109; for a comparison of
different domestic laws cf. Spencer,  in: Delmas-Marty, Mireille / id.(eds.), p. 594.
 So-called “selbständige Beweisverwertungsverbote“; for example, even if a car is legally469
wire-tapped, a recorded soliloquy may not be used as evidence due to constitutional
personality rights, cf. BGH judgment of 22 December 2012 - 2 StR 509/10, NJW  2012, p. 945;
also, if telecommunication is intercepted legally, the evidence obtained may only be used as
evidence for certain very grave crimes according to paragraphs 100a and 477(2) StPO
(German Code of Criminal Procedure).
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„Green Paper on obtaining evidence in criminal matters from one Member State to
another and securing its admissibility“.  The study shows the great existing462
differences. Although the legislative acts are clearly aimed at facilitating the
admissibility of evidence in the issuing state,  there is as yet neither free movement463
of evidence, nor an obligation to admit evidence collected lawfully in another Member
State.  Hamilton  attributes this to the degree of criticism that was invoked by the464 465
more radical concept. I believe, however, that the concept of free movement of
evidence is in any case more appropriate for a supranational context (i.e. the
investigations of a European Prosecutor). There it might be expedient to have
common rules. In a national area, however, it seems acceptable that the law of the
forum decides on the admission of evidence, since its collection was from the first
ancillary to the criminal proceedings there.  The laws of admission of evidence are466
in fact so diverse, that standardization seems very difficult.  In Germany, for467
example, no violation of German or foreign law on the collection of evidence
necessarily leads to its inadmissibility in court – it is quite the contrary, as evidence
that has been collected abroad is regularly admissible, even if the foreign laws have
been violated. It remains for the judge assessing the evidence to take into account
the circumstances of its gathering.  On the other hand, the lawful collection of468
evidence does not in every case assure its admissibility.  Since these rules are very469
different in other countries, standardization would not serve any of the differing
 Williams, ERA-document, p. 21ss.; Gleß, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht,470
§ 38 para. 44; Rijken, 47 CMLRev. (2010), p. 1474.
 Art. 1(3) EEW /EIO.471
 Explanatory Memorandum, para. 41ss.472
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systems.
Still, it seems that, even if there is no obligation to admit evidence, there should at
least be a common rule on the admissibility of evidence that was collected in breach
of common principles. Since evidence is always collected for a (future) trial, and the
admission of a piece of evidence is decisive for the persons affected, only this could
give full – and equal – effectivity to procedural safeguards. This would be even more
so, should it be possible to establish a comprehensive system of transnational
evidence-gathering in the EU. The concept of free movement of evidence, too, might
then appear in a new light.
5.9 Conclusion
At the moment, it is impossible to tell which legislative measure will come into
practice. The Evidence Warrant might still be transposed, but it could just as easily
be overtaken by the Investigation Order. In either case, proceedings will be faster.
The obligation to recognise and execute foreign orders, within strict time limits,
together with the restriction of grounds for refusal, cannot but expedite the
proceedings that necessitate transnational evidence-gathering.  At the same time,470
this might also serve the accused, because mitigating evidence will be more quickly
obtained as well.
In a more general light, however, mutual recognition, as it appears in the envisaged
laws, will be very infringing on individuals’ rights, which is supposed to be prevented
by the general reference to Art. 6 TEU.  The Commission proposal for the Evidence471
Warrant stipulated some safeguards.   However, these rights have mostly been472
omitted by the Council. Even if future legislation as to procedural rights will be
adopted following the Stockholm programme and the Council roadmap, it cannot be
of the kind the Commission suggested: In the explanatory memorandum on the
 Explanatory Memorandum, para. 46.473
 See also Gleß, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 38 para. 59; a similar474
issue is under discussion with the EAW , cf. e.g. Peers, EU Justice and Home affairs law,
p. 705, 709; Tinkl, Rechtsstellung, p. 210s., for further references cf. below 7.1.; see also the
contradictory approach of the Commission, SEC2006/79 COM2006 0008 final (revised
commission report based on Art. 34 FD) point 2.2.3.
 Braum, 125 GA (2005), p. 694.475
 Kotzurek, ZIS 2006, p. 136.476
 Similarly Apap/Carrera, European Arrest W arrant, p. 13, with respect to the EAW .477
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proposal, the Commission said that the proposal aimed at enhancing “the
effectiveness, consistency and visibility of some of the standards relevant for
obtaining evidence at EU level”  [highlighted by author]. It is obvious that a legal473
instrument that aims at greatly enhancing the quickness and effectivity of judicial
cooperation in transnational evidence-gathering in a common interest must at once
address all standards that are relevant in this context. The debate on what the
conditions are under which Evidence Orders should be carried out throughout the
whole Union is a question that must be answered collectively; it cannot be left to a
later stage. As it is, many problems are again consciously left unresolved and will
probably be solved in inconsistent ways through differing national practices.
A proposal that is often made is the adoption of a European public policy exception
to judicial cooperation, here to the gathering of evidence. The Council pushed this
idea by introducing the reference to fundamental common European principles in Art.
1(3) of the legislation, although this unfortunately leaves open the question of
whether the executing authority may invoke this.474
A European public policy exception – as opposed to a national one, that is also
called for  – has the advantage of preventing executing authorities from sometimes475
pushing through their national interests.  However, with such a general exception,476
it would be very difficult to have a unitary development and interpretation. Therefore,
I think that the enumeration of specific rights is still very important. The reference to
Art. 6 TEU cannot obviate this.  In the long term, the development of a coherent477
and comprehensive system of procedural rights for transnational evidence-gathering
would in my opinion be more appropriate. Until now, the law that was proposed for
the application in transnational evidence-gathering was always a national one. In
 See above.478
 Bachmaier Winter, ZIS 2010, p. 586.479
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classical legal aid the executing state applied its own law to any investigative
measure; when the problems this causes for the admission of evidence in the
requesting state’s courts became plain, more progressive legal acts, including the
present proposal, opted for a combination with the law of the requesting state, as far
as the requested state’s law would allow. This, however, only results in a hybrid legal
structure which one should avoid for the sake of legal certainty. For that reason, the
“Programme for European Criminal Justice” envisages a single legal framework that
is but another national legal system, this time that of the executing state. Although
better for the investigating state, this system causes even more uncertainties for the
concerned individuals, exposing them to 27 different legal orders. To me, therefore,
it seems most logical to strive at a genuine European system of evidence-gathering
that includes rules on the admissibility of evidence in the Member States. Two clearly
distinct systems of evidence-gathering would then be all that a citizen had to face.
When a system for European transnational evidence-gathering will be established
(including rules on the admissibility of evidence) and its judicial control (through
Member States’ courts) secured, then the general European public policy exception
would have fulfilled its transitional purpose and could be abolished again in favour of
specific safeguards.
Another area that needs to be considered is, as I have shown, the uniform allocation
of jurisdiction. If such a set of rules could be established EU-wide, this would
certainly increase Member States’ readiness to recognise differing values and
systems of criminal law, since it would be clear that and why in a specific case the
values of one system should prevail over those of the others. A uniform allocation of
jurisdiction would also help to solve problems in other areas of judicial cooperation.478
The proposed European Investigation Order will at least be an adequate response to
some of the criticism the Evidence Warrant received: As the Evidence Warrant has
a limited scope of application, critics feared a further fragmentation of this area of
judicial cooperation. This may be improved by the proposed new legislation.479
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However, in order to effectively address the problems of mutual recognition in
transnational evidence-gathering, a comprehensive approach and an idea of the
intended development of the whole area are indispensable.
After having illustrated some of the problems of the mechanism of mutual recognition
in a specific area, I will now move to the two areas where solutions can be found. We
will first look at the problems of jurisdiction, then turn to fundamental rights in mutual
recognition.
 See also Klip, EU Criminal Law, p. 423.480
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Chapter  6 Jurisdiction in European Criminal
Procedure
The present study has shown the particular nature of European judicial cooperation
in criminal matters. Due to competence issues and political unwillingness, there is no
coherent system of substantial or procedural rules applicable to a case. The so-
called „principles“ of mutual recognition and mutual trust are in fact no legal
principles, but policy concepts that achieve their legal significance chiefly through
their rhetoric value. We have seen that for both of these concepts, a uniform
allocation of jurisdiction is desirable both for theoretical and for practical
considerations. From a theoretical perspective, a coherent and planned approach is
preferable to randomness. For the individual, forseeability of the criminal law that he
will be subject to is an important aspect. From a practical perspective, we have seen
that the current framework favours more punitive systems over lenient ones. The fact
that the ne bis in idem applies only after a decision has been rendered can lead to a
certain rush for a judgment in cases of positive conflicts of jurisdiction.  The480
analysis of the envisaged EU framework for evidence gathering has also shown
some of the problems that will in all probability arise from the lack of common
jurisdictional rules in this area. The idea that at least some sort of EU activity in this
respect is highly expedient seems to be universally accepted. I will try provide a
theoretical approach to the issue of jurisdiction within a European judicial space. For
that, I will first outline the basic concepts of jurisdiction and their respective
implications. After that, I will  explore how issues of jurisdiction are currently
addressed by European legislation and by representative proposals in the literature.
In the end, I will define some of the necessary features of a possible European set of
jurisdictional rules.
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6.1 Conflicts of jurisdiction
Conflicts of jurisdiction can occur in two ways: positive and negative conflicts. While
a positive conflict refers to a situation in which more than one state assumes
jurisdiction, a negative conflict, also called a vacuum iuris, describes the absence of
any competent forum. In international criminal cases, concurrent jurisdictions
represent  the rule rather than the exception. In this respect it differs greatly from the
private law sphere. This development is the consequence of the different objectives
of jurisdiction in these two branches of law. Whereas in civil matters states provide
private parties with access to justice and are not all averse to restraining their
jurisdiction, in criminal matters the states’ own interests are concerned. The idea of
a criminal prosecution without a gap, together with a traditionally purely national take
on criminal matters, leads to uncoordinated and widely overlapping jurisdictions.
More specifically, positive conflicts of jurisdiction are the result of a dual clash: Firstly,
states use different links to determine their jurisdiction. Secondly, even if they should
use the “same” link, a different construction of the rule can give rise to multiple
proceedings: 
The most common clash within the first category, i.e. the use of different links, is the
difference between the jurisdiction of the locus delicti commissi and the jurisdiction of
the defendant’s home country. If, for example, a German citizen commits a theft in
the Netherlands, he could be prosecuted in the Netherlands because the crime was
committed on that territory and the Netherlands apply the territoriality principle, but
he could also be persecuted in Germany because German law assumes jurisdiction
for crimes committed by German citizens under certain conditions according to the
active personality principle.
However, the common links in international criminal law are far from being
unambiguous in themselves. Not only can the same factual criterion be fulfilled in
several states (e.g. in cases of dual nationality), but also can one link be construed
in different ways. Therefore it can encompass different situations both within one
jurisdiction and between jurisdictions. This is particularly true for the territoriality
principle. If a national piece of legislation ascribes jurisdiction to the courts of this
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state if the offence has been committed on its territory, does this refer to the act of
volition? Or to the completion of the offence? To the harmful results? In some legal
orders it refers to one of these, in others to all and even more situations, so that the
territoriality principle consists in fact of a multitude of links. Intersections and overlaps
are inevitable. Additionally, diverging rules on evidence can cause courts to come to
different conclusions in ascertaining the place of committal.
How courts will interpret a provision on jurisdiction depends greatly on the function
that jurisdictional rules have within that legal system. In order to find viable
suggestions for EU cooperation it is therefore necessary to consider more closely
methodological approaches to jurisdiction, its systematic position within different
legal orders and the historical development of and reasoning behind the most widely
used principles of jurisdiction.
6.2 Nature of jurisdiction rules
It is very difficult to say what jurisdiction actually is. For centuries, there has been
debate over this and in every legal order it has developed differently . Additionally,
the self-conception of a legal order need not represent the true function a set of
norms has. The term jurisdiction is misleading in itself, for it carries more or less
specific conceptual implications so that it forestalls a correct answer to this question.
One should better ask: of what nature are the rules from which it follows that a state’s
courts may try a case? The main differentiation here is between procedural and
substantive theories. Procedural theories state that such laws are of a purely
procedural nature because they set down the prerequisites that must be fulfilled to
enable national prosecution authorities and courts to take action. Substantive
theories on the other hand hold that these rules are, either in fact or logically, in
some form an element of the substantive criminal law. In between, we find theories
that stress the hybrid nature of these rules or that contest that they fall into either of
the categories, being a set of norms sui generis. This debate is not just of academic
interest, but actually of great practical import. Courts and scholars in every country
are ready to draw legal conclusions from this systematic classification, because
 I will confine myself to the facts that are relevant at this particular point and lay aside all the481
other intricate legal problems. For an overview see Gärditz, W eltrechtspflege, p. 191s.;
Ambos, Mutual Recognition, p. 6. The House of Lords was mainly concerned with the problem
of immunity and, more relevant here, extraterritoriality and double criminality in the extradition
procedure.
 Cf. for the uncertainty Goldstone/Smith, p. 116s; Roht-Arriaza, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. (2001),482
p. 314s.; although the legal provision is based on the universality principle, the warrants
explicitly referred to Spanish victims.
 Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo penal pleno, Rollo de apelacion 173/98 of 5 November483
1998, available at http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/chile/pinochet/autochile.html, under
“tercero”:  “El citado artículo 23, apartado cuatro, de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial no es
norma de punición, sino procesal. No tipifica o pena ninguna acción u omisión y se limita a
proclamar la jurisdicción de España para el enjuiciamiento de delitos definidos y sancionados
en otras Leyes. La norma procesal en cuestión ni es sancionadora desfavorable ni es
restrictiva de derechos individuales, por lo que su aplicación a efectos de enjuiciamiento penal
de hechos anteriores a su vigencia no contraviene el artículo 9, apartado tres, de la
Constitución Española. La consecuencia jurídica restrictiva de derechos derivada de la
comisión de un delito de genocidio ñla penañ trae causa de la norma penal que castiga el
genocidio, no de la norma procesal que atribuye jurisdicción a España para castigar el delito.
El principio de legalidad (artículo 25 de la Constitución Española) impone que los hechos sean
delito conforme a las Leyes españolas, segn el artículo 23, apartado cuatro, tan mencionado
cuando su ocurrencia, que la pena que pueda ser impuesta venga ya determinada por ley
anterior a la perpetración del crimen, pero no que la norma de jurisdicción y de procedimiento
sea preexistente al hecho enjuiciable. La jurisdicción es presupuesto del proceso, no del
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different principles apply to procedural and substantive criminal law.
For example, almost all legal systems do not apply the prohibition of retrospective
laws as strictly in procedural matters as they do in substantive criminal law. The
principle of “nullum crimen sine lege certa praevia” is not applicable. States that
regard jurisdiction as a purely procedural matter, for example most common law
countries or Spain, can make use of this. Spanish courts for example used exactly
this line of argumentation in the Pinochet case.  When Pinochet had travelled to481
London for medical treatment in 1998, Spain requested his extradition on the basis
of two international arrest warrants. He was being prosecuted, among other things,
on the basis of the passive personality principle and/or the universality principle  for482
the torture of Spanish citizens and the murder of a diplomat as well as a conspiracy
on the basis of the territoriality principle. The Audiencia Nacional was faced with the
problem that the provision granting Spanish courts jurisdiction regarding Pinochet’s
crimes in Chile (Article 23(4) Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial of the 1st of July 1985)
had been adopted after he had committed them. However, the court held that, as
jurisdiction was solely a matter of procedure, this amendment did not cause any legal
problems.483
delito. “
 Such as in the application of EU law under Art. 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.484
 § 7(2) Strafgesetzbuch (penal code).485
 See e.g. Ambos, in: Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, § 7 para. 26.486
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There are also theories that regard jurisdiction as a matter of substantive criminal
law. Most far-reaching here is a theory that states jurisdiction to be one element of
the three-dimensional scope of incidence of criminal norms, i.e. definition of the
crime, time of the crime and locus of the crime. In Germany, jurisdiction in criminal
law is said to follow from substantive law that determines the applicability of the
penal code (“Strafanwendungsrecht”, “objektive Bedingung der Strafbarkeit”). If
jurisdictional rules were of a substantive nature, the principles of criminal law, such
as “in dubio pro reo” or specificity would have to be applied and, if taken literally, the
defendant would have to be acquitted in case the conditions for jurisdiction should
turn out not to be fulfilled. So, if for example the charge is based on the territoriality
principle because the defendant was supposed to have uploaded criminal content on
the internet in one country and a doubt arises as to the place where he acted,
because it is not sure from which computer he accessed the server, he would have
to be acquitted. The result would be that he could not be tried again in this state even
if other pieces of evidence should turn up (national ne bis in idem). More importantly,
in contexts where the principle of ne bis in idem is applicable internationally,  no484
other courts could hear the case, not even in the country where he actually uploaded
the content.
This and other unfortunate consequences are avoided in practice by ascribing a
hybrid or dual nature to these rules. Such an interpretation does certainly do justice
to the need for flexibility, but it lacks consistency. A pertinent example is a provision
in the German penal code according to which Germany has jurisdiction over crimes
committed by German nationals abroad, even if the defendant becomes naturalised
after the offence has been committed.  This is not a case of (forbidden)485
retrospective application of a law, but a case in which the punishability is made
dependent on facts that occur after the event has been committed. Because of the
dual nature of jurisdiction this is held to be permissible.486
 See, for example, Ligeti, Strafrecht und strafrechtliche Zusammenarbeit, p. 69.487
 Judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice of September 7, 1927 (PCIJ,488
Ser. A., No. 10, 1927).
 Cf. Amalfitano, Conflitti di giurisdizione, p. 4ss.489
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To me it seems more convincing to say that jurisdictional rules are neither procedural
nor substantive. At least in the international sphere they must be treated as being a
category sui generis. This may not be a very ambitious or illuminative approach, but
it has the advantage of being modest. The rules we are talking about can be looked
at from many angles, but if feasible suggestions for the EU are to be made, it is
impossible to use categories that are already burdened with national traditions. The
consequences of decisions based on a legislative act must be the same wherever it
is applied and an autonomous interpretation is not enough. It is important to exercise
a certain self-restraint and regard these rules in a purely functional, teleological light.
I will, however, go on to name these rules jurisdictional rules, for the sake of
simplicity and in the absence of any better term.
If we are to talk about jurisdiction, it also makes sense to differentiate between
jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate and jurisdiction to enforce,487
referring respectively to the legislative, the judicial and the executive competence to
deal with a criminal case. In the following, we will be mainly concerned with
jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate.
6.3 Jurisdiction rules and international law
All national and EU legislation on jurisdiction in international criminal cases must take
into account the limitations through international law: If a state claims jurisdiction over
a case that also has links to other countries, it is an issue of international non-
interference to respect other countries’ interests. However, there are only marginal
restrictions on states’ possibilities of claiming jurisdiction, mainly because of the fact
that there is no internationally accepted principle of ne bis in idem and the other state
is not barred to initiate a second proceeding. Therefore, it is accepted since the
Lotus case  that any reasonable link to a state enables it to claim jurisdiction,488 489
although the common law doctrine in particular tries to set up a framework that is
 Council framework decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA); I will490
deal with this legislation in detail later.
 Cf. Art. 9(1)(a) of FD 2002/475/JHA.491
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more specific. As far as EU criminal justice is concerned the restrictions to
jurisdiction must be even less: In public international law, the necessity of a
reasonable link is owing to state sovereignty. In the ambit of the EU, instead,
Member States have transferred their sovereignty partly onto the EU. Consequently,
one cannot regard the exercise of jurisdiction in a matter of common policy by one
Member State as a violation of another Member State’s sovereignty - in this respect
one has to consider the two states as parts of the common judicial space. This idea
has taken shape in the framework decision on combating terrorism,  where Member490
States are given the possibility of extending their jurisdiction to terrorist acts
committed on the territory of another Member State, even if there is no other link to
their territory .491
6.4 Bases for jurisdiction
There are numerous links that can be considered in assuming jurisdiction over a
case. As there are only very few restrictions under public international law, states are
practically free to extend their jurisdiction as they see fit. The relevant criteria have
been developed over a long time in history and basically fall under the following
categories:
6.4.1 Territoriality
Territoriality is rightly called the basic principle of international criminal law. It is
generally considered reasonable to assign jurisdiction to the courts of the state
where the offence has been committed. The effects of a crime will normally be
greatest at the locus delicti. Evidence (witnesses) will be more easily accessible, so
that the trial can be conducted more efficiently. The defendant, on the other hand,
will hardly ever be surprised to be tried in this particular forum and be subjected to its
laws. Territoriality, therefore, is in perfect conformity with international law and has
 In English doctrine it is sometimes considered to be the only feasible criterion, but these492
views are changing, see Hirst, Jurisdiction and the Ambit of the Criminal Law, p. 6 ss., 45 ss.;
cf. also Cockayne, 3 JICJ (2005), p. 515ss.
  Hein, Zuständigkeitskonflikte, p. 32, translation by author.493
 Cf. Klip, EU Criminal Law, p. 179.494
 See Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 54: different roots in English and continental law;495
see also Gärditz, W eltrechtspflege, p. 54ss. Sometimes, in practice, quite different results may
occur, especially concerning distance crimes (p. 57s.).
  Hirst, Jurisdiction and the Ambit of the Criminal Law, p. 28.496
  Lew, 27 ICLQ (1978), p. 168; Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 61.497
  Gärditz, W eltrechtspflege, p. 74, cites Holdsworth vol. 1, 7th ed., p. 317.498
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sometimes been regarded as the only such criterion.492
However, even a strict application of the territoriality principle does not help to avoid
multiple fora. On the contrary, Hein calls it the prime “multiplicator of jurisdictional
conflicts“.  The reason for this is rather obvious. Since the locus of a crime is far493
from being clear, the territoriality principle can be used both to widen and to limit
jurisdiction.  How courts will construe this principle depends greatly on the494
objectives that the respective legal order pursues with rules on jurisdiction and on the
function these rules have. In this respect, there is a surprisingly clear divide between
English and continental legal doctrine.  In the common law tradition, adherence to495
the territoriality principle is rather strict and its interpretation narrow. The main reason
for this is that, for centuries, territoriality was regarded as lying at the heart of
procedural justice. Continental laws instead used to consider jurisdiction and
territoriality as a question of sovereignty.
Let us first look at English law. Here, the evolution of the territoriality principle took
place in close connection with the evolution of the jury. According to the ancient
concept of the jury,  criminal proceedings should take place before a local jury,496
because local men of standing were considered best qualified to take into account
the circumstances of a particular case and its social significance. They might know
the people concerned personally and thus be able to judge rightly.  The reason why497
a “body of neighbours”  should hear a case was first seen mainly as a means to498
secure speedy trials and thereby increase the proceeds from justice. But soon it was
clear that it served as a safeguard against arbitrary or wrongful prosecution. This
  Art. 20.499
  Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 61.500
 Lord Halsbury in Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales [1891] AC 455, 458.501
 [1991] 1 AC 225, 251.502
 See below for a more thorough analysis.503
  Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht.504
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understanding of local jury and territoriality dates back as far as the Magna Carta499
and had great influence on the further development. Because a trial was only
considered fair when it was heard by a local jury, the territoriality principle was
applied very rigidly. Originally this idea extended even to the relation of the different
counties (i.e. principle of locality). This resulted in the absence of any venue rather
often, especially concerning crimes committed over a distance.
Exceptions to this were thus very few,  limited to specific courts and some crimes500
only (like high treason, later also homicide).
With the long-lasting application of the territoriality principle the understanding of
crime itself changed. It was now perceived to be local in effect and by nature, leading
to the famous dictum of Lord Halsbury in 1891: “All crime is local. The jurisdiction
over crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed”.  This concept is501
still very influential in the legal doctrine, even though Lord Griffiths announced in
Liangsiriprasert (Somchai) v Government of the United States of America:  “crime502
has ceased to be largely local in origin and effect”.
The development on the continent was altogether different. The strong tradition of
personality-based jurisdiction, i.e. jurisdiction based on the nationality of the
defendant or the victim,  never quite ceased. On the contrary, territorial jurisdiction503
was generally regarded as just one among many possible criteria for the assumption
of jurisdiction. One of the reasons for this is the preference continental systems gave
to justice in substance over a procedural struggle for justice.  This affinity was504
furthered by the influence of absolute theories of punishment by Hegel and Kant on
the legal doctrine. Universal justice was the aim, and territoriality was regarded as
one way towards achieving it.
 Binding, Handbuch, vol. 1, p. 383, concerning territorial application of the substantive law,505
translation by author.
 BGH, judgment of 12 December 2000 - 1 StR 184/99, NJW  2001, p. 624.506
146
A theoretical underpinning came with territorial concepts of sovereignty. It was
considered to be an essential attribute of sovereignty to be able to exercise
jurisdiction over every act occurring within the territory, but it was not considered to
limit sovereignty correspondingly. While legal doctrine could therefore use social
contract theories extensively to justify territorial sovereignty (based on temporary
submission of foreigners and permanent submission of resident nationals), it did not
hesitate to use other theories for other principles.
Arguments for the territoriality principle as the exclusive source of jurisdiction were
only put forward by liberals, especially in Prussia, at the close of the nineteenth
century. This was directed against a tendency of the authoritarian state to secure
universal control over its subjects through wide jurisdiction. However, it met with little
success. Far from thinking extraterritorial jurisdiction an interference in other states’
internal matters,  trying only crimes committed on the territory was considered as
showing disrespect to other sovereigns. As a leading scholar of the time, Binding,
puts it: territoriality is “the principle of the most despicable selfishness”.505
It is not surprising then, that the territoriality principle as set down in §§ 3 and 9 of the
German penal code is very wide. In fact, it sets down the principle of ubiquity. A
crime is consequently committed in every place where the defendant a) acted, b)
should have acted, c) where the crime was completed, d) where the crime was
meant to be completed by the defendant e) where specifically defined elements of
the crime have been completed; for other participants any of the places where the
main offender acted according to a) to e) and where criteria a) to e) are fulfilled by
him.
That these criteria can cause problems in the international arena is evident and can
be illustrated with a case involving cybercrime that was decided by the
Bundesgerichtshof in 2000  (simplified): The defendant Töben, an Australian506
citizen, had founded the Adelaide Institute in Australia, a pseudo-scientific anti-
 Para. 130 (1) and (3) of the German Penal Code (StGB).507
 Cf. e.g. Vec, NJW  2002, p. 1536s.508
 Judgment of 7 November 2007 (STC 235/2007); the criminalisation of the denial, not the509
justification was held unconstitutional.
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Semitic organisation. While being in Australia physically, he had uploaded several
articles in the English language on the institute’s website that was using an
Australian server. These articles were belittling or denying the holocaust and
decrying its witnesses, pretending to be based on academic research. There was no
evidence that any one in Germany other than the police had accessed the website.
Under German substantive law, the publishing of the articles would amount to a
qualified “Auschwitz-lie”  and libel. Töben was arrested on a visit to Germany. The507
Bundesgerichtshof held that German courts had jurisdiction on the basis of the
territoriality principle. The act had been committed in Germany because its harmful
result, i.e. the completion, had occurred there. The argument was as follows: the
completion of the Auschwitz-lie consisted in the creation of a danger for the protected
legal interest. The articles were threatening public peace in Germany, since they
were accessible to everyone. By choosing the internet for publication the defendant
had shown that he wanted worldwide publicity, including Germany.
That this argument, satisfactory though the outcome might be, is not very convincing
in legal terms, need hardly be said. It was criticized heavily in Germany for ascribing
territoriality-based jurisdiction to all states in the world concerning cyber crime.508
The confusion that would arise in Europe can be illustrated if we modify the facts
slightly. Despite Article 6 of the Council of Europe’s 2003 additional protocol to the
convention on cyber crime and the proposed framework decision on combating
racism and xenophobia the Auschwitz-lie, if unaccompanied by other circumstances,
is still not punishable in the majority of Member States. In Spain, for example, the
Constitutional Court ruled that the respective criminal provision was partly
unconstitutional.  Let us now presume that the same events had taken place in509
England, committed by a British citizen and
a) Germany issues a European Arrest Warrant for arrest in England.
 Council framework decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest W arrant510
(2002/584/JHA).
 See also the corresponding discussion in civil procedure on the interpretation of Art. 5(3) of511
Regulation 44/2001/EC (jurisdiction in the place where a tort or delict has been committed);
lastly ECJ judgment of 25 October 2011, joint cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 (eDate and
Martinez).
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b) When the defendant is on a holiday in Spain, Germany issues a European Arrest
Warrant for arrest in Spain.
c) The defendant travels to Austria. Germany issues a Warrant for arrest in Austria.
In case a), the warrant would normally have to be executed according to Article 1(2)
of the framework decision.  That the act does not constitute a criminal offence in510
England does not signify anything, for, according to Article 2(2), double criminality
must not be verified (here: “computer-related crime” and “racism and xenophobia”).
But Article 4(7)(a) lays down that execution may be denied when the European
Arrest Warrant relates to offences which 
“are regarded by the law of the executing Member State as having been
committed in whole or in part in the territory of the executing Member State or
in a place treated as such” [highlighted by author].
As we see here, a state can determine and interpret the territoriality principle
independently if the question is whether the act was committed on its territory.
England and countries with similar legislation could therefore refuse to execute the
arrest warrant. 
This happened in fact in the case of the very same Töben. After his conviction in
Germany, he served a nine month prison term and then continued his internet
publications. Thus, Germany issued a European Arrest Warrant for further offences
of „Auschwitz-lie“. On 1 October 2008, Töben was arrested on Heathrow airport by
British authorities executing the Arrest Warrant. The Magistrates’ Court, however,
dismissed the Arrest Warrant on October 29, 2008, because it contained inadequate
detail about the offences. This shows exactly the problematic nature of the
territoriality principle: As the territoriality of an internet crime is very uncertain,  the511
British judge could validly argue that the act might have been committed on British
 N.B.: The wording gives a leeway to the “executing judicial authority” on an individual basis,512
but some states make use of this through their legislation on a general basis. 
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territory as well. This would constitute a ground for refusal according to section
64(2)(a) of the Extradition Act 2003, which requires that „no part of it occurs in the
United Kingdom“. Since the German authorities did not precisely state that the act
did not occur in the UK, there was too little information in the Arrest Warrant. 
We can see from these examples that there are two problems with the independent
interpretation of the territoriality principle by the executing Member State. First of all,
a state with a wide interpretation of territoriality, such as Germany itself, could very
often refuse to execute Arrest Warrants concerning cyber crimes, for they would
almost always have been committed “in part” on its territory. Secondly, under Art.
4(7)(a) of the framework decision all countries are still free to execute an Arrest
Warrant under such circumstances; the refusal is just an option.  For an individual512
who acts in another state that is willing to extradite him, this might mean that he
would very unexpectedly be confronted with German law.
In case b), the steps are the same: at first glance, execution is obligatory and double
criminality not required. However, Spain, not having such a wide understanding of
territoriality as Germany and not having the same factual link as England, could not
apply Article 4(7)(a). There remains Article 4 (7)(b) which says that execution may be
denied where the European Arrest Warrant relates to offences which 
“have been committed outside the territory of the issuing Member State and
the law of the executing Member State does not allow prosecution for the
same offences when committed outside its territory.”
Here the framework decision does not specify which law is to determine whether the
act was committed “outside the territory of the issuing Member State“: From a
systematic view it could be parallel to (a), so that (b) would apply only when the
issuing Member State assumes extraterritorial jurisdiction according to its national
law. But Germany attributes its jurisdiction to territoriality. This construction would
therefore mean that Spain would have to surrender the defendant. 
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However, one could also argue that, since (b) does not refer to the law of the issuing
state, as does (a), e contrario the issuing state’s law has to be disregarded. But since
no national law determines when a crime has been committed within or outside of the
territory of another Member State, this could then only mean that the facts of the
case would have to be adapted and then Spain would have to determine whether the
act would have been committed inside or outside of its territory had it been in the
same factual position as Germany. Since Spanish jurisdiction rules concerning cyber
crime are not as wide, it would probably have been outside. The next step is now to
determine whether it allows prosecution for the same offences extraterritorially. We
have seen that an equivalent offence does not exist any more. A wide understanding
of this could lead to the conclusion that not criminalizing an act necessarily excludes
extraterritorial prosecution for the act. But in reality, the argument would here be on
a different level, i.e. double criminality and not jurisdiction, so it is neither a very
elegant nor a cogent reasoning. Spain would not have to surrender the defendant.
The third possibility would be to rely on an autonomous, uniform interpretation of the
norm. There is, however, no indication that this was intended and it would in fact be
very difficult to find a European understanding of territoriality. Member states’ laws
are too different and European legislative acts trying to define territoriality are still too
vague to serve this purpose (see below). It is not possible to determine whether
Spain would have to surrender the defendant.
In case c), Austria could most probably rely on (a). Although Austria, as far as I can
see, has not yet had to judge a similar case, its jurisdictional provisions are so similar
to Germany’s that the act could be regarded as having been committed partly on its
territory. It could therefore refuse to surrender the defendant according to (a), but
would probably have no interest in doing so because the „Auschwitz-lie“ is a
punishable offence under Austrian law, too.
What can be seen from this case is that, without a common approach to jurisdiction,
the defendant’s legal position is difficult to foresee and will always depend on the
contingencies of the case. Even when just one jurisdictional principle, territoriality, is
used, it is unclear why and when an arrest warrant concerning the same act is
 Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 132: Rechtsstaatsprinzip.513
 Germann, 69 ZStrR (1954), p. 237ss.514
 Böckenförde, Festgabe für Carl Schmitt, p. 131 nt. 33. If taken literally, this should be515
favourable to the active personality principle.
  Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 313.516
  Colangelo, 36 Georgetown Journal of Int. Law (2005), p. 539: “the vessel is that state’s517
territory.“ Midway the Italian Codice Penale, Art. 4 para. 2: „Le navi e gli aeromobili italiani sono
considerati come territorio dello Stato, ovunque si trovino [...]“; Ligeti, Strafrecht und
strafrechtliche Zusammenarbeit, p. 72: „quasi-territorial“.
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recognised and when it is not. And in no case would a state’s decision (here
England) not to criminalize a certain behaviour be recognised by other states. If the
execution of the arrest warrant can be refused, this depends on other criteria.
To say that the territoriality principle is advantageous because it creates individual
justice in bringing a substantive criminal law to application that could be expected by
the defendant is too short-sighted.
Therefore, there have always been voices requiring the forseeability of the applicable
norm. The argument was founded on different principles, either the rule of law  or513
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege  or on democratic elements, i.e. the non-514
participation of foreigners in legislation.  How this can be better substantiated on a515
European level will be shown below.
6.4.2 Flag Principle
The flag principle holds that actions occurring onboard a vessel or aircraft carrying a
state’s flag are subject to that state’s jurisdiction. It was often described as a
subcategory of the territoriality principle, the vessel being a territoire flottant or
floating territory.  This flawed description still appears occasionally.  It is now,516 517
however, well established that vessels and aircraft are not extraterritorial when
travelling through another state’s territory. Therefore, the riparian state is free to
exercise full jurisdiction on the basis of the territoriality principle unless otherwise
agreed on. 
It is true that traditionally the flag principle was based on the idea of the close
 See e.g. Ambos, in: Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, Vor §§ 3-7, para. 37.518
 Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 151; cf. also Blakesley, in: Bassiouni (ed.), Int.519
Criminal Law Vol. II, p. 117.
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connection of a ship to the home country and the domestic sovereign, which is a
territorial element. But since the carrying of flags is often dependent on the owner’s
nationality, there are also many similarities to the active and passive personality
principle (see below). 
Considering how laws differ and how easily some states’ flags may be carried, one
must state that the justification of this principle today does not lie in any specific link
to the home country. The main advantage instead is that the flag can easily be
determined and is unambiguous. If crew members and passengers have different
nationalities and many countries are passed through, sometimes at high speed, any
other link seems more random.
The flag principle is so widespread that it is laid down in many treaties as the primary
link to be used in the limited context of international aviation and ship transport, other
forms of jurisdiction being subsidiary or excluded.
6.4.3 Active Personality Principle
Just like the territoriality principle, the active personality principle is one of the
classical links in international criminal law. It states that the nationals of a state are,
under certain conditions, subject to that state’s law. It can already be found in archaic
laws because of the importance of the clan. Just like in private law, a person was
believed to carry their respective ‘personal statutes’ with them. The principle
experienced a revival in the 19th century when an authoritarian and paternalistic
concept of the nation state gave rise to a new rationale behind the personality
principle: A citizen was believed to owe a duty to his state of staying faithful to its
laws.  Additionally, it was mistakenly regarded as the logical consequence of the518
passive personality principle:  a national who was protected by his own criminal law519
abroad should also have to abide by it abroad. When this idea was manifested in the
 Art. 5, Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 142.520
 See Blakesley, in: Bassiouni (ed.), Int. Crim. Law Vol. II, p. 117.521
 Cf. Hein, Zuständigkeitskonflikte, p. 35, 45.522
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French Code d’instruction in 1866,  it had great appeal to other continental520
legislations, especially to German states. It seemed to be conducive to absolute
justice and was quickly adopted. Tellingly, it became the basic principle of German
law from 1940 to 1974. Thus, Germans committing crimes in Germany were not tried
on the basis of the territoriality principle, but on the basis of the active personality
principle.
However, it were not only nationalistic considerations that helped this principle to
spread: from the first, there was also an element of international comity involved. It
was considered to be against public morality to offer a loophole to nationals who had
perpetrated abroad. Since a states’ own nationals were - in civil law jurisdictions -
normally not extradited, it was regarded as a matter of respect to a foreign sovereign
to try the defendant (aut dedere aut iudicare).  521
This idea is still existent today,  so that the rationale behind the active personality522
principle may be said to be the idea of abstract solidarity between the states. It is
also sometimes found in European legislative acts when a state that will not extradite
in certain cases is required to create a basis for jurisdiction (see below).
One of the main problems in this context is of course the role that the substantive
criminal law of the locus delicti commissi is to play. As always, jurisdiction of the
home country will lead to the application of domestic law. That it can be an undue
hardship to disregard the law of the country where the defendant acted is often
acknowledged, without taking this as a starting point for a more thorough analysis of
the problem (see below).
Sometimes the existence of a lex loci is thought to be imperative, sometimes
commendable. Germany for example requires such a law in some cases of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, but not in all. Other suggestions recommend to apply the
milder of the two laws in question, the lex mitior, in all cases (Switzerland) or to
 For this question see also van den Wyngaert, Double Criminality as a Requirement to523
Jurisdiction, p. 46.
 Cf. Juppe, Gegenseitige Anerkennung, p. 95ss.524
 Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 116; see also Böse/Meyer, ZIS 2011, p. 341s.525
 Gerritsen, Jurisdiction, p. 58.526
 Thus Schultz, Neue Entwicklungen, p. 312, regards it as a form of vicarious administration527
of justice.
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regard the foreign law as the maximum threshold.  However, the real problem still523
remains whether it is appropriate at all to apply the substantive law of the home
country or not.
Closely connected to this is the link of the permanent residence or domicile of the
defendant. This is often found in European legislation instead of or in addition to the
active personality principle. It is altogether better adapted to the realities of modern
life and takes into account the interest in resocialising the defendant.524
6.4.4 Passive Personality Principle
A state can also assert jurisdiction because of the nationality of the victim.  This form
of jurisdiction is, like the active personality principle, independent of the locus of the
offence, but it may be limited to certain types of offences. It is part of the protective
principle because it is supposed to protect nationals abroad. As a link in international
criminal law it is very controversial and has been called “the worst of all principles”.525
The passive personality principle is almost always characterized by a certain distrust
towards foreign administration of justice. The fear is that the foreign legislator or the
foreign authorities will not take enough efforts to protect aliens.  Although one could526
argue that this principle is thus contrary to the idea of a system of mutual recognition
based on mutual trust, it found its way into European legislation (see below). The
reason for this, however, cannot really be the protection of one’s own nationals
abroad. For often the offender is unaware of the nationality of his victim and, in any
case, is unlikely to be influenced by thoughts about the international criminal law of
his victim’s home country.  The real rationale then is that the public interest in a527
prosecution of the crime and in retribution will usually be great in a victim’s home
 Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 136.528
 Loc. cit.529
 Hein, Zuständigkeitskonflikte, p. 37.530
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country. Without going into the legitimacy of this desire there is one substantial
argument, even though it might not possess the greatest weight: The passive
personality principle massively facilitates a participation of the alleged victim in the
proceedings. This might be relatively important for him in countries where he can
partake in the proceedings as a party or with considerable procedural rights.
When the nationality of the victim is not known or not discernible by the offender,
there are again serious problems, for the offender had no reason to believe that he
could ever be subject to any law but that of the country he was acting in. Oehler
asserts that in these circumstances the passive personality principle should not be
applied “for lack of reasons of justice”.  On a European level, it would be more528
desirable to find specifically legal reason for such considerations, as will be shown
later. 
Both Oehler  and Hein  require the existence of a lex loci, or an equivalent norm529 530
for reasons of international law, in order to avoid an infringement of the principle of
non-interference. These views reflect the doubtful legitimacy of the passive
personality principle.
6.4.5 Protective Principle
The protective principle is based on the idea that every state must be competent to
judge crimes that affect its very own interests. All states will take on jurisdiction over
offences which concern their existence, security, functioning, honour etc. such as, for
example, high treason or crimes concerning betrayal of state secrets. It should be
noted, however, that the UK still uses this form of extraterritorial jurisdiction sparingly
against aliens, i.e. mainly only as an active personality principle. 
The reason why states assume this form of jurisdiction is not only based on the
nature of the protected interests, but also on the fact that other states have rarely
 See also Böse/Meyer, ZIS 2011, p. 342.531
 Ligeti, Strafrecht und strafrechtliche Zusammenarbeit, p. 76.532
 See Cockayne, 3 JICJ (2005), p. 518ss.533
 Cf. Meyer, 31 Harvard Int’l. L.J. (1990), p. 108, 115 s. on this principle.534
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any interest in asserting jurisdiction for crimes directed against other states or in
applying sufficient sanctions. This idea is also expressed in the possible exceptions
a state can make under Art. 55(1)(b) CISA to avoid the application of ne bis in idem
concerning offences against national security and other „equally essential
interests“.531
6.4.6 Universality Principle
The universality principle allows for the worldwide prosecution of offences
independent of territory, nationality of the defendant or nationality of the victims and
is meant for those acts that are directed against legal and cultural interests, both
individual and collective, whose protection is in the common interest of all states. The
basis of this principle is therefore solidarity. Its development was triggered through
the experience of the 20th century, but it was not unknown before. It was first applied
in connection with piracy. Examples for crimes that are often subject to universal
jurisdiction are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes etc. The definition of
crimes for which universal jurisdiction should exist is difficult to determine, especially
as a purely national definition seems hardly justifiable. The Rome Statute is generally
believed to be an acceptable orientation.  Due to its width and the lacking532
connection of the act to the sentencing state the universality principle is a widely
contested jurisdictional basis.533
6.4.7 Vicarious Administration of Justice
One speaks of vicarious administration of justice when the state where the defendant
is present tries him without any further connection to the crime or interest in the
prosecution.  The rationale behind this form of jurisdiction is the solidarity of states.534
Thus, vicarious administration is generally only subsidiary and takes place when
 Cf. below under 6.5 for examples and further explanations; see also Vervaele, 8 Colum.535
J.Eur.L. (2008), p. 151ss., 171.
 2009/948/JHA; see below.536
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extradition fails and, according to a narrow understanding, where it is requested by
a state that has jurisdiction. It is, however, increasingly used in situations where
extradition or a trial is neither requested nor welcomed by the other state, for
example in highly political cases where every state with a better basis for jurisdiction
fears consequent internal conflicts. The reason for jurisdiction would then only be
abstract solidarity with the concerned states and a desire to avoid loopholes. This is
very doubtful in the light of international law and the defendant’s position. The
vicarious principle is often linked with universal jurisdiction, as it can apply to crimes
committed anywhere and by anyone; however, it is conceived of as a residual
principle that has a gap-filling jurisdictional function.
6.4.8 Protection of EU interests
The jurisdiction of Member States to try crimes directed against EU interests is a new
form of jurisdiction that results from the lack of a European administration of justice
in criminal matters.535
6.4.9 Other
There are several other forms of jurisdiction that are sometimes named, but often
they only reflect another theoretical system for deciding principles of jurisdiction. For
example, the negotiation over the distribution of  jurisdiction in the international
sphere and the conclusion of jurisdictional treaties is sometimes referred to as a
principle of competence-distribution. This is especially important in the new
framework decision of 30 November 2009 on prevention and settlement of conflicts
of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings.  However, the actual jurisdiction536
that is agreed on is still based on a traditional principle of jurisdiction, so that it seems
unnecessary to regard the negotiation-process as a different principle.
  Council framework decision of 29 May 2000 on increasing protection by criminal penalties537
and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the Euro
(2000/383/JHA), amended by framework decision 2001/888/JHA.
  Recital 7.538
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6.5 Analysis of existing approaches to jurisdiction
6.5.1 Jurisdiction in current EU legislation
When analysing the different attempts to deal with the issue of jurisdiction, the most
important source lies in the various framework decisions that have been adopted to
implement the EU’s criminal policy. These legislative measures usually deal with
elements of substantive criminal law first and then set down criteria for the
jurisdiction of Member States’ courts in the ambit of the framework decision.
The solutions in the respective acts are not always uniform, but differ in many details.
A chronological overview shall give an impression of how the rationales for the
allocation of jurisdiction have changed over time. After that I will try to explain why
these systems for the allocation of jurisdiction vary and to outline the underlying
principles that hold them together.
6.5.1.1 Framework decision on counterfeiting of the Euro
In 2000, the Council adopted a framework decision on sanctions against
counterfeiting of the Euro . Even before the introduction of the euro-banknotes, the537
Council saw the need for an efficient protection of the common currency. It was
particularly concerned over the “worldwide importance of the Euro”  that might538
attract people to counterfeit banknotes all over the world and adopted an unusual
measure.
According to Article 7 of the framework decision, a Member State’s courts are
competent if the offence has been committed in whole or in part within its territory.
This shows that on the European level the territoriality principle remains the basic
  Art. 7(2).539
 Cf. also Vervaele, 8 Colum. J.Eur.L. (2008),  p. 171.540
 Cf. Juppe, Gegenseitige Anerkennung, p. 102 s.541
 Art. 7(3); see Hecker, ZIS 2011, p. 61.542
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factor in determining jurisdiction. It was later on followed by all the other framework
decisions.
But the territoriality principle is supplemented by a very broad provision which
requires the states of the eurozone, not all Member States, to “take the appropriate
measures to ensure that the prosecution of counterfeiting, at least in respect of the
Euro, is possible, independently of the nationality of the offender and the place
where the offence has been committed” . This provision obliges the states to539
assume extraterritorial jurisdiction over every crime in connection with counterfeiting
of the Euro, regardless of whether a more specific connection exists.  If a540
Paraguayan citizen develops a computer program for counterfeiting of the Euro in
India, he can be tried before an Italian court. Such a wide assumption of jurisdiction
can be explained with the protective principle: The states of the Eurozone claim
extraterritorial jurisdiction over each crime against the common currency, because it
is their own currency and thus in their own national interest to defend the currency
and thereby the economy. Additionally, the European interest can, as shown above
6.4.8, only be protected through the Member States’ criminal justice. The adoption of
this principle must be seen in view of recital 7 and the fear of the legislator of criminal
acts in foreign states due to the worldwide importance of the euro.
Since all Eurozone states are in the same position regarding extraterritorial acts
(except factually, e.g. availability of evidence etc.), this form of jurisdiction always
carries the risk of multiple fora. The European legislator not only accepts these
positive conflicts, but encourages them in order to avoid the possibility of a negative
conflict of jurisdiction.  Its solution to this conflict here is a form of “cooperation”541
between the Member States with a view of centralising the prosecution in one
state,  which is a very vague approach.542
 Council framework decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 (OJ L 328/55 of543
06.12.2008). See also the Proposal for the framework decision COM/2001/664fin. (OJ C 75
E/269 of 26.03.2002).
 Cf. Art. 9(2).544
160
6.5.1.2 Framework decision on combating racism and xenophobia
The framework decision on combating racism and xenophobia  introduced a more543
complex system for the allocation of jurisdiction. The basis is again the territoriality
principle as set down in Article 9(1)(a). This principle is extended, though, by a more
specific definition of the place of the crime: Spreading racist material over the
internet will be regarded as a crime on a state’s “territory” either if the person acting
is physically present on its territory or if the content is hosted on an internet server on
its territory.  This definition, however, is not complete. It is meant to be a minimum544
standard for jurisdiction of the Member States. There might be other places where
jurisdiction could reasonably be established, for example the place where the effects
of racism are meant to take place by the offender, where material is meant to be
accessed or downloaded etc. The framework decision does not say anything on the
location of effect. Nor does it preclude an extraordinarily wide construction of  the
territoriality principle as is, for example, the case in Germany.
This somewhat unclear principle of territoriality is complemented by a personality
principle in Article 9(1)(b) and (c). According to these provisions, a Member State’s
courts are competent if the offence was committed by one of its nationals or for the
benefit of a legal person on its territory. The Commission’s proposal, instead,
provided that not only the act needs to be committed by one of its nationals, but also
that it affects individuals or groups of this state. This had been a very interesting
combination of the active and the passive personality (protective) principle: Not only
the perpetrator must be a national, but also the victim. Thus cumulating two
prerequisites, the personality principle was given a very restricted scope and
probably it is for this reason that the Council did not adopt this restriction, nor has it
been followed in subsequent legislation (see infra).
Another important restriction to the principle of personality, however, is set in Article
9(3) of the framework decision, which stipulates the general possibility to exclude the
 See Articles 12(3) and 13(1) of the Commission Proposal COM/2001/664fin. (OJ C 75545
E/269 of 26.03.2002).
 Council framework decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash546
means of payment (2001/413/JHA).
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application of this principle. Member States thus can choose to make territoriality the
only basis for jurisdiction in their implementing laws. The legislator had to pay respect
to the fact that not all Member States accept extraterritorial jurisdiction, which would
be a direct effect of claiming jurisdiction over its own nationals regardless of the
place where the crime has been committed. The Commission had proposed a more
advanced system of jurisdiction that required the Member States to extradite their
own nationals if they do not claim jurisdiction over them, i.e. if they do not adopt the
active personality principle.  But this obligation has been removed by the Council.545
A special treatment of legal persons is found in Article 9(1)(c). A Member State has
jurisdiction over a case if the crime has been committed “for the benefit of a legal
person that has its head office in the territory of that Member State”. Thus, the
offender can be a foreigner who acts on foreign territory, but will be held liable before
another Member State’s courts because he acted to serve a legal person on its
territory. This is a specific form of the active personality principle: Because a legal
person cannot act itself, one has to assess the actions of its representatives. But the
question of jurisdiction is nevertheless judged according to the head office of the
legal person, because the representative is acting on its behalf. One may say that
this legal mechanism is a consistent step in adopting the active personality principle.
And more importantly, it is vital because some Member States do accept a criminal
responsibility of legal persons and others do not: Article 9(1)(c) ensures an equal
application of the allocation of jurisdiction regardless of these national differences.
6.5.1.3 Framework decision on non-cash means of payment
The model of jurisdiction introduced by the proposal on the framework decision on
combating racism was the first elaborate solution which served as a model for later
legislation. In the subsequent framework decision on the protection of non-cash
means of payment,  the Council again takes territoriality as a compulsory basis for546
 Article 9(1)(a).547
 Article 9(2) and (3).548
 Art. 7(3) of that framework decision, see above.549
 Council framework decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA);550
amended by Council framework decision of 28 November 2008 (2008/919/JHA).
 Article 9(1)(a).551
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the allocation of jurisdiction.547
The active personality principle, instead, is compulsory only for those Member States
that do not extradite their nationals.  And it is still further restrained in this548
framework decision: National legislation can limit the application of the personality
principle to those cases where the act is also punishable under the law of the
(foreign) state where it was committed. This requirement of a double criminality,
effectively a lex loci, is exclusively found in this framework decision. 
As to the question of avoiding multiple fora, Article 11(2) only provides for
consultations, as did the framework decision on eurocounterfeiting.549
6.5.1.4 Framework decision on combating terrorism
The most extensive rules for the allocation of jurisdiction were adopted by the 2002
framework decision on combating terrorism.  Here, the Council not only provided for550
ample possibilities of assuming jurisdiction, but also developed a more decisive
approach towards multiple fora.
The first basis for claiming jurisdiction is, again, the territoriality principle.  But in551
contrast to all other legislative acts, territoriality can be understood as a pan-
European territoriality: It is left open to the Member States to claim jurisdiction
whenever an offence is committed on the territory of another Member State. If a
national legislation adopts this concept, it will claim extraterritorial jurisdiction even in
cases where there is no significant link to its own territory. Such a universal
jurisdiction is rare in the existing legislation as outlined above. Although this form of
the universality principle would entail problems in public international law if a state
were to apply it of its own motion, it is possible to implement it through a framework
 Cf. Klip, EU Criminal Law, p. 181.552
 Document A5-0206/2001fin., p. 16.553
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decision on the European level. From the standpoint of European Union legislation,
it seems to be regarded as an adequate means to protect vital interests that are
common to all Member States. Additionally, we find the flag principle for offences
committed on board a vessel or an aircraft mentioned in Article 9(1)(b);  this552
principle is not widened to a European flag principle but represents the traditional flag
principle. 
But there is not only an extension of the territoriality principle - the active personality
principle is widened as well: Article 9(1)(c) allocates jurisdiction to Member States
over their own nationals, but also over persons residing on their territory. Which are
the reasons for claiming jurisdiction over cases where the terrorist act is committed
in another country and the offender is no citizen of the state? A similar proposal had
been made by the European Parliament in its opinion on the framework decision on
child pornography. It suggested to claim jurisdiction if “the offender is one of its
nationals, or resides permanently or temporarily on the territory of the Member State
concerned”.  But this proposal of extending jurisdiction to residents had not been553
adopted in the framework decision on child pornography. Probably the provision of
the framework decision on combating terrorism is a singular reaction to the fear of
foreign citizens planning terrorist acts on the territory of the EU and executing them
abroad, as has happened in the assaults of September 11, 2001.
To complete the survey on jurisdiction in the framework decision on combating
terrorism, one must pay attention to Article 9(1)(e) that establishes the protective
principle in this ambit: A Member State has jurisdiction if “the offence is committed
against the institutions or people of the Member State in question or against an
institution of the European Union or a body set up in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community or the Treaty on European Union and based
in that Member State.” The protective principle comprises, generally speaking, the
passive personality principle (the offence is committed against the state’s nationals)
and the protection of state interests (the offence is directed against other national
 See infra.554
 See e.g. Hecker, ZIS 2011, p. 61.555
 Report on the Commission proposal for a Council framework decision on combating556
terrorism, A5-0397/2001 final.
164
interests). Article 9(1)(e) comprises both aspects and thereby tries to extend a
Member State’s jurisdiction over terrorist acts. It even extends the passive
personality principle to the “people” of the Member State, so that not only its
nationals are protected.
It has become a commonplace to argue that an extension of jurisdiction is
undesirable because it leads to legal uncertainty. The legislator seems to accept this
uncertainty in order to avoid “loopholes” for criminals.  It tries to deal with the554
inevitable positive conflicts of jurisdiction on a second step: In Article 9(2), the
Council creates a detailed procedure in multiple fora-cases. The respective Member
States shall “cooperate” to find an exclusive place for jurisdiction by applying the
principles of territoriality, active personality/residence, passive personality and lastly
the state of arrest as hierarchical criteria (the framework decision speaks of
“sequential account”).  This is an important progress in comparison to earlier555
legislation where the Council contented itself with a simple recourse to “consultation”.
Whether this system of first widening jurisdiction and then solving conflicts on a
second step is a feasible concept will be revealed in practice. The question here is
not whether this system can work in practice, but rather what it implies about the
European legislator’s understanding of criminal justice. I will deal with this in more
detail later. Here it is sufficient to say that the extension of jurisdiction is an express
aim of the legislator. If one accepts this political goal, the framework decision on
combating terrorism is a step forward on the legal level, because it at least
establishes legal criteria for dealing with multiple proceedings. It would, however,
have been a still more far-reaching step to provide for a conflict-solving mechanism,
as proposed by the opinion of the European Parliament.  It may occur that a simple556
“cooperation” between the Member States will not suffice to assign the jurisdiction to
one Member State in cases of controversy. There is no binding decision-making
procedure if one Member State does not want to waive its jurisdiction. The
 Cf. amendment 40 with the view of introducing a new Article 12(2a).557
 Council framework decision of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector558
(2003/568/JHA).
 Cf. Article 7(1)-(3).559
 Council framework decision of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of560
children and child pornography (2004/68/JHA ).
 Council framework decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings561
(2002/629/JHA).
 Council framework decision of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the562
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking
(2004/757/JHA).
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Parliament brought forward the idea of giving Eurojust or the European Court of
Justice a competence to finally decide on the question of jurisdiction according to the
criteria of the framework decision,  which would be a desirable step forward.557
6.5.1.5 Framework decision on corruption in the private sector
The very extensive approach to jurisdiction, as introduced by the framework decision
on terrorism, has remained singular. The 2003 framework decision on combating
corruption in the private sector  has returned to the original system again: It558
prescribes jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality and active personality (including the
above-mentioned system for legal persons), but makes this extraterritorial jurisdiction
optional to those states who surrender their own nationals.  However, a system of559
dealing with multiple fora is not implemented here.
6.5.1.6 Framework decisions on child pornography, on trafficking in
human beings and on drug trafficking
In the succeeding framework decisions on child pornography,  on trafficking in560
human beings  and on drug trafficking,  a very similar concept can be found.561 562
Articles 8, 6, and 8, respectively, take over the model of the earlier legislation:
Territoriality and limited personality principle. This can therefore be regarded as the
common “acquis” of a jurisdictional pattern in the former EU third pillar measures. Yet
again, the issue of multiple fora is not dealt with.
 Council framework decision of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems563
(2005/222/JHA).
  Article 10(1)(a).564
  Article 10(1) and (3).565
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6.5.1.7 Framework decision on attacks against information systems
The framework decision on attacks against information systems  provides again a563
more complex approach to jurisdiction, similar to the system of the framework
decision on combating terrorism. The first relevant link is once more the territoriality
principle.  This principle is then defined more specifically as the place where the564
offender is physically present or as the place where the attacked information system
is situated. Thus, the Council clearly states that “territoriality” means the location of
action as well as the location of the effect. Each link will suffice on its own to give the
Member State jurisdiction over a “computer crime” so that the framework decision
institutes the principle of ubiquity, albeit not in the broadest possible way. It thereby
reflects the two basic aspects of criminal law: controlling the offenders’ actions
(location of act) and protecting the victims’ interests (location of effect).
The other provisions of the framework decision on attacks against information
systems are known from the framework decision on terrorism: A limited personality
principle is adopted, whereby Member States have to claim jurisdiction if they do not
extradite.  An interesting aspect in comparing the two framework decisions is the565
fact that the very wide extensions of jurisdiction in the framework decision on
terrorism are no longer followed. One can observe an interdependence between the
gravity of the crime and the expansion of jurisdiction: Terrorism is regarded as a
universally disapproved act so that extraterritorial jurisdiction may be assumed in a
large number of cases. The framework decision on information systems, in contrast,
also deals with minor crimes that may vary more significantly from state to state.
Therefore, the relevant link to the sentencing state must be closer. 
The problem of multiple proceedings in various Member States due to extraterritorial
jurisdiction is dealt with in the known way, by mainly restating the system found in the
framework decision on terrorism. Member states shall cooperate in order to
  Council framework decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA),566
Article 9(2).
 Article 9(1)(a).567
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concentrate proceedings in one Member State only. The hierarchy of the relevant
links to be taken into account in determining the competent state remains the same,
but seems to be no longer legally binding: The new legislation has a slightly different
wording in respect to the older framework decision on terrorism: Instead of “shall be
taken”  we read “may have recourse”. Thus, the hierarchy of the relevant links is no566
longer a legal determinant, but only a non-binding legal argument. This avoidance of
clear and obligatory criteria may lead to more legal uncertainty in solving positive
conflicts of jurisdiction.
6.5.2 Impacts of the framework decisions
6.5.2.1 Priority of the territoriality principle
In all legislative acts, the territoriality principle is the basic principle for the allocation
of jurisdiction. It is applicable without restrictions and seems to be the greatest
common denominator in a European debate on jurisdiction criteria. While other
bases for jurisdiction may be optional to the national legislators implementing the
framework decisions, jurisdiction on the basis of the territoriality principle must be
established by all Member States in all cases.
6.5.2.2 Interpretation of the territoriality principle
The territory refers to the Member States’ territories in most cases. The framework
decision on combating terrorism, however, allows for the creation of a European
territory as an entity in national jurisdiction laws.567
More important is the question of where an act is considered to have been
committed. As outlined in the first part, there are numerous possibilities, especially
the place (or places) where the defendant acted and the place where the harm was
 Article 9(2).568
 Article 10(2).569
 Article 8(5) of the framework decision: Member States must open a forum if a computer570
system was “accessed from its territory”.
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inferred or the act completed. An explicit indication of these places is only given in
two cases, namely in the framework decision on racism and xenophobia  and the568
framework decision on attacks against information systems  where we find the569
principle of ubiquity. This difference may be owing to practical considerations.
Although a divergence of the place where the defendant acted and where the act
was completed can occur with respect to many crimes, it is certainly most typical in
cases of cybercrime. Surprisingly, territorial jurisdiction concerning child pornography
need only be assumed for the place where the defendant acted.570
It would appear, then, that the principle of territoriality means different things in EU
legislative acts. However, it is dangerous to infer too much from this, because there
seems to be no theoretical concept behind this differentiation. Rather, it is a reaction
to practical needs and political feasability.
6.5.2.3 Development of the personality principle
The personality principle, especially the active personality principle, is present in
almost all the framework decisions, but in different forms. There is, however, a clear
development over time:
In the framework decision on counterfeiting of the Euro there is no personal element
in jurisdiction. The framework decision on racism and xenophobia introduces the
active personality principle. The framework decision on non-cash means of payment
also adopts the active personality principle, but allows to subject it to the requirement
of a lex loci, thus introducing a double criminality requirement. The framework
decision on terrorism widens the scope of personality to include residents and
applies the passive personality principle independently. From the framework decision
on corruption in the private sector onwards, the personality principle is a standard.
The active personality principle is generally optional. In the latest framework
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decisions, however, it is only optional if states are ready to surrender their own
nationals both generally (as they now have to) and in the individual case. This
amounts to vicarious administration according to the principle of “aut dedere aut
iudicare”.
The question that remains is why solutions to the question of jurisdiction that are so
similar in the overall conception often vary in seemingly insignificant details. This is
especially true for the cooperation that Member States should use to concentrate
proceedings in one state. In some measures there are no criteria given that could be
used in the negotiations. In others there are slightly different hierarchical orders. A
particular conceptual reason for this is not apparent. The reasons can, as indicated
above, only be found on a practical, political level. These framework decisions only
concern themselves with measures that seemed relevant at the time of the adoption
and confine themselves to typical situations as illustrated with the framework
decisions on racism and attacks on information systems; the typical image here was
cybercrime. The motivation also plays an important part: the framework decision on
terrorism is certainly most far-reaching.
6.5.2.4 Protective principle
The protective principle as such is only found in the framework decision on terrorism
(Article 9(3)) and the framework decision on counterfeiting of the Euro (Article 7(1)),
but in a very wide form: every state always has jurisdiction. That only these two acts
set down the protective principle is due to the subject-matter: they are the only
framework decisions that could concern genuine state interests.
6.5.2.5 Exorbitant jurisdictions
The basic concept of all these legal acts seems to rest on two steps. First, one seeks
to create as many fora for a certain case as possible, later one seeks to limit the
consequences of this by requiring states to cooperate. For this cooperation, however,
there are neither strict criteria nor is there an obligation to succeed. The new
 Framework decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009(OJ L 328/42 of 15.12.2009),571
recital 17.
 Cf. also Herlin-Karnell, 15 ELJ (2009), p. 351 to this aspect.572
  COM/2000/854fin. p. 17 and p. 27.573
  CdR 87/2001fin. at recital 26.574
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framework decisions follow this basic pattern and further elaborate it.
This procedure cannot convince. It does not give the least attention to the interest of
a defendant in being able to predict the jurisdiction he will be subjected to and to
defend himself adequately. The framework decision on prevention and settlement of
conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings purposely avoids
answering the question of whether an individual may have a right to be tried in a
specific jurisdiction and leaves it entirely to national law.  That this “interest” can571
actually be a real procedural right on a European level will be shown later. Suffice it
to say here that independently of any individual-rights-based position, criminal
procedural law in general serves to give a framework to the exercise of state power.
Were prosecutions to negotiate freely over jurisdiction on the European level, this
would open the way to forum shopping and undermine the trust in the impartiality of
criminal proceedings.
All this goes to show that, on the European level, there is a change of the
understanding of criminal law. Instead of being the last resort, the ultima ratio of state
measures,  it is regarded as an effective means to fight all unwelcome572
developments in society. A wide jurisdiction of many states is therefore positive per
se, whereas negative conflicts of jurisdiction are a real threat. That this is not just
speculation can be seen in the explanatory memorandum to the Commission’s
proposal on trafficking in human beings and on child pornography  that claims the573
need to create competences “which are as clear and as far reaching as national legal
systems will allow in order to guard against persons evading prosecution.”
Or, in the words of the Committee of the Regions on the same legislation:  “The574
Committee of the Regions [...] highlights the particular importance of international
extradition agreements and national provisions on criminal law jurisdiction with a view
to ensuring that criminal acts committed wholly or partially outside the home country
 See Fletcher, 26 Yearbook of European Law (2007), p. 10; Vander Beken/Vermeulen/575
Lagodny, NStZ 2002, p. 625.
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of the offender can be punished under criminal law without loopholes”.
Loopholes, however, can be avoided through extradition alone. The system of the
European Arrest Warrant is already so advanced that, if there were a system of
uniform allocation of jurisdiction, loopholes would hardly exist. The added
“advantage” of multiple proceedings over extradition is based on the better and faster
results prosecutors can get when they cooperate. If multiple investigations are
initiated, cooperating Member States can at any given moment chose the most
practical forum for a trial, combine their knowledge through data exchange and
exchange of evidence and react flexibly to new developments in the investigation. It
is clear that this results in a direct disadvantage to the defendant who will normally
not be able to defend himself adequately in several different countries
simultaneously, as he will be faced with investigations based on different legal orders
and in different languages, which, among other things, also multiplies the costs of
adequate legal representation during the investigating stage.
Finally, the conscious creation of positive conflicts of jurisdiction certainly violates
Article 82 para. 1 lit. b TFEU (ex-Art. 31(d) EU) that requires EU action to prevent
and settle conflicts of jurisdiction.575
6.6 Jurisdiction and ne bis in idem
Because of the freedom of states to assert their own jurisdiction in general and the
great preference that EU legislative acts give to extensive jurisdiction in harmonised
areas of criminal law, multiple proceedings for criminal acts will increase.
Although the need to prevent positive conflicts of jurisdiction is often recognised,
there is as yet no piece of legislation that sets substantive, binding and rights-based
criteria for the allocation of jurisdiction. The framework decision on conflicts of
jurisdiction does admittedly not aim at advancing predictability for the individual
through its negotiating procedure. 
 Cf. only van Bockel, ne bis in idem; Mansdöfer, ne bis in idem; Kniebühler, ne bis in idem;576
Jagla, ne bis in idem; Eser, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 36; Lööf 15
EJCCL (2007), p. 309; Klip, EU Crim inal Law, p. 231ss; van den Wyngaert / Stessens, 48
ICLQ (1999), p. 779; Vervaele, 1 Utrecht Law Review (2005), p. 100.
 This requirement is not reiterated in Art. 50 of the Charter. The meaning of this is under577
debate. German courts still apply the criteria of Art. 54 CISA, see Landgericht Aachen of 08
December 2009, 52 Ks 9/08 (Strafverteidiger 2010, 237); Bundesgerichtshof of 25 October
2010, 1 StR 57/10 (BGHSt 57, 11), citing the Explanations relating to the Charter (OJ C 303/17
of 14.12.2007, p. 31); Bundesgerichtshof of 01 December 2010, 2 StR 420/10; upheld by the
Bundesverfassungsgericht of 15 December 2011, 2 BvR 148/11; see for further details Böse,
Gegenseitige Anerkennung unter Lissabon, p. 70ss.; id., GA 2011, p. 504ss.; Hackner, NStZ
2011, p. 426 ss.
 Cf. Klip, EU Criminal Law, p. 423; Juppe, Gegenseitige Anerkennung, p. 90 s.578
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The only further legal barriers to Member States in their assumption and exercise of
jurisdiction are ne bis in idem rules, mainly Articles 54 ss. of the Convention
Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) and now Article 50 of the Charter.
There is a host of literature on the evolution and the meaning of the transnational ne
bis in idem,  and it is not my aim to add to this. I will instead concentrate on the few576
aspects relevant for this study in  trying to explain the function that the ne bis in idem
principle has acquired over time, and why it is an inadequate mechanism to resolve
most of the problems associated with conflicts of jurisdiction.
The ne bis in idem only applies to final sentences. This means, first of all, that
multiple proceedings in different Member States are not avoided, which is both a
waste of resources and a tremendous practical problem for an adequate defence
strategy and the procedural rights of the suspect. But even if it were to be widened in
scope so as to include lis pendens (other states would then have to stay their
proceedings pending the outcome of the prosecution in the first state) this would still
mean that mainly decisions to criminalise a certain act would prevail, because
normally there is no prosecution without an offence. Additionally, Art. 54 of the CISA
requires that, if a penalty has been imposed, ne bis in idem will not apply unless that
penalty “has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no
longer be enforced [...]”.  Thirdly, the ne bis in idem gives no consideration to the577
jurisdictional basis on which a decision rests. The question of which states’ criminal
laws and jurisdictional rules will be recognised Union-wide is totally random, as it is
generally the first final decision that will profit by the ne bis in idem,  but if another578
 ECJ judgment of 28 September 2006, C-150/05 - Van Straaten; ECJ judgment of 28579
September 2006, C-467/04 - Gasparini.
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state can beat it concerning the enforcement stage, it can still gain recognition. Ne
bis in idem, then, is not a means of allocating jurisdiction, and on deciding which
state should be able to determine if certain acts constitute a crime or not and if a
certain person is guilty or not, but just a tool to lessen the negative effects of multiple
proceedings while trying to uphold as far as possible state sovereignty.
Since it is the only mechanism of resolving these problems at the moment, however,
the ECJ has taken a very proactive approach towards it. This has been mainly done
through the link of Art. 54 CISA with the right to free movement. What is a very
welcome development from the point of view of the individual cases and the
fundamental rights of the defendants has none the less led to some inconsistencies
that are new to the ne bis in idem framework. From a doctrinal point of view, and with
regard to the increasing level of integration in criminal matters, it seem odd that ne
bis in idem, one of the most fundamental principles of criminal law, should be
interpreted with regard to the right to free movement instead of in accordance with its
own specific function in a European criminal justice sphere. This might, however,
change with Art. 50 of the Charter, as unlike the CISA, the Charter is not primarily
created for dealing with the effects of lifting internal border controls. It is then
possible to interpret a transnational ne bis in idem not mainly with regard to its effects
on free movement, but its effect on the individual in a broader sense, similar to the
national ne bis in idem. 
From a systematic view, the current approach leads to contradictory results in
practice. For example, the ECJ has repeatedly (and rightly) decided that Art. 54 CISA
applies to acquittals as well as to convictions, also in cases where this was based on
lack of evidence or on a time-bar.  This leads to the paradoxical situation that a579
person who is threatened with prosecution in one Member State but is not guilty
according to the laws of another Member state with jurisdiction, e.g. because his acts
do not constitute an offence there, or the time-bar applies, can only wish that,
through some mistake, he will be prosecuted, charged and acquitted in that other
Member State. Then, he would fully benefit from the ne bis in idem. In a case where
 As this is not normally a final decision within the meaning of Art. 54 CISA.580
 As outlined above, Advocate General Sharpston used the Gasparini case as an occasion581
to elaborate her differing understanding of the ne bis in idem. In her state-based approach, the
dilemma depicted is not a problem for the defendant’s fundamental rights, but rather an
incentive to undesirable “jurisdiction-shopping” by him, para. 104 of the opinion, and a threat
to safety in the area of freedom, security and justice.
 Feller, 16 Israel Law Review (1981), p. 40; see also above 6.5.2.5 for the Commission’s582
approach.
 Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht, p. 130.583
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the prosecution correctly determines beforehand not to bring charges, this would
leave the first state free to charge that person.  It should, however, not make any580
difference if a person is acquitted because of a time-bar, or if he is not even charged
for that same reason. This is again one of the reasons why a common basis for the
allocation of jurisdiction is necessary.581
6.7 Suggestions for jurisdiction in EU criminal procedure
The difficulty lies in determining just what cause to keep in mind when attempting to
agree on common European rules for jurisdiction in criminal matters. The starting
point should be the purpose of jurisdictional rules.
One answer that is often given is that jurisdiction rules should help to avoid any
loopholes so that offenders can be called to account.  However, this answer does582
not really help to tackle the problem, for one of the main problems of jurisdiction is
the question of which national law should decide whether an act is a criminal offence
or acceptable behaviour, and which national law should not. Thus, it is circular to
argue that jurisdiction should help to prosecute offenders, when it is necessary to
determine the conditions of someone’s being an “offender”. To favour wide
jurisdiction rules would not help to avoid loopholes for criminals, rather, it would itself
generate these criminals. 
Another theory says that jurisdiction rules are based on the two pillars of self-
protection of the state and solidarity and have to be measured against these.583
Although not wrong, the only real conclusion that can be drawn from this is that there
must be a substantive interest in the prosecution of the defendant.
 Similarly Nowakowski, 6 ÖZÖR (1955), p. 129.584
 Brocher, 7 Rev. droit int. et lég. comp. (1875), 128; similarly  Gärditz, W eltrechtspflege,585
p. 316-349, who tries to legitimize the universality principle through certain reasons for
punishment.
  COM/2005/696 final.586
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Since jurisdiction and criminal proceedings are ancillary to substantive criminal law
and punishment, I would concur with theories that take into account the reasons
behind these and try to effectuate them through jurisdictional rules. This would mean
that jurisdiction must help to protect certain legal interests that are behind criminal
norms  and can thus vary according to substance matter. They must equally serve584
to further the aims of punishment, e.g. rehabilitation, deterrence or retribution.  585
Therefore, jurisdictional rules should be based on specific needs of the area they
apply to and define their jurisdictional criteria accordingly. This idea can be seen to
a limited extent in both the framework decision on xenophobia and the framework
decision on attacks on information systems where the place of commission is
described specifically for these offences. Similar approaches should be adopted for
more areas of crime in order to determine what state would be more appropriate to
deal with certain facts and why. The purpose of the substantive criminal law should
be at the bottom of all models of allocation of jurisdiction. The approaches to the
allocation of jurisdiction in legislation and doctrine can be traced back to three basic
models. 
6.7.1 Cooperation model 
The most obvious approach leaves it to the states themselves to coordinate their
activities and their exercise of jurisdiction and tries to provide a better framework for
this.
The Commission, contrary to its position displayed in the framework decisions, has
published a Green Paper on conflicts of jurisdiction and the principle of ne bis in idem
in criminal proceedings in 2005  and the Council has finally adopted a framework586
 Council framework decision of 30 November 2009, 2009/948/JHA; to be implemented until587
15.06.2012.
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decision at the end of 2009.587
The framework decision is a lot more vague than the proposal in the Green Paper. It
mainly aims at rendering criminal prosecution more efficient by avoiding multiple
proceedings. The only duties it sets up for cooperation of the Member States are the
duty to contact another Member State if it is suspected that parallel proceedings exist
in that state, and a duty to reply when contacted (Art. 5, 6). If parallel proceedings
exist, states must enter into direct consultations (Art. 10). There is certainly no duty
to reach an agreement, nor any provision for this procedure or any relevant
substantive criterion.
The Green Paper was rather vague itself, but it had at least some substantive
provisions. It suggested a three-stage procedure consisting of an initial informational
stage, a consultation stage and finally, mediation. On the first stage, Member States’
authorities that have started or are about to start criminal proceedings shall be
required to inform all Member States that might be interested. The second step
would be a “duty to enter into discussions” for those prosecuting authorities that wish
to prosecute. Ideally, all but one state would close or halt their proceedings. If no
such settlement should be reached, the Commission proposed a mediation stage
with Eurojust acting as a mediator and toyed with the idea of introducing a fourth
stage where an EU body could take a binding decision if mediation fails. The
Commission was rather vague about what criteria should be used to assume
jurisdiction. Under 2.5. it simply enumerates the known principles: “In particular, the
list could include territoriality, criteria related to the suspect or defendant, victims’
interests, criteria related to State interests, and certain other criteria related to
efficiency and rapidity of the proceedings. Perhaps, certain factors which should not
be of relevance could also be identified.” It then adds that “a more flexible approach
could be preferred. [...]. For example, such a principle could refer to reasonableness
and/or due process.”
This approach resembled those taken in the framework decisions on substantive
 Cf. for the necessity of explicit criteria Juppe, Gegenseitige Anerkennung, p. 89 s.588
 Art. 11 of the framework decision.589
 The effects of the framework decision are perceived differently. W hile Peers, EU Justice590
and Home Affairs Law, p. 833, calls it “disappointing”, Hecker, ZIS 2011, p. 61 is more
optimistic. Since information and consultation among states are obligatory, the Commission
could institute infringement proceedings if Member States omitted this. Cf. also Eser, in:
Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches Strafrecht, § 36 para. 100.
 Lagodny, Empfiehlt es sich, eine Europäische Gerichtskompetenz für Strafgewaltskonflikte591
vorzusehen? 2001.
 Vander Beken/Vermeulen, Finding the best place for prosecution, 2002.592
 Published together as Vander Beken/Vermeulen/Lagodny, NStZ 2002, p. 624.593
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criminal law, but it was too wide to help to avoid negative effects and legal problems
of the allocation of jurisdiction, because it focussed too much on avoiding multiple
proceedings and too little on determining the appropriate forum predictably.  588
Still, compared to the current framework decision, it seems like the height of
procedural fairness and transparency. Now, states shall simply “consider the facts
and merits of the case and all the factors which they consider to be relevant”  -589
factors which are always observed in international law and seem hardly worth
mentioning. However, according to Art. 12(2) the matter can be referred to Eurojust,
which, though not able to force states to accept a solution, might help to unify
approaches.590
6.7.2 Model specifying soft criteria
More ambitious models mainly try to establish more specific criteria that might be in
a certain hierarchical order, but that are not strictly binding in all cases.
Lagodny  and Vander Beken and Vermeulen  independently published two591 592
studies that addressed jurisdictional problems and came to rather similar results.593
They proposed a system in which the principles for jurisdiction are in a hierarchical
order, but this hierarchical order is dependent on qualitative criteria or gravity. So,
although the higher criteria (e.g. territoriality) should be given priority, this changes
when other, subordinate criteria have a better qualitative position. For example, if the
territorial link is very remote and all evidence is in another country where the
defendant also happens to be resident, this last state would be allowed to prosecute
 Amalfitano, Conflitti di giurisdizione, p. 354ss.; Juppe, Gegenseitige Anerkennung, p. 99ss.;594
Hecker, ZIS 2011, p. 62s.
 Hein, Zuständigkeitskonflikte, p. 223ss.595
 Art. 2 draft treaty, p. 254.596
 Art. 3 draft treaty, p. 254, with default rules.597
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the act. The suggestion is based on both an abstract hierarchy and an individual
weighing-up. They also try to involve European bodies in the control of the respective
decisions. Sometimes, Eurojust is also named as a possible body to decide on
conflicts according to these criteria, and subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ.  594
There are also some more far-reaching models that opt for a stricter application of
the criteria. Hein  proposes a model convention to this end and takes into account595
the interests of the state in prosecuting an act, the interests of the victims and the
interests of the defendant. His conclusion is that the interests of a particular state can
only override other interests when the state is the direct target of a crime,  which is596
a recourse to the protective principle. In all other cases he believes that the
defendant is the only person who has a legally relevant and material interest in the
allocation of jurisdiction, for example resocialisation. Therefore he wants to give him
the choice between all the jurisdictions that are willing to prosecute the case.597
Although this suggestion certainly avoids multiple fora and is favourable for the
defendant, it does not do so on the basis of sound legal considerations. There is no
reason why a defendant should be able to chose his forum and, consequently, the
applicable criminal law. If either the defendant, or, as in other suggestions, the
prosecution, gets to chose the forum, there is a great danger that the expected
outcome will determine the choice, independent of the appropriateness of the
application of that law. Without a useful and well-founded jurisdiction, however,
criminal law cannot perform its fundamental functions.
6.7.3 Model specifying strict criteria
As already outlined before, I think that a strict allocation of jurisdiction that leaves just
one forum for certain acts is necessary and desirable. Although it can lead to a forum
  Cf. Impalà, 1 Utrecht Law Review (2005), p. 65s.; Luchtman, 7 Utrecht Law Review (2011),598
p. 76s., 90ss.; on the Commission’s Greenpaper see Braum, ZRP 2002, p. 512s.; Satzger, StV
Beilage 2/2003, p. 140.
 In most continental law doctrines, it is a very strict constitutional principle that even requires599
that the particular judges who sit on case are unambiguously determined by law prior to the
commission of the offence, for example in Germany (Art. 101 para. 1 clause 2 of the Basic
Law), Austria (Art. 83 para. 2 of the Constitution), Italy (Art. 25 of the Constitution) or Belgium
(Art. 13 of the Constitution). On the other hand, the UK has no constitutional provisions
concerning the legally competent or the natural judge, cf. Muessing, 47 Am.J.LegalHist.
(2005), p. 161ss.;  Eser, Der “Gesetzliche Richter” und seine Bestimmung für den Einzelfall,
p. 247ss.
 Cf. also Mansdörfer, ne bis in idem, p. 164.600
 For a general overview of this principle see Bassiouni, in: id. (ed.), Int. Criminal Law Vol. I,601
p. 73ss.; Bernardi, in: Bassiouni et al. (eds.), p. 97s.
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that, in a very specific case, might not be the most practical forum, it has the great
advantage of being foreseeable. For the recognition of decisions and for the mutual
trust it is a great advantage if a state’s decisions are enforced throughout the whole
Union because they are based on criteria that have been previously agreed on and
that are the most appropriate for certain crimes according to the common values that
have brought about this choice. The allocation of jurisdiction would then also lead to
the recognition of the substantive choices of the competent state not to punish a
certain act, and would avoid multiple prosecutions. 
One can even ask whether a uniform allocation of jurisdiction is not, independently of
the functioning of mutual recognition and the creation of trust, already required by
principles of European law: according to the principle of the court specified by law
that is set down in Art. 6 ECHR and Art. 47(2) of the Charter and is part of the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States (Art. 6 TEU), the competent
court must be determined by law when the offence is committed,  although598
admittedly its content varies greatly between Member States.  But in actual fact,599
this rule is even much more important on the international level because of the
traditional link between the forum and the applicable substantive law in criminal
matters (i.e. the lex fori). It is very disturbing that the substantive law to which an
offender will be subjected depends on random developments after the offence has
been committed.  This is problematic with regard to another fundamental right,600
namely the legality principle as laid down in Art. 7 ECHR / Art. 49(1) Charter.  If we601
 Cf. for example the argument of Eser/Burchard, Interlokales “ne bis in idem” in Europa, p.602
518s.
 Cf. similarly Nettesheim, EuR 2009, p. 41; Luchtman, p. 93. 603
 Cf. for the reduction of extraterritorial jurisdiction Böse/Meyer, ZIS 2011, p. 336ss. 604
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take the purely national understanding of these rights, as it is mainly done today,602
none of these rights would be violated. In a traditional interpretation, it is enough in
cooperation that each national law adheres to these standards in isolation. This view
is however overly formalistic and does not take into account the close cooperation
within the European Union. The interpretation of these rights must change with
increasing integration that is supposed to lead to a European judicial space. Since on
a European level we now have a new level of sovereignty and a new entity with
specific responsibilities, it seems more than plausible that these rights should pose
obligations for the EU when it tries to make cooperation more effective.  At least603
when the EU itself tries to harmonise substantive criminal laws and assigns
jurisdiction for it, it should be obliged to guarantee these rights in a functionally
equivalent way to their meaning within a nation state. This question will be dealt with
in the next chapter. 
Additionally, the difficulties in reaching a coherent approach to jurisdiction are once
more emblematic of the difficulties within the Union to find a collective answer to a
question of joint responsibility. Since the judiciaries of Member States are already
heavily intertwined through EU measures of mutual recognition and harmonising
measures, a common approach to the question of jurisdiction is the only way out of
a system whose outcome depends on serendipity rather than on choice and
foresight.
To outline why and how uniform allocation of jurisdiction is necessary for Europe’s
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice was the main focus of this chapter. In
contrast, the question of what specific jurisdictional basis could be used for what
forms of crime, and how they should be defined in concreto, is only of secondary
importance to the theoretical framework and cannot be dealt with extensively in the
scope of the present work. It seems however most feasible and rational to depend
mainly on territorial jurisdiction for the reasons mentioned.  The law of the state604
 See above.605
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where a person acted is, first of all, foreseeable, which is important from the
individual’s perspective. Since criminal laws try to direct behaviour with regard to
certain legal interests, the lex loci is also the one that can best further this aim.
Finally, deterrence and retribution as rationales for punishment are generally needed
in the state where a person acted and where society was affected. Rehabilitation, on
the other hand, can just as well be served through the enforcement of the sentence
in the state of residence. But since, as we have seen, territoriality is a multi-faceted
concept with no real boundaries, it would have to be defined autonomously. In order
to further the aims of substantive criminal laws, it could be defined with regard to the
specific area of crime that is addressed in a legislative act. Certain crimes for which
no territorial links exist or for which this might not be enough  would have to be605
based on other jurisdictional links. If the ECJ could be given the competence to
decide on issues of doubt to prevent that multiple proceedings are initiated, a
consistent development could set in. The loss of efficiency for the prosecution that
could result if other prosecutions do not work on a case simultaneously should be
compensated by a closer cooperation in the investigative stage where the authorities
of the state with exclusive jurisdiction could depend on other prosecutions to execute
their orders. As outlined before, common jurisdictional rules are a necessary basis
for mutual recognition.

 Apap/Carrera, European Arrest W arrant, p. 11; Fichera, 15 ELJ (2009), p. 96; Smeulers, in:606
Vervaele (ed.), European Evidence W arrant, p. 79ss.
 Cf. only the recent Stockholm Programme on the future agenda for the area of freedom,607
security and justice, Council Doc. 17024/09, p. 12.
 Cf. Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010608
on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, OJ L 280 of 26.10.2010,
p. 1.
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Chapter  7 Procedural rights and safeguards in
the context of multi-layered judicial cooperation
How adequate jurisdictional rules can be generated is a question that cannot be
addressed on its own. It is closely connected with the general question of how
standards for procedural safeguards may be developed in the European sphere. This
is why I will now look at procedural safeguards and fundamental rights in a more
general context.
7.1 Introduction
The question of procedural safeguards in the area of criminal law cooperation is a
controversial one. It is however widely accepted that individuals’ rights need
strengthening in this context.  Several initiatives of Member States, as well as606
Commission proposals and activities of the European Parliament urge their further
development.  Still, there is a surprising vacuum. While every piece of legislation607
acknowledges the necessity to respect fundamental rights, there is generally a great
reluctance to establish a binding and specific set of rules against which EU action
could be measured. At the present stage, provisions on procedural rights are found
in separate legislative acts, as their primary content, as well as in legislation on
specific substance matters, like the European Arrest Warrant, as a corollary. As for
specific legislation on procedural rights, there is mainly the right of access to an
interpreter and translation.  Apart from this, there are two proposed directives on608
procedural rights. One of them deals with the right of access to a lawyer and to
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of609
access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and European arrest warrant proceedings and on
the right to communicate upon arrest, Revised Text, Council-Doc. 7337/12 of 9 March 2012.
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right to610
information in criminal proceedings, COM/2010/392fin., and Council-Doc. 18410/11.
 Recital 12.611
 Recitals 27s.612
 Recitals 17; more specific rights in recital 17a of the general approach.613
 Recital 6; more specific rights mentioned in recital 5.614
 Cf. Mitsilegas, 43 CMLRev. (2006), p. 1290ss; Alegre/Leaf, 10 ELJ (2004), p. 203ss; Peers,615
EU Justice and Home affairs law, p. 705, 709; Tinkl, Rechtsstellung, p. 210s; Keijzer,
Extradition and Human Rights, p. 193; Smeulers, in: Vervaele (ed.), European Evidence
W arrant, p. 91; for differing implementations in the Member States cf. Annex SEC(2005) 267,
p. 5s to the report COM/2005/63fin.; cf. also above under 5.9.
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inform a third person of an arrest;  the other sets down, as a kind of flanking609
measure, the right of the person accused to be informed of his rights.  Thereby the610
European legislator has only provided for some few and - albeit their importance in
themselves - rather randomly chosen procedural rights. In the ambit of specific
legislation, where such rights have a limited scope of application – for example within
a single framework decision – a general reference to common standards is usually all
that is found. Apart from a very few (and random) rights and procedural safeguards
that are named in the framework decisions, any clear rule is avoided. So, most
mutual recognition instruments, for example, the framework decision on the
European Arrest Warrant,  the framework decision on the European Evidence611
Warrant,  the proposed directive regarding the European investigation order,  the612 613
framework decision on freezing orders  and many others contain a general614
reference to fundamental rights and the principles of Art. 6 TEU and the Charter.
However, there is no mention of whether violations may serve as a ground for refusal
under certain circumstances; such a reference is limited to cases of discriminatory
prosecution and its binding effect as part of the preamble is dubitable. In some
instances, we find the declaration that the respective piece of legislation does not
modify the obligations to respect these rights in the main body of the text, as in
Articles 1(3) of the framework decisions on the European Arrest Warrant and the
European Evidence Warrant or the proposed directive regarding the European
Investigation Order. Member States, courts and scholars have widely differing
opinions on whether this may justify a refusal to execute a decision,  and the615
 Commission report on the European Arrest W arrant, revised version, COM/2006/8fin., point616
2.2.3. Cf. also above 4.6.
 See above Chapter 5.617
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Commission itself seems to have an openly contradictory approach. In its 2006
report on the European Arrest Warrant it elaborates that: “Contrary to what certain
Member States have done, the Council did not intend to make the general condition
of respect for fundamental rights an explicit ground for refusal in the event of
infringement. A judicial authority is, of course, always entitled to refuse to execute an
arrest warrant, if it finds that the proceedings have been vitiated by infringement of
Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and the constitutional principles common
to the Member States; in a system based on mutual trust, such a situation should
remain exceptional.”  This statement adequately demonstrates the overly tentative616
approach to fundamental rights in judicial cooperation that shrinks from any real
commitment and authorship. A human rights clause is rather meaningless if there is
no rule on which state’s evaluation is decisive and what the consequences are.
While some provisions, for example Art. 3 No. 2 or Art. 5 No. 1 of the framework
decision on the European Arrest Warrant, set down some specific requirements to
protect individuals, many controversial aspects remain deliberately unanswered. This
can be seen by the fact that specific suggestions are sometimes eliminated in the
process of adopting a framework decision without intending to make any statement
about the eliminated rights in either direction. So, as we have seen, during the
adoption of the framework decision on the European Evidence Warrant, Parliament
had suggested several specific rights as grounds for refusal, such as for witnesses
who might refuse to give evidence in some states. These were not included in the
framework decision, while it was vaguely alluded to the fact that they might, under
certain circumstances, still serve as grounds for refusal.  All these facts point to the617
conclusion that contentious issues are consciously left unresolved at the level where
they first arise. It is then left to the practice of the national authorities to find a
working mode to compensate for the lack of unity and the resulting inconsistencies
and deficits. 
The situation becomes even more complex whenever it is attempted to establish
 See above under 5.6.2.618
 The “opt-out“ of the UK and Poland through the Protocol No 30 to the Lisbon Treaty, to619
which the Czech Republic is to accede, is, if correctly interpreted, not a real opt-out. Art. 1(1)
of the protocol sets down  that the Charter does not extend respective national courts’ and the
EU courts’ power to find respective national laws incompatible with Charter rights. Thereby it
merely restates the content of Art. 51 of the Charter, cf. Belling, p. 260; cf. also the Advocate
General’s opinion in the N.S. case discussed above, C-411/10,  at para. 167ss. and the ECJ’s
judgment on the joint  N.S. and M.E. cases (C-411/10 and C-493/10) at para. 117ss; Peers,
The death of ‘Mutual Trust’. The status is more difficult to answer in relation to social rights
and Art. 1(2) of the protocol, which concerns rights not at issue here; suffice it to say that Art.
1(2) might be a partial opt-out, but many of the social rights are already part of the general
principles of Union law and can still apply; cf. to the applicability of general principles besides
the Charter Belling, 18 ELJ (2012), p. 261s.
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more general individual rights that will either be applicable in all matters of judicial
cooperation or that will even have to be observed in a purely national context. The
history of the framework decision on procedural safeguards and the new step-by-
step approach amply illustrate this.  In a more general area, it can also be seen in618
the debates on the Charter and the “opt-out” of the UK, Poland and the Czech
Republic.619
As a result, we now have a very mixed system with overlapping protection of
fundamental rights through national (constitutional) procedural rights, the procedural
rights of the ECHR, the procedural rights from the Charter, the general principles of
Union law and specific rights in secondary Union law. The relation of these,
particularly between the ECHR and the Charter, and their scope of application is far
from clear. There will be even more issue for debate when the European Union will
accede to the ECHR.
The reasons for this development are manifold. Most importantly, there is as yet no
well-founded theoretical concept of transnational procedural safeguards. Ideas as to
sources, functions and content of such rights are varied, if any thought is given to
them at all. A great contributing factor to this is that the debate on procedural
safeguards is dominated by two strong opposing forces that channel the proposed
solutions in a certain direction. The debate about procedural safeguards and
fundamental rights is most often termed as a question of “balancing” freedom and
security within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. An efficiency-based
approach stresses the importance of creating cooperation mechanisms and
 See Monar, The Problems of Balance, p. 177ss.620
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prosecution competences to achieve the necessary level of security in the face of a
perceived threat. Its opponents, on the other hand, believe that the time has come to
counter-balance the current cooperation mechanisms with strengthening individual
rights and safeguards and thereby focus more on “freedom” than on “security”. But
while these views seem to be diametrically opposed to each other, they are also
equal. They concur in their conceptual understanding of the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice. Both regard freedom and security as public goods that are
opposed to each other and need to be put into a just relation through an act of
balancing. They mainly vary in the priority they accord to one good over the other. 
7.2 Efficiency approach 
To a certain extent, a security-bias that focuses on efficient prosecution of crimes
and closer judicial cooperation has been part of the logic behind the development of
the AFSJ from the start. Partly, the reason for this lies in the fact that closer police
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters has generally been triggered by outward
events and been regarded as a response to these. The rise of international terrorism
in the 1960s and 1970s and the need for coordination were the main reason for the
first meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in 1975 that resulted in the
TREVI network. Later on, organised crime, and especially drug related crime, came
to the fore. The most obvious single event that shaped the framework of police and
judicial cooperation is, of course, the attack of September 11.620
In the reactive rush that follows such events, certain responses are presented as
compelling and without alternative. Specific events are taken as indicators that a
change has taken place, and that threats to society are now so high that security has
to take precedence over individual freedoms. This bias found its clearest expression
in the ex-Art. 29 TEU, whereby the Union was to “provide citizens with a high level of
safety within an area of freedom, security and justice”.
Apart from single events, this line of thought has also gained prominence through the
 See above 3.2.621
 Douglas-Scott, The rule of law in the European Union, at p. 222 speaks of a “compelling622
need” for action at supra-national level in the wake of the single market.
 COM/1985/310fin., para. 29, 55.623
 COM/1988/640fin., at para. 16 (vi) and (viii). 624
 COM/1988/640fin., at para. 16 (ii), (iii) and (viii) and annex. 625
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spillover of the principle of mutual recognition from the area of the internal market to
judicial cooperation.  The idea that criminals could benefit from free movement was621
often used as an argument for the analogy that free movement and mutual
recognition should also apply to judicial decisions and measures. In fact, the
increasing integration through the internal market is often regarded as a very great
factor for a rise in cross-border crime. By proponents of this line of argument, it is
taken for granted that cross-border crime has in fact risen and that the four freedoms
are the cause for this. It is then concluded that compensatory competences for the
prosecution are necessary flanking measures of this development.622
Traces of this way of thinking can certainly be found in the early Commission
proposals in this area. Already in the White Paper of 1985 on completing the internal
market, the Commission was of the opinion that the abolishment of internal frontier
controls by 1992 would require new protective measures against terrorism and drugs.
Besides closer cooperation of national authorities, the Commission was also aiming
at approximating drugs legislation through directives.  After the Single European623
Act, in its 1988 Communication on the abolition of controls of persons at intra-
Community borders the Commission clearly stated that the removal of internal
frontiers required a coordination of extradition laws and closer judicial cooperation to
avoid safe havens for criminals under the European Political Cooperation  as well624
as approximation of drugs and weapons legislation and action against terrorism.625
The Coordinators’ Group on Free Movement of Persons that was set up at the
Rhodes European Council in 1988 then set out to propose a whole set of measures
to react to the perceived dangers in the so-called Palma document and subsequent
reports. With deepening integration, the argument was put forward with ever greater
fervour. It is underlying every widening of the Union’s competences in this area.
 Cf. also Fletcher/Lööf/Gilmore, EU Criminal Law, p. 24ss.626
 Full texts available at http://europeansourcebook.org.627
 See for this aspect Van Duyne, (Transnational) Organised Crime. 628
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Such an argument certainly seems plausible at first sight.  After all, the facilitation626
of cross-border financial transactions and the possibility to move freely are likely to
enlarge the scope of activity for any form of organised crime. But it is very difficult to
find conclusive evidence as to the reality of this phenomenon. Indeed, empirical data
proving a rise in transnational crime is hard to find, as it is not easy to measure.
Criminologists dealing with crime in Europe rely heavily on the so-called European
Source Book of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics, a Council of Europe project
that is financed by several national governments.  These multi-annual publications627
compare police and judicial crime statistics of European countries since 1990.
However, they do not give indications of the transnational relevance of crime
phenomena, as these are generally not recorded in national crime statistics. The
Sourcebook does not provide statistics with a specific European perspective. It
would, in fact, be very difficult to come by reliable data on transnational crime. First
of all, there is no universally accepted definition of transnational crime. More
importantly, national police and judicial statistics do not collect the necessary data.
Even though it is important for the investigations, it is usually of no importance for a
national trial whether there is a transnational element involved in a certain crime or
whether it has been committed by locally or nationally organised criminals and can
therefore not be put into numbers as easily. In order to raise statistics on these
questions, one would have to work with very different methods and collect other data.
Scholars often admit this lack of data. But while some conclude that the threat
scenario is unrealistic and is being used to create fear for political ends, others still
see a real danger.628
Even if one were to presume a potential rise in transnational crime rates, proving that
the internal market is the cause for this is almost impossible. There are countless
other possible causes for this mere correlation. During the last two decades, the fall
of the iron curtain and the general process of globalization have brought along a
deepening of worldwide economic integration and a steady rise in international travel,
 See the EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2011, p. 50 (available at629
https://www.europol.europa.eu). 
 EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2007, p. 22. 630
 EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2007, p. 19s. (traffic); EU Organised631
Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2011, p. 43s. (internet). 
 Walker, Odyssey, p. 12: “[...] security policy is never compelled by external events”;632
Fletcher/Lööf/Gilmore, EU Criminal Law, p. 29.
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transport of goods, financial transactions and so on. This was further aided by
technical innovations like the internet and mobile communication. Therefore, a
possible rise in transnational crime might be linked more to these general factors
than to the specific changes brought along by the internal market. Moreover, even
between non EU-countries with less market integration and strict border controls
cross-border crime rates can be very high. There is a continuous flow of illegal
firearms, drugs, and illegal immigrants over the U.S.-Mexican border. Or, to stay
within the EU sphere, the highest levels of transborder crime are not found on the
inner borders of the EU, but on its outer borders. In its annual reports on organised
crime in the European Union (OCTA), Europol identifies five so-called “EU Criminal
Hubs”, all located on the outer borders of the EU.  The OCTA-reports are mainly629
concerned with specific sectors of organised crime such as drugs, trafficking in
human beings or fraud for which the involvement of Europol seems useful. Even
though these reports sometimes allude to the same basic assumption that the
internal market gave rise to organised transnational crime,  they do not provide any630
empirical data or any analysis to support this view. They do confirm, however, that
the general rise of transport, travel and technical means is a factor that causes a rise
in cross-border crime.  Finally, since this argument has been used ever since the631
19  century, it appears unlikely that the rise has been as high as was supposed. Itth
seems safe to assume, therefore, that the development of the internal market has
not had such an overwhelming effect on transnational crime as is generally taken for
granted. 
So both arguments, namely, that society has to deal with certain new threats and that
the abuse of market freedoms by criminals causes rising cross-border crime-rates,
are not necessarily wrong. It should be noted, however, that they can never require
specific policy choices.  Often, they are the result of a pre-existing policy agenda632
 Walker, Odyssey, p. 11ss.633
 See for example the programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual634
recognition of decisions in criminal matters, OJ C 12/10 of 15 January 2001, that expects
mutual recognition to strengthen Member State cooperation, to enhance the protection of
individual rights, to facilitate rehabilitation and contribute to legal certainty all at the same time.
 Cf. Böse, in: Fragmentarisches Strafrecht, p. 242ss.635
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that is merely introduced at a seemingly opportune moment. After all, it is more
difficult for political opponents and citizens alike to oppose certain measures that are
presented as the response to external events and therefore seem to be an objective
demand of reason. The security-bias is not just a result of the subject-matter of
cooperation in criminal matters which is concerned with the public good of security.
It also follows from the general tendency of public authorities to widen rather than
limit their own competences. In this sense, seemingly reactive policy choices could
be termed proactive.633
This theoretical conception often influences how the mechanism of mutual
recognition is perceived. In line with a certain security bias, mutual recognition is
regarded as a wholly beneficial mechanism by the early official approach.  It is not634
considered to have negative effects on individuals’ rights, but rather  to be neutral in
that it does not interfere with national rights standards. If certain elements of mutual
recognition, such as the abolition of classical grounds for refusal or automatic
recognition instead of exequatur-proceedings are criticized for curtailing individuals’
rights, it is argued that these never served individuals’ rights in the first place, but
were upheld for raisons d’Etat.   More importantly, it is pointed out that mutual635
recognition has juridified a procedure that was formerly merely a political act – a
process which necessarily improves the individual’s position. The importance of
establishing individuals’ rights is, however, not completely ignored. But, as we have
seen above, establishing procedural safeguards is usually considered in terms of
trust-building measures which will in turn enhance the efficiency of judicial
cooperation, rather than as an integral part of a fair procedure.
To some extent, it is true that the principle of mutual recognition even strengthens
the individual’s position because it provides a legal framework based on legal
principles. Apart from theoretical considerations, there is one practical aspect that
 For example, although the Darkazanli  judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 18636
July 2005, 2 BvR 2236/04, was only about the special relation of nationals and their state, it
sheds light on systematic problems with jurisdiction and territoriality in the EU.
 Apap/Carrera, European Arrest W arrant, p. 15.637
 Cf. Albrecht, ZRP 2004, p. 1ss regards the European judicial sphere in criminal matters as638
a “nightmare”.
 Schünemann, ZRP 2003, p. 472, speaks of the “sinister” effect of mutual recognition, and639
calls the principle a “Trojan horse” and a “W olf in Sheep’s Clothing” in GA 2004, p. 202;
Albrecht, Stellungnahme, B I and Schünemann, ZRP 2003, 187, call it the “gravedigger” of fair
trial.
 For Schünemann, GA 2004, p. 202,  the abolishment of dual crim inality creates “a sort of640
state terrorism” by forcing the executing state to prosecute people who are innocent in its own
view.
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makes mutual recognition conducive to individuals’ rights. Since nationals are now
subject to surrender, legislators, courts, state authorities, academics and of course
the general public have been much more concerned with procedural safeguards than
ever before. It is not by chance that important national rulings concerning the
European Arrest Warrant were often about nationals.  This has increased the636
general awareness of the problem of procedural safeguards. However, this is only a
very remote and general mechanism. In the end, the position of the individual
depends on the specific safeguards an individual has in a specific procedure, and on
his ways to enforce these. The model of cooperation chosen is merely a framework
for this. 
7.3 Rights-based approach
The efficiency approach is often criticized for unduly favouring security over freedom
in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.  Closer judicial cooperation as it is637
developing at the moment is conceived as a direct threat to individuals’ rights and
freedoms and to well-balanced national criminal law systems.  This view tends to638
establish procedural safeguards as counter-rights to judicial cooperation. 
Proponents of this approach often dismiss mutual recognition as detrimental to
individuals’ rights.  The abolition of classical grounds for refusal, faster procedures639
and the automatic recognition of foreign standards, are regarded as jeopardising the
safeguards that protect the individual.  It is often ignored that classical legal aid was640
 Braum, 125 GA (2005), p. 694; Gazeas, ZRP p. 2005, 21; Schünemann, ZRP 2003, p. 187;641
id, ZRP 2003, p. 407.
 Cf. also Deiters, ZRP 2003, p. 359ss.642
 Fletcher/Lööf/Gilmore, EU Criminal Law, p. 49ss. regard this as a form of “secondary643
spillover” as - in their understanding - the legitimacy of fundamental rights action is derived
from the existence of the first spillover in the eyes of its proponents .
 Cf. e.g. the titles of the books by Balzacq/Carrera (eds.), Security versus Freedom? and644
Guild/Geyer (eds.), Security versus Justice?.
 Cf. to this aspect Monar, The Problems of Balance, p. 166; Di Fabio, NJW  2008, p. 422; cf.645
also Fletcher/Lööf/Gilmore, EU Criminal Law, p. 22.
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anything but rights-based. It was merely a system of cooperation created in the
interest of sovereign states, ignoring largely the individual's perspective.
Mutual recognition is also blamed for creating a level of “maximum punitivity”.  It is641
true that at the moment, the principle of mutual recognition promotes punitivity rather
than impunity. The problem with this, however, lies more with jurisdiction than with
mutual recognition, as we have seen.  The rights that are finally brought into the642
discussion are either extremely vague or they are extremely limited in that they
simply mirror one Member State’s legal order. The internal market dynamic of mutual
recognition is rejected entirely. 
There seems to be a general - and not entirely unreasonable - feeling that, after a
long phase of creating new competences for law enforcement and public authorities,
it is now time to compensate for these measures with a greater focus on human
rights.  This is generally discussed under the heading of balancing “freedom” and643
“security”, though sometimes human rights are also discussed as part of “justice”.644
The bias of ex-Art. 29 TEU gave way to a more prominent place for fundamental
rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice through the new Art. 67(1) TFEU,
with the “high level of security” appearing only in Art. 67(3).
One main feature of this view is that “freedom” is once more understood as freedom
in its traditional understanding, as a safeguard against state intervention. In contrast,
in the evolution of the AFSJ, freedom had often been used and interpreted by the
efficiency approach  and given the additional notion of “freedom from fear”.  This645
view was reflected in the Vienna Action Plan of 1998 where freedom in the AFSJ was
interpreted as free movement of persons plus “freedom to live in a law-abiding
 Action plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of646
the Treaty of Amsterdam on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, OJ C 19/1 of
23.01.1999, at p. 3.
 An exception is the right to privacy.647
 Walker, Odyssey, p. 25; Waldron, 11 Journal of Political Philosophy (2003), p. 205ss.; Di648
Fabio, NJW  2008, p. 422.
 Gibbs, 17 ELJ (2011), p. 121ss., suggests countering these concerns by using the symbolic649
element of the AFSJ in the form of a common political experience in making reasoned
judgments about balance.
 Waldron, 11 Journal of Political Philosophy (2003), p. 194, 200ss.; more generally Walker,650
Odyssey, p. 25.
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environment” where public authorities “combat and contain those who seek to deny
or abuse that freedom”.  Besides free movement, hardly any mention is made of646
any freedom against state intervention.647
Mirroring this argument, security can be interpreted as security from state
intervention, as the powers of the state pose another threat that is a danger to the
individual.  There is no guarantee that new competences will be used in order to648
achieve more security and that they might not be abused by the state. In fact, new
powers are hardly ever retracted even if society should become more secure, so that,
according to the idea of balancing, more freedom could be introduced.
Both of these interpretations have a certain validity. If we stopped at this point, the
approaches would be crossed over in a chiastic structure that does not really offer a
solution to the basic problem, but takes us back to where we started. 
The question remains whether the act of  balancing freedom and security can lead us
anywhere. The idea of balancing is really a metaphor that, as we have seen, conveys
the misleading notion of objectivity and necessity while it is in fact based on a
number of choices.  It has also rightly been outlined that both security and freedom649
are public goods that affect different groups of society differently. Not unfreqently, a
majority group will profit by  (alleged) gains in safety, while a minority group will have
to pay for this in terms of infringements of their freedoms, as can be seen in the
effect that national anti-terrorism laws have.650
Finally, when mechanisms of judicial cooperation and new competences for criminal
investigations and prosecutions are justified with security arguments, the actual
 Cf. generally Waldron, 11 Journal of Political Philosophy (2003), p. 195, 209.651
 Di Fabio, NJW  2008, p. 422.652
 Similarly, Waldron, 11 The Journal of Political Philosophy (2003), p. 191, 209 s., argues that653
security cannot be enhanced by taking away due process rights that will make the outcome
less reliable - it can only serve a symbolic or psychological purpose.
 Council Doc. 17024/09, adopted by the European Council on 11 December 2009, EUCO654
6/09; see also the Commission’s action plan COM/2010/171.
195
effects of legislation on crime phenomena are often overrated.  It is part of the651
global tendency to use punitive measures for a symbolic purpose, that is to contend
public opinion by the enactment of criminal laws. 
7.4 Transnational approach
It does, therefore, not seem useful to uphold the dichotomy between freedom and
security and discuss procedural safeguards of judicial cooperation mainly as a
question of balance. This phrasing of the conflict is only partially true and the debate,
if put this way, misses out on the main problem. 
Firstly, on an abstract level, security and freedom are more than equiprimordial; they
are interdependent rather than opposed to each other, and one cannot be generated
without the other.  On a more specific level, defence rights are not opposed to an652
efficient prosecution, because they are an integral part of a fair trial. And it is only a
fair trial that will lead to convictions that are right according to the rules and values
society gave itself. Since this is the goal of prosecution, lack of procedural
safeguards cannot make it “efficient” in achieving this goal.  Hopefully, this is what653
the European Council meant under point 1.1. of the Stockholm Programme:  “The654
challenge will be to ensure respect for fundamental rights and freedoms and integrity
of the person while guaranteeing security in Europe. It is of paramount importance
that law enforcement measures, on the one hand, and measures to safeguard
individual rights, the rule of law and international protection rules, on the other, go
hand in hand in the same direction and are mutually reinforced.” Since a coherent
approach to fundamental rights must be an integral part of every Union policy, it
cannot as such be discussed under the heading of a human rights competence of
the Union as has been done until now.
 Walker, Odyssey, p. 5.655
 Fletcher/Lööf/Gilmore, EU Criminal Law, p. 20.656
 From an institutional standpoint, see Alston, Philip / Weiler, Joseph H.H. An “Ever Closer657
Union” in Need of a Human Rights Policy; critical: von Bogdandy, 37 CMLRev. 2000, p. 1307;
on the advantages of such an approach based on the idea of mainstreaming cf. De Schutter,
Mainstreaming Fundamental Rights in the European Union, p. 43ss.; dismissive of the idea of
huamn rights mainstreaming Koskenniemi, 1 Humanity (2010), p. 47 .
 This is compatible with, and even required by, the principle of subsidiarity, as the Union is658
best placed to deal with fundamental rights issues following from its own measures and the
transnational dimension of its effects in this area; cf. also Alston/ W eiler, An “Ever Closer
Union” in Need of a Human Rights Policy, p. 27.  
 Cf. above as to the Council Resolution on Procedural Rights and the Stockholm659
Programme.
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Secondly, if individual freedoms are discussed in terms of balancing within the AFSJ,
the fundamental notions inferred from this tend to stay too general. After all, freedom,
security and justice, though it can be filled with meaning, is nonetheless a “highly
abstract triumvirate of values”,  a “pleasing triplet”.  It does not necessarily help in655 656
creating specific rights that are adapted to specific conflicts that arise in transnational
criminal proceedings. If this is not kept in mind, negotiations on fundamental rights
often lead to strange compromises in specific legal acts that have no basis in a
systematic conception of judicial cooperation. An appropriate approach will have to
result from a coherent and proactive policy that questions the effect of specific
measures on fundamental rights  and resolves conflicts at the earliest possible657
stage.  658
Thirdly, the issue is not whether advanced forms of judicial cooperation curtail
existing concepts of individuals’ rights in legal aid and in criminal procedure. The
question is rather how rights can be generated that do justice to the newly emerging
multi-layered legal system of cooperation in criminal matters. If frictions occur, this is
often not the result of a conscious choice to disregard individuals’ rights. Rather,
even those who wish to set down procedural safeguards are not certain which legal
framework to observe. So, despite many drawbacks, there is quite a lot of activity in
this area  that cannot be dismissed as mere window-dressing. It is, however, not659
fully effective because of a vague understanding of both the source and the reach of
individuals’ rights in this area. The courts are also aware of the importance of
individuals’ rights. However, in court cases concerning extradition matters the
 Cf. Tinkl, Rechtsstellung, p. 5, 45ss.660
 See above 3.1.2.1.661
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solution is usually very pragmatic and does not go into the interaction of different
legal orders. Both the ECtHR and the ECJ have had to deal with individuals’ rights in
extradition cases, but both have avoided to find any comprehensive theoretical
underpinning for it. This is more understandable in the case of the ECtHR, as I will
show. The main problem in this is that all possible sources for individuals’ rights in
extradition have their basis, directly or indirectly, in national legal systems. 
This is problematic in two respects. First of all, national legal systems have never
established any real procedural safeguards for extradition or other forms of legal aid.
The reason for this is that, until recently, legal aid has always been a political area
that was not juridified. This has led to the fact that there are few, if any, particular
rights for individuals in the situation of judicial cooperation. For a long time,
individuals affected by judicial cooperation were merely considered the object of a
matter between sovereign states.  The idea of giving these persons subjective660
rights is in itself relatively new. If rights have been granted, then these have usually
been derived from rights granted in ordinary criminal proceedings, but to a lesser
extent (effet attenué). None of the rights discussed is, in its content, a decision of
how to bring procedural fairness to the conflicting interests in judicial cooperation.
The other reason for the lack of procedural rights in judicial cooperation is closely
connected with this. The perspective of judicial cooperation is still a national, rather
than a transnational one. This means that each state will only take on the
responsibility for its own actions and disregard the doings of the other state. To a
certain extent, this does make sense for a nation state from a legalistic standpoint,
because the rights in question have been designed to bind that sovereign only, and
usually in a national context. This is the reason why many states have carried this
notion extremely far. Even states that protect the right to life and have abolished the
death penalty did often not hesitate to extradite people to states where they would in
all probability be executed.  This view has long been challenged and finally661
undergone a gradual change, where a limited effect is granted to such rights. But it
 For an overview of this principle in international and domestic criminal law see Bassiouni,662
in: id. (ed.), Int. Criminal Law Vol. I, p. 73ss.
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is still the conceptual basis of rights in extradition procedures, even though it does
not do justice to the multi-layered legal system of the EU where the blind spot of
nation states could effectively be left behind.
In order to find out why this is not done, it is important to look at the sources that are
used in this context and to see how they are interpreted in a European framework.
The most important, but also the most amorphous, concept is that of the common
constitutional traditions of the Member States as expressed in Art. 6(3) TEU as
general principles of Union law. It can serve to introduce many of the Member States’
basic concepts of criminal procedure into the balancing. Among these are the
principle of legality (nulla poena sine lege),  the principle of ne bis in idem, the662
presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, the right to a court previously
established by law, the privilege against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur se ipsum
accusare), the right to life and liberty, and many more.
On a similar level (i.e. as general principles) are the many fundamental rights and
procedural safeguards of the ECHR. 
Both of these sources of rights are not specifically adapted to transnational
proceedings. While the national constitutional traditions are, by origin, national, the
ECHR is no less designed for national systems and contains only minimum
standards for these. How this limits the effective development of individuals’ rights
will be shown by discussing the most important cases in this area. I will then also
determine if and how an accession of the EU to the ECHR according to Art. 6(2) TEU
would change this. 
Another major source that, at least on the surface, seems to be less nationally
confined in outlook is the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU, cf. Art. 6(1) TEU.
The Charter does indeed set down many relevant rights, particularly judicial rights in
Art. 47 ss. It is however obvious that these reflect the ECHR and the constitutional
 For the complex relation between these see Esser, in: Sieber et al. (eds.), Europäisches663
Strafrecht, § 53 para. 19 ss.; Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, p. 100 s. 
 ECtHR of 7 July 1989, No. 14038/88.664
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tradition.  I will discuss how these could be interpreted in line with a European663
transnational dimension.
Finally, there are those few specific rights that are set down in acts of judicial
cooperation or in particular secondary legal acts.
Let us first look at how the existing framework of individuals’ rights is used in judicial
cooperation and how this use limits individuals’ rights by analysing the most
influential decisions of the ECtHR and the ECJ. All of these decisions are mainly
concerned with the question of when a state might be responsible for a breach of
fundamental rights that takes place in another state in cooperation proceedings.
None of these decisions deals with the question of whether these fundamental rights
should be given a cooperation-based content. The courts carefully try to outline the
scope and reach of these rights, but do not discuss whether their content must be
adapted and interpreted differently in judicial cooperation.
The Soering Decision  and related ECtHR decisions664
Söring is a German national who was accused of having killed his girlfriends’ parents
in Virginia in 1985. He was arrested in England in 1986 and then indicted, inter alia,
with capital murder in Virginia. On the 11th of August 1986 the US government
requested his extradition under the terms of the 1972 extradition treaty between the
UK and the US. The UK Home Secretary then ordered the competent court to issue
an arrest warrant for the extradition of Söring. Since the death penalty had been
abolished in the UK the treaty provided for the possibility to refuse extradition unless
satisfactory assurance was given as to its not being carried out (Art. IV). When the
British Embassy in Washington then (29th October 1986) sought an assurance that
the death penalty, if imposed, would not be carried out, or that such a
recommendation would be given, the competent attorney swore affidavits that he
would represent the UK’s wishes to the judge. However, later on the Virginia
authorities told the UK government that the very same attorney would not give any
 In the meantime, the competent German authorities had also sought his extradition for665
prosecution in Germany, to which Söring was willing to submit.
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further such assurances as he was planning to seek the death penalty for Söring in
court.
The UK authorities proceeded with the extradition and, after Söring had exhausted
national remedies, on 3 August 1988 the Secretary of State signed a warrant
ordering his surrender to the US. Pending the decision of the ECtHR, this warrant
was not carried out as an interim measure.665
The complaint that Söring lodged with the Commission was based on three grounds.
Firstly, he asserted that the assurances given by the US authorities concerning the
death penalty were not sufficient. There was, in fact, a substantial risk that the death
penalty would be carried out. This would make him subject to the death row
phenomenon which would constitute a breach of Art. 3 of the Convention (inhuman
or degrading treatment). Secondly, he maintained that his right to a fair trial (Art. 6)
was ignored due to the lack of proper legal aid in Virginia. He also claimed a violation
of Art. 6 through a specific aspect of the extradition procedure in the UK; this issue,
however, was not admitted by the Court for procedural reasons. Lastly, that the UK
provided no proper procedure to control the application of the convention since a
breach of the convention was no legal ground to stop extradition. This amounted to
a breach of Art. 13.  
Of these three points, only the breach of Art. 13 can be considered without further
justification. It is directly connected with  the administration of justice within the UK.
The UK, as a contracting party, is bound by the convention and responsible for any
violations. It is possible that a lack of legal remedies or reviewability of the breach of
the convention is contrary to Art. 13. However, to serve the purpose of the applicant
there would have to be an actual breach of the convention to be reviewed which can
only be based on a breach of Art. 3. 
This, however, presents intricate legal problems. It is mainly based on the situation
in the US, a third country to the convention. Inhuman and degrading treatment by US
authorities is, however, neither directly necessary nor sufficient to constitute a
 ECtHR of 30 October 1991 July 1991, no. 13163/87 et al. - Vilvarajah and others v. the666
United Kingdom, para. 108 and 112 makes it clear that concerning asylum seekers that, even
if ill-treatment occurs upon their return, the ex ante foreseeibility is decisive for the
responsibility; see also Smeulers, in: Vervaele (ed.), European Evidence W arrant, p. 87.
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violation of Art. 3 by the UK through an extradition. The extradition in itself could be
of such a nature as to violate human rights, for example through the conditions in
extradition arrest. On the other hand, if a person is unexpectedly subjected to
inhuman or degrading treatment in a third country, this is normally of no concern to
the extraditing state that is not accountable for such acts and did not commit them
itself.  Whether this attribution of responsibility can ever be different has been an666
ongoing issue in extradition law. If a complaint in extradition matters is based on the
situation in a third country, there are four questions to take into consideration. 
First, fundamental or human rights have to be applicable in extradition matters at all.
While the ECtHR has long taken this position concerning the Convention, national
courts have, with many different arguments, often taken an antagonistic position,
especially concerning their constitutional rights. This did not only concern the stage
after the surrender of the individual, but also the stages within the jurisdiction
following the extradition request.
Secondly, the situation in the third country has to amount to a violation of convention
rights. Here, it is also pertinent to discuss the degree of violation. Whether any
breach is enough or whether it is necessary to have a gross or an evident violation or
a violation of the most important rights is subject to discussion and closely connected
with the first question, namely, if fundamental rights apply as a whole and
completely, or only more remotely.
Thirdly, one needs to determine under what circumstances a contracting party can
be held accountable for this situation when extraditing an individual. The relevant
factor here is mainly the degree of forseeability.
Lastly, the relation between the second and the third question becomes relevant.
Does the necessary degree of forseeability change with the gravity of the impending
violation?
 In the alternative, it was argued that Art. 3 should only be applied when a breach was667
certain, imminent and serious. The UK did not see this criterion fulfilled in this particular case
since the delay of an execution and the resulting death row phenomenon would have been
caused by legal remedies used by the applicant. This was the only line of argumentation
brought forward before the Commission since the Commission had already declared its view
on the main line of argumentation in prior cases.
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The different answers given to these questions by the parties, the Commission and
the Court are indicative of the difficulties of finding a standard of fundamental rights
in extradition law. 
The UK exhibited a very classical, nationally confined understanding of human rights
in legal aid. It submitted primarily that a contracting state could not be in breach of its
obligations under the Convention through the actions of a third state since it was in
no way responsible for events within another state’s jurisdiction and that therefore
Art. 3 should not be applicable with regard to these events.667
The applicant on the other hand argued that the Convention imposed a duty on
extraditing states to protect individuals and thus make certain that they would not be
subject to inhuman or degrading treatment in third states.
The Commission and Germany tried to find a middle way by acknowledging that
states could be in breach of their own duties through third state actions contrary to
the Convention where there was serious reason to believe that an individual would
be subject to such treatment, though they drew different conclusions from this for the
actual case: The Commission did not see a breach of Art. 3.
The Court first stresses the fact that the Convention is indeed territorially confined. It
then argues that one state may be responsible for another state’s inhuman or
degrading treatment of an extradited person where there are substantial grounds for
a real risk of being exposed to such treatment. This argument is mainly based on the
underlying values and the spirit of Art. 3 and the Convention in general. As to this
particular case, it held that the death row phenomenon constituted inhuman and
degrading treatment and that, due to the non-binding assurances and the intention
of the attorney to seek the death penalty, there was a substantial risk for the
applicant. An extradition would therefore, in itself, amount to a breach of Art. 3.
 At para. 113.668
 Schabas, 25 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. (2002-2003), p. 590s., 595.669
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As to a violation of the right to a fair trial by the UK due to the lack of legal aid in
Virginia, the Court introduces the “flagrant denial” criterion without much reasoning.
This is supposed to limit a violation of Art. 6 by assisting another state to exceptional
cases, which was not held to be the case here.668
This ruling is most important for European criminal cooperation for many reasons.
While most states do now agree that extradition procedures are not exempt from
human rights in their own jurisdiction (so that they must have legal remedies and
proper detention conditions etc.) the next question is how to take these
considerations one step further. Before the Soering ruling many states still split the
extradition proceedings into two distinct parts, one in their own jurisdiction, for which
they are responsible, and one in a foreign jurisdiction, for which no responsibility is
taken on. The Soering decision is one of the few that leaves behind the purely
national sphere and tries to establish a certain responsibility for the entirety of the
proceedings. This corresponds with the position of the individual for whom a legal
split-up must appear artificial. Through this decision both the Soering ruling and the
ECHR have become a standard reference point in EU criminal cooperation.
However, while the ruling of the ECtHR is progressive for its particular case it is not
at all adapted to the EU setting.
The ruling of the ECtHR is progressive because it applies Convention rights in
extradition cases with third states, constitutes a certain responsibility of the
Convention state and, it must be said, tries to refute the death penalty without being
openly able to say so because of Art. 2(1) s. 2 of the Convention.  The problem is669
that Convention rights themselves, though, are only meant to set minimum standards
for national proceedings. They have no specific content for transnational cases.
Furthermore, the community of Convention states is not an entity that could in itself
have responsibility for criminal cooperation. The ECtHR tries to promote individuals’
rights despite these limiting factors. It broadens the national perspective without,
however, introducing a new level. Therefore, in its area, the decision is really
 ECtHR decision of 4 May 2010, no. 56588/07 - Stapleton v Ireland - declaring the670
inadmissability of the action.
 Cf. to this standard Fletcher/Lööf/Gilmore, EU criminal law, p. 126, who believe that the671
ECtHR does not want contracting parties to pass judgments on each others’ systems in the
guise of extradition decisions.
 ECJ, reference for a preliminary ruling, lodged on 27 July 2011, C-396/11 - Radu.672
 At para. 86.673
 At para. 86.674
 At para. 89.675
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progressive. What is progressive in that respect is, however, not necessarily
progressive or even suited to the EU criminal cooperation system. The ECtHR has
already shown in the Stapleton decision  that it will not alter its perspective in EU670
measures. According to this decision, the protection of fundamental rights does not
have to take place at the first possible occasion, i.e. in the executing state, but can
be left to the issuing state without a breach of Art. 6. Additionally, it affirms once
more that only a “flagrant” violation of this article by the issuing state would oblige the
executing state to protect the individual.  The Soering-threshold was not lessened671
and the application deemed inadmissable. Whether the ECJ has a different
understanding of the responsibilities of the executing and issuing Member States
might be decided in the pending Radu-case.672
The ECtHR is implying in the Soering decision that not all Convention rights, but only
the more fundamental rights can give rise to a duty of the extraditing state to protect
the individual. Namely, an extraditing state does not need to be satisfied that the
conditions for the extraditee are “in full accord with each of the safeguards of the
Convention”.  Additionally, it stresses that the “beneficial purpose of extradition” is673
a matter that needs to be taken into account not only in justifiying a violation, but
already in determining the scope of application of the Convention rights.  Even for674
the specific and substantial interpretation of the notions of inhuman and degrading
treatment in extradition cases, the Court wants to take account of the purpose of
extradition,  so that basically, what amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment675
in ordinary cases does not necessarily do so in extradition cases.
So as to the first systematic question we asked above on the applicability of human
rights in extradition, the ECtHR declares that Convention rights are applicable, but
 Judgment of 26 June 1992, No 12747/87; cf. also Smeulers, in: Vervaele (ed.), European676
Evidence W arrant, p. 94s.
 At para. 110.677
 Cf. para. 14 of the joint partly dissenting opinion of judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan in678
the case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, ECtHR of 4 February 2005, no 46827/99 et
al.: “not fully explained in the Court’s jurisprudence”.
 The factual side of the matter is a question of foreseeability and thus the “substantial679
grounds” criterion.
  Ibid.680
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answers the second question (situation in the third country) by a triple limitation: it
limits the applicable rights, it limits the notion and content of these rights, and it limits
the relevance to certain grave violations by the third state, depending on the specific
Convention right. It sets a relatively high threshold for the forseeability in answer to
the third question, but does not go into the fourth question systematic quesiton we
asked, namely, if lesser violations are sufficient for a breach when there is a greater
degree of certainty that they will occur.
The criterion of a “flagrant” violation for Article 6 was also upheld for other areas of
criminal cooperation, namely the enforcement of foreign penal sentences in Drozd
and Janousek v. France and Spain.  A relevant argument was once more not to676
“thwart the current trend towards strengthening international cooperation in the
administration of justice, a trend which is in principle in the interests of the persons
concerned”.  In his concurring opinion, judge Matscher regards this criterion as an677
expression of the international principle of granting rights only a “reduced effect” in
recognising foreign sentences.
The criterion of a “flagrant” violation in relation to article 6 has often been criticized.
Indeed, first of all it is rather vague.  It is unclear wheter it refers to a very grave678
violation, or whether it refers to cases of  - from a legal standpoint  - a very obvious679
violation. The dissenting judges in Mamatkulov v. Turkey acknowledged the
uncertainty and tried to define it as a breach “so fundamental as to amount to a
nullification, or destruction of the very essence, of the right guaranteed”,  thus680
setting a very high threshold that refers to the degree of violation. More importantly,
it is questionable why, when there are substantial grounds to expect a violation of
Convention rights in a third state, the minimum threshold of the Convention should
 Smeulers, in: Vervaele (ed.), European Evidence W arrant, p. 89.681
 Sari v. Turkey and Denmark, ECtHR of 8 November 2001, no. 21889/93.682
 Para. 66-68.683
 Para. 91, 96.684
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be lowered, particularly when a person is extradited to another Convention state.681
After all, this does not impose national standards on a foreign state. Rather, it limits
the cases in which assistance is given to that third state.
While the Soering case was concerned with the question of whether one state may
assist another state in what would be a violation of the Convention, the question
remains of whether the actions of two states viewed together can be a violation of the
Convention. If one state makes use of the acts of the other, one could attribute
responsibility to this state on the basis of derived responsibility. If two states
cooperate in a violation, one could also hold them jointly responsible.
These questions arose within a dispute on a hearing within a “reasonable time” as
required by Art. 6(1) ECHR in the Sari case. . A Turkish citizen was prosecuted for682
a homicide he had committed in Denmark. Investigations were being conducted in
both states. Between the first relevant prosecutorial act in Denmark and the final
sentence in Turkey, more than eight and a half years had passed. In Denmark itself,
the proceedings had lasted for over four years and in Turkey approximately eight
years and four months. The temporarily parallel proceedings had initially involved an
extradition request and a request o f transfer of proceedings with long-standing
negotiations between the two countries involved. Somewhat surprisingly, the Court
states withouth much reasoning that, for the “reasonable time” frame, the whole of
the proceedings in both states needs to be considered together.  It then tests683
whether the time-frame was reasonable by taking into account the behaviour of the
relevant authorities. Although it saw a lack in promptness during the legal assistance
stages that it ascribes to a joint responsibility of both states,  it did not find a684
violation of Art. 6(1) by either state. As a reason, it relies on the nature of mutual
legal assistance: “the delays that have occurred therefore have to be considered as
being part of a classic system that, unfortunately, takes time and thus has to pass as
inevitable, at least if one believes the facts presented by the parties” [translation by
 Para. 92.685
 Para. 93.686
 Para. 99.687
 Cf. also den Heijer, p. 29s. for an assessment against the background of the International688
Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally W rongful Acts.
 Smeulers, in: Vervaele (ed.), European Evidence W arrant, p. 94 goes even further and689
suggests that in transnational evidence-gathering, a state might be held liable for a delay even
if the delay is solely due the other state, as it is the result of the misplaced and unjustified trust
displayed by the first.
 Cf. also Keijzer, Extradition and Human Rights, p. 194: “If human rights are endangered,690
anywhere whithin the Union, no Member State can wash its hands in innocence.”
 Stojkovic v. France and Belgium , ECtHR of 27 October 2011 no. 25303/08.691
 It was out of time addorcing to Art. 35(1) and (4) ECHR; cf. the judgment at para. 38ss.692
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author].  Unlike the applicant, who had argued that both states had to be held685
equally responsible for the delay,  it was precisely this joint responsibility that held686
the court from attributing individual responsibility to either state. It concluded that, on
the whole (“globalement”), the states had acted diligently.  Because both states687
caused a delay in an interdependent way, no state was held responsible individually
on a basis of derived responsibilty for the actions of the other state, but they were
also not held jointly responsible.688
But in a system based on mutual recognition, such a nationally confined and
separating approach is no longer justified. In fact, if one state profits by a swift,
almost automatic system, it has to share in the liability for this and be responsible for
the actions of the other state, even if, taken alone, its actions would not have
amounted to a violation.  Shared benefits of cooperation require a sharing of the689
burden.690
The ECtHR tended to stay within a system where it attributed responsibility only to
one state at a time, but in the Stojkovic case  it showed that this view might change691
in the future. In this case, the applicant was interviewed by Belgian authorities as a
“legally assisted witness” upon a French request, as he was supsected of having
committed robberies in France. Even though French authorities and the applicant
requested a (French) lawyer to be present, this was not carried out by the Belgian
authorities. Thereby, Belgium might have been in breach of Art. 6(3)(c) ECHR
(access to a lawyer); however, the application against Belgium was inadmissible.692
 At para. 56s.693
 OJ C 197/1 of 12.07.2000.694
 At para. 55.695
 ECJ judgment of 3 May 2007, C-303/05 - Advocaten voor de Wereld; for an analysis of this696
decision see also Fichera, 15 ELJ (2009), p. 84ss; Braum, wistra 2007, p. 401.
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But, though France was not responsible for this interrogation that took place
according to Belgian law, it was held to have violated Art. 6 (1) taken togehter with 6
(3)(c) of the Convention for not having remedied this breach in Belgium by taking it
into account in the ensuing French proceedings and thus failing to provide the overall
fairness of a process required by Art. 6.  The Court even indicated that France693
might have been held responsible for the violation in the Belgian interrogation if this
had taken place under the regime of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union of 29 May
2000  as opposed to the 1959 Convention. According to Art. 4(1) of the 2000694
Convention, the interrogation would have had to be held in accordance with the
formalities and procedures indicated by the requesting Member State.  This issue695
will be particularly relevant in the future, as this rule is found in most new proposals,
for example in Art. 8(2) of the proposed Directive regarding the EIO and Art. 12 of the
Framework Decision on the EEW.
Despite these first attempts to take into account the special nature of transnational
cooperation, the ECHR still remains a Convention with minimum rights for a national
setting and cannot replace a debate about fundamental rights in judicial cooperation.
Because of this continuing nation state-based understanding, EU criminal justice is
unduly dominated and restricted by a purely national understanding of individuals’
rights. This fact will be illustrated by the famous 2007 ECJ case of Advocaten voor
de Wereld concerning the European Arrest Warrant.
The Advocaten voor de Wereld decision696
In 2004, Advocaten voor der Wereld sought an annulment of the Belgian law
implementing the framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant before the
Belgian Arbitragehof. The Arbitragehof made a reference for a preliminary ruling to
the ECJ in 2005 asking two questions, namely 1. whether a framework decision
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might have been chosen for the European Arrest Warrant according to Art. 34(2)(b)
and 2. whether Article 2(2) of the framework decision is „in so far as it sets aside
verification of the requirement of double criminality for the offences listed therein,
compatible with Article 6(2) of the [EU] Treaty […] and, more specifically, with the
principle of legality in criminal proceedings guaranteed by that provision and with the
principle of equality and non-discrimination“. It is the second question that is most
important in the area of individuals’ rights.
With regard to these rights, Advocaten voor de Wereld argued that the list containing
the 32 categories of offences for which no verification of dual criminality was needed
constituted a breach of the principle of legality. This list in Art. 2(2) of the framework
decision makes a surrender mandatory without the verification of dual criminality if
the acts fall within any of the listed categories. The main argument is that a person
affected by extradition cannot know with sufficient certainty whether one of his acts
will fall within these categories and whether he will therefore be threatened by
extradition. The listed categories are not defined and no specific offences, but, as
has often been said, criminological classifications. This would then infringe legality
and also lead to differing applications of the law by different Member States.
Furthermore, since dual criminality is still the standard for all other offences, this was
said to breach equality and non-discrimination because individuals were treated
differently in extradition law on the basis of the offence they had committed. 
Advocate General Colomer outlines that the rights mentioned were general principles
of community law following Art. 6(2) EU. He then states that the principle of equality
is not violated since the differentiation is based on objective criteria – thereby he
seems to mean general criteria – and that the distinction is reasonable since it serves
a legitimate goal. He also dismisses any inequality before the law. What is more
important for the question of transnational rights than these aspects are the
arguments in connection with the principle of legality or nullum crimen, nulla poena
sine lege. The main argument for a breach here was the fact that the list of offences
is too vague. Colomer outlines that this principle has two aspects to it. First, it means
that on the substantive side criminal offences have to be defined before their
commission. On another level, which he calls procedural, it means that the offences
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are determined by law. He explains that these requirements are however only
applicable to laws that directly impose punishments. Since the surrender of a person
is not in itself punitive, but just an assistance to a national criminal proceeding, he
concludes that the principle of legality is not applicable to the extradition procedure.
It is only required that the issuing state observes the principle of legality concerning
the offence in question in its own law. 
The Court too acknowledges the principle of legality as a general principle of
community law according to Art. 6(2) EU by referring to Member States’ constitutions,
the ECHR, the Charter and other international treaties. It does not see any breach of
this principle since the issuing Member State must, in its own law, respect the
principle of legality. The court even refers to Art. 1(3) of the framework decision that
obliges the issuing state to observe human rights. The question of equality is
answered similarly to the Advocate General, as a differentiation that is justified.
The line of argumentation of the Advocate General and particularly the ECJ
concerning the principle of legality is very revealing. Even though they may be right
in their outcome (i.e.: the abolishment of dual criminality does not infringe the
principle of legality) they have missed an opportunity to give procedural guarantees
in criminal law a transnational perspective. For both the Court and the Advocate
General take the principle of legality as it is found within national legal systems.
Therein, it means no more than that an offence must be defined by law prior to its
commission within that system, i.e. by the same sovereign. In extradition procedures,
the principle of legality is now interpreted in the same way. Since extradition rules do
not impose punishments, the principle of legality is as a whole deemed to be
inapplicable in connection to these. It is considered sufficient that each Member
State observes the principle of legality in the framework of its own national law. It
seems as though the fact that Member States are now cooperating in a juridified and
compulsory framework of extradition that is based on EU legislation and specific EU
interests could not make any difference in the interpretation of the content of the
principle of legality. 
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7.5 Conclusions
What, then, is the right direction for an EU policy of transnational fundamental rights
in judicial cooperation? 
The most important part is to acknowledge that fundamental rights are always an
integral part of judicial cooperation. Any piece of legislation in the area and any new
mechanism of cooperation causes new and specific conflicts for individual rights that
need to be adressed at the earliest possible stage. It is not in line with the principle
of subsidiarity to leave these issues unresolved, as it is often consciously done.
Solutions that Member States implement on their own lead to distortions and are
never as effective. Neither is it sufficient to leave questions of fundamental rights out
of specific legislation and refer to general bodies of rights. Important as these are for
guaranteeing certain minimum standards, they can never replace a debate about the
particular choices conerning human rights that are made when a specific legal act
with its particular functioning is adopted. Procedural rights are no abstract ideas, but
need to be reflected by the concrete dispositions of the law. If Member States and
the EU are willing to take on collective authorship in cooperation to achieve a
common goal, they must also be able to openly reveal their choice of what rights an
individual should and should not have in the specific context. 
At the moment, the development of common transnational fundamental rights is
somewhat limited because existing bodies of rights were all developed in a national
context that does not have to provide for a responsibility of one sovereign for the
actions of another sovereign. To me, the problem is not that an EU framework of
rights is based on national principles. But it is not adequate to simply require that this
principle be observed only by each Member State within its own jurisdiction. So, for
exampleIe in the Advocaten decision, it would have been necessary to look at the
function and the rationale of the principle of legality within a single jurisdiction, and
then try to give it a functionally equivalent interpretation on the European level. If one
does take this seriously, then it becomes quite clear that the framework decision on
the European Arrest Warrant does have problems with the principle of legality, even
though not because of the abolishment of the dual criminality requirement. The
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framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant does, as has been outlined
above, create a situation in which it is never clear which state’s assessment of a
certain behaviour will prevail, and which criminal law will be applied, while at the
same time it is clear that it will never be the assessment of a state that does not
punish the act. This is greatly due to the lack of a uniform allocation of jurisdiction.
Within a single jurisdiction, this situation would never be tolerated. But the problem
with the principle of legality is often not recognised because of a purely national
perspective. The challenge of seizing the chance and the responsibility of creating a
new dimension for procedural safeguards is not used because the blind spot of
nation states is taken on to a new level.
Apart from the principle of legality, there are several other rights that are very likely
to be affected by EU judicial cooperation. At the stage before trial, proceedings in
different states for the same act can impede an effective defence whereby the
defendant may forfeit his position. More importantly, the fact that it is not clear in
which state a certain case will be tried, that this is open to negotiations, leads to the
situation that neither the court nor the applicable criminal law in concreto are known
beforehand. At first sight, this can, independently of forum shopping, conflict with
many principles, among these are also the lawful court, ne bis in idem etc. From the
purist point of view of national law, however, none of these principles would be
violated, for these are held to be applicable only with regard to the same sovereign
and the exercise of the same ius puniendi. Thus, if a person is persecuted for the
same act in France and Germany, and via “consultation” or “cooperation” they agree
to leave the case to French jurisdiction, this causes a problem for neither state. Both
France and Germany will have set up the lawful court before, there is no
retrospective application of substantive criminal law, and, even if the nulla
poena-principle should apply to jurisdictional rules, it will not be violated because
both systems of norms declared themselves applicable before the act was
committed. The idea is that a state cannot normally violate its own laws by ignoring
the actions of another because there is no basis for an attribution.
This does make sense in a purely international law context since states will have to
deal with each other as equal sovereigns. Exceptions from this are only made in
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more extreme circumstances and at a slow pace. For example, even though an
international ne bis in idem is not accepted as such outside a treaty framework, most
states will at least not disregard a sentence served for the same offence in another
state and release the individual earlier.
On the European level, however, the situation is different. The EU can create a new
dimension of common action in judicial cooperation, but the counterpart of this must
be a new dimension of accountability. This means that the more the EU tries to
facilitate common action and judicial cooperation by stepping towards a unitary legal
sphere, the more it must counterbalance frictions for individuals that occur because
of this. Such a legal framework can first of all be created by analysing common
fundamental rights in national criminal law and procedure, as well as in classical legal
aid, and interpreting their content according to their function in a national legal
system. Additionally, specific problems arising through transnational procedures must
be addressed by specific safeguards for typical transnational situations.
In doing this, it is clear that Europe has a multi-layered legal system where
differences caused by different national laws must not be eliminated. But the degree
of protection must vary according to where the responsibility lies and where frictions
can be adequately resolved. So, for example, if an EU legislative act requires states
to punish a certain behaviour in the common interest, it is possible to leave it to the
Member States to observe the general principles of Union law in implementing this
provision into their national laws. There is no point that could not be adequately
addressed by the states themselves. If later there should be a breach of individuals’
rights in the law concerning this offence, the Member State will be responsible for
this breach.  If, however, the EU has a common interest in the prosecution of this
offence in all states, as for example in the framework decision on terrorism, and
therefore sets down jurisdiction for all states, then the resulting conflicts can only be
addressed on an EU level because the states do not initiate simultaneous
proceedings out of their sovereign right, but out of a common interest.
It is therefore important to address each question on the level where the
responsibility lies, by making use of classical fundamental rights in a functionalist
 Cf. Jacqué, 48 CMLRev. (2011), p. 1011ss.; Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, p.697
102s; O’Meara, 12 German Law Journal (2011), p. 1832.
 Some thoughts in this direction are offered by Greer and Williams, 15 ELJ (2009), p. 462,698
476ss., 480; see also Rijken, 47 CMLRev. (2010), p. 1488.
 Cf. the changes to Art. 59 ECHR introduced by the interpretation clause of Art. 1 lit. d and699
e of the Draft Accession Agreement CCDH(2011)009.
 Cf. also Meyer, EuR 2011, p. 192s.700
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interpretation and by creating particular transnational rights that are adapted to the
particular area of judicial cooperation. These rights should not be minimum
guarantees, but true legal standards. An accession to the ECHR would certainly help
with this approach as it would force the EU to guarantee the Convention rights not in
each national legal system, but throughout the EU as a whole, even though the rights
of the ECHR are not specific enough for this area and only contain minimum
standards. The accession is at present mainly discussed from an institutional and
procedural viewpoint, especially as to who would be the right defendant and what
court would have what jurisdiction.  It is, however, very interesting to see the697
possibilities an accession gives to transform fundamental rights into more than the
sum of the national protection of all Member States.  From the draft accession698
agreement of the Steering Comittee for Human Rights (CCDH) it is clear that for the
purpose of the Convention, within its competences, the EU will be treated as one
authority.  Hopefully, this will give new impetus to a debate on the creation of a true699
judicial “area” with transnational rights and values.700
215
Chapter  8 Concluding remarks
From what we have seen, it is obvious that the development of the area of European
Criminal Procedure is one of the most ambitious projects of European integration.
However, the direction in which it is heading is often unclear. This is partly the result
of a lack of visionary theoretical approaches to it, but it is just as much a conscious
political choice. While there is a general agreement to take judicial cooperation
further, it is often very difficult to reach agreement on far-reaching proposals. By
leaving a certain grey area, these measures can develop their own dynamic in
practice. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters is evolving between the traditions of
classical legal aid and the attempt to overcome these ties entirely in an Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice. This as well as the unclear responsibilities of
Member States and the EU have led to a legal hybrid that is continually changing its
shape.
The existing theoretical approaches to this field of study are often nationally
confined. In fact, when one follows the debate in different Member States, one could
almost believe them to be about different subject matters and different legal orders.
Similarly, the high technicality of legislation in judicial cooperation and its necessary
interlocking with domestic criminal and procedural laws have isolated this area
further from other sectors of the law.
Scholars with a background in domestic criminal law tend to focus on legalistic
aspects of judicial cooperation and often point at the deficits of it, especially in terms
of democracy, sovereignty and legitimacy on the one hand, and fundamental rights
on the other hand. This is why the dynamics of this area and of mutual recognition in
particular are often under attack. There is of course a great deal of justification for
this. But the criticism is mainly phrased in terms of a purely national understanding of
rights and a very state-based approach to democracy and legitimacy. This point of
view is, however, also a part of the problem. Without a more common approach to
the role of a European citizen in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, these
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problems cannot be overcome. While it is true, as we have seen, that individuals
often suffer from the combination of different legal orders in judicial cooperation,
these developments also offer great chances. At the current moment, states are still
free to extend their ius puniendi and their corresponding jurisdiction according to their
very own understanding of criminal justice. Individuals are thereby confronted with
randomness and unconnected value choices. If a true European criminal justice
system could evolve, transnational cases could be reconnected to the purpose of
criminal law and be subject to proceedings that are based on a common
understanding of substantive and procedural justice. The European Union can
effectively step beyond the blind spot of nation states and benefit individuals with a
system that is specifically adapted to these situations.
To this end, judicial cooperation should be embedded in a common criminal policy
instead of being distinct from it. Judicial cooperation and mutual recognition are
mostly concerned with procedural justice, but in the end they are also very closely
connected to substantive criminal law. They have partly the same objective because
they declare the substantive law applicable and render it effective. 
At the moment, the Union has a criminal policy that is very much confined. As we
have seen, it is mainly instrumentalist and uses criminal law to further other (political
and social) goals. Sometimes, it is almost crude, equating criminalisation of an act
and producing safety. For a future criminal policy, we would have to realise that
safety and freedom are interdependent and can both be furthered by a coherent
policy. For this, an open theoretical debate is necessary prior to establishing new
competences. The characteristics of a European judicial space should, as far as
possible, be a matter of conscious choice. We need to ask ourselves what kind of
criminal law we want for the European Union, what procedures of criminal law should
be dealt with by European bodies, and what should be left to the Member States.
Finally, for judicial cooperation, there needs to be a notion of the conditions under
which we want to enforce decisions Union-wide and accept them as the balanced
outcome of a proceeding that has observed those principles that are deemed
necessary for a common understanding of justice.
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